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Summary
Niels Bohr Intended his concept of complementarity
to be a general principle of knowledge, and several writers,
including Bohr himself, have suggested that it might be
applicable to various problems in Christian theology. The
purpose of this study is to examine the concept in detail
and evaluate these suggestions. Bohr's philosophy is dis¬
cussed, and the logic of his complementarity principle is
mapped, first in atomic physics, and then in other fields
of application. The views of Bohr's allies and critics are
carefully considered. Previous theological applications
are reviewed, and then a systematic attempt is made to
apply the principle to a number of Christian doctrines as.
these are expounded in the theological literature.
Questions of method are discussed throughout, and it is rec¬
ognized that this; is only one of many possible ways to
tackle such a complex issue. The study concludes with an
overall evaluation and suggestions for further research.
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The scope of the following study Is broad and, at
the same time, narrow. It is broad in the obvious sense
that it ranges over both science and theology; in fact, over
a variety of special sciences and a variety of topics in
Christian theology. Throughout, however, we are concerned
with a single, common theme: the problem of the relation¬
ship of the parts to the whole or the relationship between
different modes or levels of being, a problem which has long
been of concern to philosophers and theologians (cf. the 'one'
and the 'many') and has now risen, afresh in modern science
(especially in quantum physics and molecular biology). In
other words, we are attempting a comparative study in the
history of ideas, and the breadth of the investigation is made
possible by the strict limitation to a particular theme.
This does not mean that other issues will not arise.
We shall encounter a- great many, but only in the context of
the investigation at hand. Occasionally, tentative con¬
clusions can be drawn on such issues (e.g. the relational
character of attributes), but these conclusions can only be
functions of the particular; method being followed. If we
imagine the world of ideas as a raulti-dimensional space in
which the history of ideas takes place, then the present
study might be considered a 'trajectory' within thi's space.
Its purpose is to probe the relations of the ideas to each
other. The conclusions, then, are all of the type: "If this
is true, then that follows, provided certain other condit¬
ions are satisfied."
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It follows that our study is far from being defin¬
itive since a variety of other 'trajectories' could be
executed, some 'intersecting' the present one and others
'parallel' or even 'skew'. However, my hope is that it will
he definitive in the sense that this particular trajectory
will demonstrate that there are underlying issues common to
science and theology, including not only the principal theme
of modality bur also subsidiary ones such as the use of
models and metaphors. Moreover, it should demonstrate that
there are also other issues, such as the nature of history,
that are more prominent in theology than in the sciences.
In other words, the chosen trajectory serves to illustrate
the general relationship between science and theology and
provides an 'hypothesis' about this relationship which could
be corroborated by other trajectories or studies undertaker}.
In the same spirit.
Our investigation is limited not only by the partic¬
ular theme chosen but also by a particular starting-point
and a particular method. The basis of the investigation is
the 'principle of complementarity' first developed by Niels
Bohr to account for the relation of atomic particles to the
stable states of the atoms to which they belong. According¬
ly, the first half of our study is an attempt to establish
the precise content of 'complementarity' as Bohr himself
understood it. In particular, we shall look, at Bohr's phil¬
osophy as a whole and the role that complementarity played
within it (chapter l), the precise significance of complem¬
entarity (for Bohr) in quantum physics (chapter 2), its
application to other sciences (chapter 3)7 and, finally, the
uses and criticisms of the idea by other scientists and
philosophers (chapters *+ and 5). The principal results
will be: (a) an eleven-point definition of the complementar¬
ity relation itself, and (b) three further 'principles' which
are required to develop a hierarchy of complementarities in
the various sciences. This is the starting-point for our
study as a whole.
The method used for completing the 'trajectory' into
theology is roughly hypothetico-deductive. Granted that
problems involving modality occur in theology, and given com¬
plementarity as a particular model for handling similar
problems in science, there arises the possibility of testing
complementarity as a conceptual tool in the theological
field. Such a 'test1 would not be. a severe one, however,
since it is not claimed that all theological problems are
susceptible to complementarity, but only that some are.
Hence our 'hypothesis' would be verifiable but not strictly
falsifiable.* But the test could be tightened up, as: it
were, if some finite group of theological doctrines could be
identified and the claim were made that complementarity must
apply to all members of that group.
Accordingly, the application to theology takes place
in two stages. First, a preliminary survey is made of prev¬
ious suggestions.for applications of complementarity to
theology (chapter 6). Some of these must he discarded out-
of-hand, but others remain as 'candidates' for complementarity,
1. J.W.N.Watkins points out that statements of the form,
"there exists a...", are non-falsifiable, just as those of
the form, "for every...", are non-verifiable; see his "Con-
firmable and Influential Metaphysics", Mind 67? 1958> PP»
3^+ff.
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at least, as far as the preliminary survey is concerned.
Nov, it turns out that all of these 'candidates' share a
common element (their 'revelational' structure) and, more¬
over, that this element bears a prima facie resemblance to
one of the eleven features of complementarity (the 'pointing'
relationship). Therefore, we choose the complete group of
theological doctrines sharing this feature as the testing-
ground for our hypothesis. Fortunately there are no more
than six or seven doctrines in the group.
Once the testing-ground has been established, the
second stage of the application to theology begins (chapters
7 to 11). Here complementarity is used as a format for the
exposition of the various doctrines in two ways: (a) the
eleven-point definition of complementarity is used as a for¬
mat for the exposition of the individual doctrines, and (b)
the three principles pertaining to the hierarchy of comple¬
mentarities are used to investigate the relationship between
the doctrines. The result of (b) is an overall hierarchy
involving both science and theology, i.e. nature, man and
God. Of course, the hierarchy itself is not new, but the
novel feature here is that it is constructed systematically
with a minimum of basic postulates.
The reference here to 'verification' should not be
taken too seriously; it is intended as a guide to procedure,
not as a criterion for truthfulness. In principle, the
opposite direction of inquiry (the reverse 'trajectory')
could just as well have been followed; the doctrines of
Christian theology could have been taken as the starting-
point and the natural sciences as the testing-ground,
V
although this would have been far more difficult in practice
due to the less formalized nature of theology. The possible
value of complementarity should rather be judged on the
basic of its comprehensiveness as an integrating principle,
its relative precision of formulation, and its fruitfulness
in suggesting new insights, unforseen relationships, and
possibilities for new lines of research (chapter 12). Even
though it is only one of many possible trajectories in the
world of ideas, it will prove, I hope, to be a uniquely for¬
tunate one.
The procedure of using complementarity as a format
in theology is, of course, subject to all the dangers of
extrapolating and imposing categories from one field of study
2
onto another. Therefore, great care must be taken not to
force a fit but to allow the theological material to assume
its own characteristic form under the pressure of the imposed
format. This is a question of execution, however, not of
method, and each theological doctrine will .offer its own. pec¬
uliar form of 'resistance1 which will be a matter of great
interest in itself.
One result of this resistance is that the definitive
terms of complementarity will be semantically displaced as
they are applied to each new problem, and this must be
allowed if arbitrariness is to be mimimlzed. In fact, the
same holds true for the application of complementarity to
sciences other than atomic physics, hence the value* of study¬
ing Bohr's applications to fields like biology and psychology
before looking at the problems of theology. In other words,
2. See T.F.Torrance, Theological Science. London, 1969,
pp. 28^*f.
room for semantic displacement is built into the logic of
complementarity itself; it is not merely invented for the
sake of theology. The over-all result, then, is that
complementarity becomes a purely formal principle, a theme
which allows for variations, and it should not be identified
too closely with atomic physics. In fact, Bohr may have
derived, his basic insights from his thinking about biology
and psychology. The development and interpretation of
quantum mechanics merely provided the occasion, as it were,
for his formalizing the principle in fairly rigorous terms.
Nonetheless, the prestige of complementarity is in¬
evitably bound up with that of 'orthodox* quantum mechanics,
and it is no secret that the latter is being seriously ques¬
tioned today by a number of both physicists and philosophers.
Of course this situation is not at all new; the basic prin¬
ciples of quantum theory have been challenged from the start
even by many of the physicists who pioneered in its early
development. It is not that quantum mechanics has been ref¬
uted or falsified in any way. To the contrary, the mathem¬
atical formalism is both elegant and fully consistent, and
its predictions have been verified far beyond the experimental
range upon which it was based. The difficulty lies with the
interpretation of the formalism and particularly with the
Heisenberg 'uncertainty principle', Bohr's 'principle of
complementarity', and the problem of 'completeness' raised
by Einstein. In view of this controversy, we cannot possibly
regard complementarity as a sure result of the exact sciences,
now to be imported into theology in order to provide support
for orthodox Christianity. Our concern is primarily
vii
with the comparative history of ideas and the quest for
underlying issues, and it has considerable value in itself
independent of the popularity of the particular ideas stud¬
ied in either science or theology. However, to be honest,
I would not have taken such an interest in Bohr's .ideas if
I did not believe that they were viable at the very least.
Moreover, I could not sustain my thesis for long if I did
not try to present these ideas in their best light. In this
sense I must assume the role of an apologist for Bohr.
The results of the apologetic approach are worth
noting. For one thing, I find that Bohr's ideas fit tog¬
ether in a coherent way. I don't think this has been suff¬
iciently appreciated before. Although some extremely
valuable studies of Bohr's ideas have been done recently, I
don't, think that they have taken sufficient regard for the
integrity of Bohr's thought as a whole.^ They have invar¬
iably isolated one or two elements and treated the others as
being arbitrary. My own conclusion is that Bohr's ideas
stand or fall together; there is an overall logic to his
thinking, and it is in this context that complementarity
should be evaluated.
A second result is the conclusion that Bohr has been
largely misunderstood by his critics. There are two reasons
for thisi one is the subtlety of his ideas compounded with
the impenetrability of his prose style, and the other is the
confusion caused by his many followers and allies. I was
3. The recent study by E.Scheibe (The Logical Analysis of
Quantum Mechanics, Oxford, 1973* ch.l) comes closest to the
ideal, but it is confined, to Bohr's thoughts about atomic
physics and does not do justice to the principle of comple¬
mentarity itself.
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surprised to find that none of Bohr's supposed allies really
represented his thinking as a whole. The results have been
particularly damaging for our understanding of the principle
of complementarity. The literature contains a variety of
different versions, and critics have frequently mi staleen
these for Bohr's original intentions.
Finally, I have come to the conclusion that the
present difficulties in quantum theory are not caused by the
contributions made by Bohr; if anything, they are due to the
neglect of his insights. Bohr was basically an intuitive
thinker who stressed the physical principles of quantum
mechanics whereas the present conceptual difficulties stem
from a misplaced emphasis on the formal, mathematical side
(e.g. the 'collapse' of the 'state vector'). It might be
hoped, therefore, that a renewed interest in Bohr's work as
a whole would lead to a clarification at the foundations of
physics as well as theology.
1+. "Here it must be recalled that there is no single
formulation of quantum mechanics based entirely and con¬
sistently on the principles proposed by Bohr." E.Scheibe,
op.cit., pA.
Part I
The Logic of Complementarity in Science
Chapter 1
The Philosophy of Niels Bohr
The notion of complementarity...simply stresses
the character of objective description, inde¬
pendent of subjective judgement, in any field
of experience where unambiguous communication
essentially involves regard to the circumstances
in which evidence is obtained. N. Bohr,
Essays: 1958-1961. p.60.
Niels Bohr is one of the most quoted, yet least
understood, of the pioneers of modern physics. Various
interpretations of his thought will be considered in chapters
and 5 after we have thoroughly examined Bohr1 s philosophy
in its own right, but it would be wise first to consider the
man and his background in order to see why he is so freq¬
uently misunderstood and to establish some points; of method.
1.1 General Characteristics:
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Bohr's
writings: is their ponderous quality of terseness. We know
from his collaborators that Bohr continually str\iggled with
X
language to improve the formulation of his ideas.' The
result was a discontinuous series of aphorisms which appear
to be loaded with meaning and yet are often difficult to
2
interpret- from the context. A comparison of his- famous
essay "Light and Life" xfhich first appeared in 1933 with a
2
h
later revised version shows the attention Bohr paid to
minute detail. Yet one .finds the revised version, if any¬
thing, more enigmatic than the original.
This opaque prose style helps to account for the
variety of interpretations of Bohr1s philosophy. On the
other hand, the care with which Bohr expressed his ideas
suggests that a comparative study of his writings' might
enable one to decipher his aphoristic code. It Is surpris¬
ing that no systematic study of this kind has yet been
published. He wrote not more than thirty essays of
philosophical interest, and all of these have been published
in English. More than half of these essays have been
7
reprinted in three collective volumes and are readily avail¬
able. The problem was that while Bohr was alive he was
regarded as more of a symbol, to be blindly followed or else
senselessly maligned, than a serious thinker in his own right.
Like Einstein, he has been claimed as the champion of
everything from Kantian idealism to logical' positivism,
8
dialectical materialism and naive realism, and few people
have been willing to listen to the man himself to hear what
he was trying to say. Too often one finds writers expounding
the ideas of Bohr but quoting passages from Heisenberg or
9
von Weizsacker or Jordan. The procedure in this study,
therefore, will be to examine Bohr's writings thoroughly
before turning to those of his followers.
Another reason for the confusion about Bohr's ideas
is his dialectical style of writing. One might even call
his style dialogical since Bohr always hammered out his
ideas in conversation with his friends before committing them
to writing.He particularly valued the opinions of thos
who were critical and, above all, the continual battle of
] 1
"thought experiments?" with Albert Einstein. ' This con¬
tinual dialogue is reflected in the informal use of paradox
in Bohr's writings. When confronted with an apparent
contradiction in his thought, he never sought to harmonize
the conflicting elements but would always try to accentuate
the contrast as much as possible in the hope that a new
12
coherence would emerge. At times he seems overtly to
contradict himself, yet the extreme care he took with all
his published articles suggests that the paradox is inten-
ional and the contradiction is only apparent. Bohr's
critics often take advantage of the ambiguity, J but our
presupposition here will be that Bohr is at all times con¬
sistent with himself and that apparently contradictory
statements should be weighed together with proper consider¬
ation for the natural changes in emphasis over the years.
This method does, in fact, lead to a coherent picture of
Bohr's philosophy.
1.2 Philosophical Background:
We should look into the possible influences on
Bonr of the various philosophical trends that provided the
background for the development of twentieth-century physics.
The greatest influence on Bohr came through the discussion
15
groups in his father's home in Copenhagen. Christian
Bohr was a biologist with an intense interest in the
vitalist-mechanist debate concerning the nature of life.
Niels later developed this antinomy into one of his favorite
*1 f
examples of complementarity. The other members of the
group were a physicist, a philologist and a philosopher.
Hence the conversations to which Niels listened as a boy
underscored the ideals and difficulties of the search for
unity in human knowledge. The philosopher of the group,
Harald H^ffding, was a particular influence as it was from
him that Bohr received his only formal training in philos-
17
ophy when he attended the University of Copenhagen.
H^ffding was "an ardent student and brilliant expounder of
1R *
Kierkegaard1s teachings". He criticised traditional
speculative philosophy for its neglect of the role of the
knowing subject and emphasized the fact that man is a
participant as well as a spectator in life, a point frequently
echoed in Bohr's writings."^ Hence the importance of decision
and discontinuity in science. H^ffding also stressed the
limitations of knowledge in the face of .inexhaustible Being
20
and the symbolic nature of all language.
The direct influence of Kierkegaard was also very
21
strong. We know that Niels read Stages on Life's Way "
22
and recommended it highly to his brother. Kierkegaard
was one of the few writers whose influence Bohr readily
23
acknowledged. J In addition to the formal epistemological
points expounded by H^ffding, Kierkegaard's influence on
Bohr seems to have penetrated into his most basic attitudes
plf
like his avoidance of formal systems, ' his relentless
2d
struggle with problems of analysis, and his distrust of
purely aesthetic considerations.^ On the other hand,
Bohr also had a. keen sense of humor and he knew how to
relieve excessive tension by telling a stc-ry or engaging in
5
27
horseplay with his students.
The only other influence which Bohr readily
acknowledged was that of Poul Martin Miller's little book,
Adventures of a Danish Student.^ This was a. half-serious
account of an overly-introspective student who found
himself paralysed by the contradictions inherent in the
process- of formulating a thought. He discovered that each
time he tried to observe the process he was confronted with
a new process of observation which also needed to be
observed. The result was an infinite series of egos, each
observing the other, which is reminiscent of the problem of
infinite regress that has; plagued the quantum theory of
29
measurement. The moral of the story is that acting and
reflecting on an action are two different things and one
cannot do one while meeting the conditions of the other - a
clear preview of the concept of complementarity.
A strong case has been made for the possible
11
influence of William James on Bohr's thought. The
evidence for this influence is as follows: (l) von Weizsacker
reports that the only philosophers Bohr often quoted with
emphasis were Socrates and William James (quite a pair!).
The similarity is seen especially in the dynamic mode of
thought which resists, systematizaticn.^ (2.) Harald
Hjdffding was a great admirer of William James. The two men
met together in America in 1901+5 and H^ffding devoted the
concluding chapter of his Moderne Philosop.hisch.en (Danish
190^, German 1905)^ to James's work in psychology.^**
James, in turn, wrote a preface for the English translation
of Hg(ffding's Problems of Philosophy in 190
6
Undoubtedly, H^ffding recommended James's writings to all
his students, (including Bohr)» (3) Bohr concluded his
original paper on complementarity (1928with reference
to "a deep-going analogy to the general difficulty in the
formation of human ideas, inherent in the distinction between
07
subject and object. This difficulty is also one of the
principle themes of James's Principles of Psychology
(h) Again at the conclusion of his second paper on complem¬
entarity (1929)^y Bohr drew an analogy between "the apparent
contrast between the continuous' onward flow of associative
thinking and the preservation of the unity of the person¬
ality. According to Meyer-Abich and Jammer ^ this is a
direct allusion to James's chapter on "The Stream of
l|_2
Thought". (5) According to these same authors the very
term, "complementarity"1, was taken from James's theory of
hysterical anesthesia, according to which "in certain
persons, at least, the total possible consciousness may be
split into parts which coexist but mutually ignore each
other, and share the objects/of knowledge between them.
More remarkable still, they are complementary." ^ (6)
Finally, during a recorded interview on the day before his
death, Bohr recalled that he had read James's chapter on
"The Stream of Thought" and found it "really wonderful" and
"most clear". When queried as to the time of this reading
Bohr seemed vague at first but finally placed the event
IfU.
somewhere between 1909 and 1912. These little bits of
evidence have a certain cumulative force, but individually
they appear circumstantial and inconclusive. Bohr did a
good deal of thinking on his own about the problems of
7
introspection, as we have seen, under the influence of
Miller's essay. Therefore, most of the analogies cited
above can be explained without recourse to the hypothesis
of James's: direct influence. Further, we are explicitly
If
told by Bohr's closest associate, Leon Rosenfeld, that
Bohr was: unfamiliar with the ideas of James when they were
first brought to his attention in the early thirties
although he then recognized a certain affinity with his own.
Lf6
philosophy. In view of the fact that Bohr never
acknowledged the influence of James as clearly as he did
that of Kierkegaard and Miller it would be best not to
exaggerate its importance.
Finally, one should consider the direct influence
of Max Planck and Albert Einstein more carefully than has
been done previously. Usually they are represented as the
champions of opposing schools in modern physics, but a
closer look at their philosophies shows some striking para-
lells as we shall see. in chapter 5. Planck and Einstein
were the pioneers of the early quantum theory which Bohr
developed, and Bohr repeatedly cited their work as the basis
lf7
of his own. Moreover, he frequently made appeals for
Einstein's support for his ideas by drawing various parallels
between the principle of complementarity and the theory of
h8
relativity. These were often contrived, but they testify
to the high respect Bohr had for his senior. We have
already mentioned the influence of Einstein's many "thought
kg
experiments" on the development of Bohr's thinking, but
Einstein's influence appears to have been even deeper.
Bohr's emphasis on physical principles rather than
a
mathematical formalism may well have been inspired by the
50
example of Einstein's early work. Certainly Einstein's
personal tribute to Bohr suggests that he recognized a
51
strong affinity with his younger colleague;
What is so marvellously attractive about Bohr
as a scientific thinker is his rare blend of
boldness and caution; seldom has anyone
possessed such an intuitive grasp of hidden
things combined with a strong critical sense.
With all his knowledge of the details, his
eye is immovably fixed on the underlying
principle. He is undoubtedly one of the
greatest discoverers of our age in the
scientific field.
1.3 The Criteria of Objective Knowledge - The Possibilities
of Observation and Definition:
It seems almost impossible to arrange the different
5?
aspects of Bohr's philosophy in a systematic fashion.
There are only a half-dozen basic points, but they Inter¬
relate in a complex web rather than a linear progression,
hence the exposition here is of necessity somewhat artificial.
However, I have arranged the topics under three general.,
headings which correspond roughly to epistemological,
methodological, and ontologies! considerations. Although
Bohr's philosophical writings' extend over a thirty-five
year period (1928-1963) and show definite signs of develop¬
ment, the basic ideas are unchanged in that they are
clarified rather, than modified, so I shall attempt an
overall synthesis with only occasional references to the
chronological development. I shall also try to compare
some of Bohr's ideas with contemporary developments in
philosophy, science, and theology in order to locate them
in the wider scope of the history of modern thought.
9
Naturally, these comparisons should only he regarded as
means to clarification and not as ends in themselves. The
purpose cf this chapter is simply to introduce and interpret
Bohr's concept of complementarity within the context of his
overall philosophy. Only in this way will it be possible
to understand complementarity as he understood it and thus
avoid the (all too common) error of importing alien concepts:
which have no place in Bohr's philosophy as a whole.
Bohr's basic epistemology is quite simples all
scientific knowledge must be ob.i ective, and the criterion
for objectivity is unambiguous communicabllity. J Of course,
this knowledge may be either true or false, but it is true
or false independent of the individual judgement of the
tn.
knowing subject. In other words', there is no "subjective
reference" in valid knowledge, y and, in this sense, no
96
departure from our position as detached observers.
A word about the criterion of unambiguous communica-
bility which is the key to Bohr'a philosophy: today we might
compare it to the "intersubjectivity" or the "social
coefficient" of knowledge and regard it as a novel idea to
57
the philosophy of science, biit it has always played an
important role in philosophy and especially in theology when
new realms of experience and knowledge are being explored.
In religious thought, for instance, there is a natural ten¬
dency to mysticism and ecstasy that has continually to be
58
harnessed by the demands of community. In this regard
St. Paul recommended the gift of prophecy, which edifies:
others, over the gift of tongues, which is only of personal
value (I Corinthians 1*+). Contemporary with the development
10
of quantum mechanics there was a similar debate between
Karl Barth and Paul Tillich. Earth1s presupposition, like
Bohr's, was that true knowledge must be capable of unam-
99
biguous formulation an.d proclamation. Bohr's basic idea
was neither new nor untimely.
In harmony with the requirement of unambiguous
communicability, Bohr repeatedly stressed the importance of
the possibilities of unambiguous definition in contrast to
the possibilities of observation or measurement.^ In his
6l
original paper on complementarity he set aside
Heiserxberg's argument for the uncertainty principle, based
on the impossibility of measuring the position and momentum
of a particle simultaneously, in favor of an analysis of the
conditions necessary for the theoretical definition of the
62
concepts of position and momentum.. Using deBroglie's
idea of representing a particle by a wave-group Bohr showed
that the necessary conditions are mutually exclusive and
thus demonstrated the uncertainty principle without reference
to the process of measurement.^ Years later, Bohr debated
with Einstein over a similar point. The celebrated paper
of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen cited the prediction of the
measured value of a. physical quantity (position or momentum)
as a sufficient condition for the physical reality of that
6b
quantity. The authors then described a thought experiment
which could not be explained by Heisenberg's measurement
theory and concluded that quantum mechanics must necessarily
69
be incomplete. Bohr's response was to remind them that
the problem was not just one of the prediction and measure¬
ment of physical quantities, but one of their unambiguous
11
definition, and for this purpose it was always necessary
66
to specify the entire experimental arrangement. Thus
the issue which separated Bohr from, both Einstein and
Heisenberg was the fundamental point of epistemology, the
requirement of unambiguous oommunicability and definition.
l.H- The Role of Classical Concepts' - Correspondence
and Incommensurability:
The aim of all science, according to Bohr, :Ls the
exploration of new fields of experience in such a way that
the requirement of unambiguous communicability is always
satisfied, and this implies the use of a common conceptual
67
framework. Hence science embodies a dialectical tension:
/■O
it is only by experience that new laws of nature can be
recognized while the content of experience can only be
69
perceived and defined within a conceptual frame. The
existing framework xd.ll generally be too narrow to comprehend
the new experience and have to be suitably adapted or
70
widened, but it cannot be entirely abandoned since there
woxild then be no means of suitably defining a new framework
and objectivity (in Bohr's sense) could no longer be main¬
tained.^1
In terms of philosophical categories, Bohr is here
attempting a middle path between rationalism (the priority
of the conceptual framexrork.) and empiricism (the priority
7?
of sense experience). He does this, however, not by
1
means of compromise, but in a dialectical fashion, and the
result is often confusing. Taken singly, some of Bohr's
70
statements have led to charges of Kantianism, J on the one
12
7h
hand, and of positivism or crude empiricism, on the otherc
But his intention is made clear by his repeated appeal to
"the general lesson of philosophy regarding the necessity of
a. balance between analysis and synthesis," representing the
79
ideals of rationalism and empiricism, respectively.
For Bohr the common conceptual framework of science
consists of ordinary language and logic as derived from
practical, everyday life."'70 Ultimately we must fall back
77
on these tools if we are to be understood by one another.
In physics, of course, one uses a specialized refinement of
17O
these tools in the concepts of classical physics. When
one develops a new field of physics, such as. relativity or
quantum theory, one finds that classical concepts, like
wave, particle, and causality, are not completely adequate
and must be suitably adapted or generalized, yet they may
not be abandoned because they are necessary for the very
recognition of the new kinds of phenomena which call them
79
into question. Hence Bohr's famous "correspondence
principle" which guided the development of both quantum
80
mechanics- and quantum electro-dynamics: "however far the
phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical
explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed
8l
in classical terms.." In this sense Bohr regarded
quantum physics as the rational generalization of classical
physics and complementarity as the rational generalisation
8 2
of the classical concept of causality. And while he
did not regard either quantum physics or complementarity to
be final expressions of the laws of nature, he anticipated
that further development would he based on them as they had
13
8^
been based on classical concepts. ^
Some attempt should be made to relate the correspon¬
dence principle to its background in the history and
philosophy of science. The view of the history of science
implied by Bohr's: approach is directly opposed to the models
discussed today in the traditions of Karl Popper and Thomas
Kuhn. For Bohr, the three hundred years from Newton to
Maxwell, the period of "classical physics", is not just
another stage in the development of physics to be falsified
or overthrown by scientific revolution as was the Aristot-
85
elian framework before it. Classical physics is unique
because it is perfectly adapted to the world of ordinary
experience and cannot be improved as such. It is so con¬
sistent and beautiful that it is bound to remain the language
OS
of physicists for all time. Relativity and quantum
theory, then, do not supersede classical physics, as is
often supposed, but are rather based upon it as rational
generalizations suited to new, non-classical realms of
87
experience. And the verification, consistency and beauty
of these new theories is: such that future developments will
OO
be based upon them as further generalizations. Hence,
Bohr's model of the development of science is cumulative
89
and constructionist rathe* than cyclical or reductionist.
How doe's this compare with Einstein's view of
scientific development? For Einstein, not only classical
physics, but all of science is essentially "a refinement of
90
everyday thinking". One begins with the level of
"primary concepts" which are directly and intuitively
connected with everyday sense experience and proceeds to
invent higher and higher levels of concepts with ever
greater comprehensiveness, on the one hand, and logical
m
unity (simplicity) and abstract-liess, on the other.' This
"stratification of the scientific system" is comparable to
Bohr's model if one takes the system of primary concepts to
be ordinary language, the "secondary system" to be classical
physics, the "tertiary system" to be quantum physics, and so
on. But then several acute differences become apparent:
(1) For Bohr, the "primary system" of everyday thinking is
inseparable from sense experience since all experience is:
"theory-laden", whereas for Einstein the sense data are
given and even the concepts of everyday thinking such as
go"the real world" are postulated or intuited from them.
(2) For Bohr, as: for Einstein, the construction of the "sec¬
ondary system" of. classical physics is: a matter of the
refinement or specialization of everyday thinking, but the
construction of the tertiary and higher systems is a process
of "generalization" guided by the principle of correspond¬
ence whereas all these systems are "free mental creations"
for Einstein.^ (3) One would expect that Einstein's
hierarchy would be more loosely-knit than Bohr's, but just
the opposite is true. For Einstein, each level can be
logically derived from the next higher level and can be
reduced, upwards, whereas for Bohr the various levels do not
0 If.
entail each other and are incommensiirable in this sense.
Einstein's hierarchy is hypothetico-deductive and mono¬
lithic, whereas Bohr's hierarchy is correspondence-
constructive and pluralistic. (*+) Finally, Einstein's
projected hierarchy is finite and convergent in the sense
that he believed that higher levels' would attain, greater
logical unity and simplicity as they increased in comprehen¬
siveness until finally a minimal set of universal elementary
laws would be reached from which all natural phenomena,
gtr
including life, could be derived by pure deduction. ^ In
96
contrast, Bohr's hierarchy is divergent and open-ended.
Quantum physics:- is a rational generalisation of classical
physics, but it does not achieve a. greater logical unity.
To the contrary, the appearance of complementarity at this
97
level achieves a greater degree of multiplicity, and
higher levels will undoubtedly move further in this direct™
98
ion. This divergence could go on indefinitely for "we
must continually count on the appearance of new facts, the
inclusion of which within the compass of our earlier
experience may require a revision of our fundamental con-
99
cepts." Furthermore, Bohr's hierarchy of correspondence
is limited to physics- (and chemistry) and does not include
biology or the other sciences. In order to map out all of
science a variety of hierarchies would be. necessary, adding
still further to the multiplicity and divergence."1"00
This comparison points up the great difference that
existed between the visions of the two chief architects, of
modern physics. This difference was not simply a matter of
taste, however; the two men actually saw the world differ¬
ently. Einstein worked towards a unified field theory
because he believed that nature was ultimately simple and
economical."'"0^ Bohr worked towards a loose confederation
of theories because he believed that nature was irreducibly
complex and inexhaustible.102
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Having examined the implications of the correspond¬
ence principle for the historical development of science, we
turn now to its implications for scientific method,
ICR
Feyerabend - has compared Bohr!s principle in physics to
Hankel' s principle of the permanence of calculating rifles in
lOt-
mathematics. According to Hankel, the construction of
a new mathematical system (e.g. the system of integers) as
the generalization of an existing system (the system of
natural numbers) should be done in such a. way that as many
* 3 0 o
rules of calculation are preserved as possible. " 7 This
principle guides the process of generalization without
I A/f
completely determining it. Clearly, this is a very close
parallel to Bohr's principle of correspondence, and one
wonders whether there may have been a connection. While
Bohr was; not well-versed in number theory, himself, his
brother, Harald, was a prominent mathematician and may well
have brought this parallel to his attention. However,
there is no direct evidence of this. On the other hand,
the parallel breaks down in that in number theory the more
general system always includes the less general one as a
special case (e.g. natural numbers are positive integers),
whereas in Bohr's; model they are incommensurable.
A more suitable parallel could be drawn between
the principle of' correspondence and the logic of models .and
1Q7
metaphors'." The scientist, the theologian, and the poet-
all use language analogically when exploring and describing
3 0 3
new dimensions of reality. ' A concept from everyday
discourse is selected and applied to some new realm of
discourse. This translation allows others to apprehend the
17
new reality (hence the "disclosure model") and gradually to
understand it. In the process the original concept is
remolded and adapted to the structure of the new reality and
109
its meaning is transformed. Of course, it may turn out
that the concept selected does not "fit" the new realm as
well as some other in which ease it may be discarded.
The way in which classical, physics employs analog¬
ical language has been thoroughly studied? such concepts as
force, mass, energy, space, wave and particle are known to
be adapted from everyday discourse.'1''1'0 Bohr referred to
this as a process of the refinement of everyday language.11'"1"
Then his insistence on the use of classical concepts in
non-classical fields is another instance of the analogical
312
use of language, though in this case Bohr referred to it
as a "generalization" rather than a refinement or special¬
ization.11^ Therefore, the logic of correspondence may be
regarded as „g special case of the logic of analogy.
This parallel is particularly helpful in view of
the current debate over the dispensability or redundancy of
analogies in science. The formalist or axiomatic school
maintains that analogies may be heuristically helpful in the
process: of scientific discovery, but once a new theory has
been found it should be completely formalized or sod omatized
so that no "soft" heuristic or intuitive elements remain.
The original theory is thereby completely reduced to the new
one and the analogical connections can be discarded like the
Ilk
scaffolding of a new building. In contrast, the mod-N
el list or intuitionist school maintains that no- matter how
much a new theory is axiomatized or how well formal asympt¬
otic agreement with the old theory is achieved , the two are
18
conceptually incommensurable and the analogical connections
J15'
will always be essential for their proper interrelation.
On each point of tills controversy Bohr would have to be
classed as a modellist or intuitionist. Many of his critics
116
disagree with him at this point *
The dialectical interplay of correspondence and
incommensurability has a further parallel in the work of the
theologian*11'' From Hilary of Poitiers to Karl Barth,
theologians have defended the use of analogies drawn from
human experience in the apprehension of divine majesty while
at the same time recognizing that God far transcends the
313
limits of human concepts.' The problem is even more
acute in theology than in science because God is believed to
be infinitely transcendent and ineffable. On the other
hand, God is also capable of actively revealing himself to
man in analogical terms, whereas the hidden realities probed
by science are generally passive and subject to man's
initiative.. So the parallel between science and theology
is complicated by the reversal of roles (between subject
and object) due to the fact that man is the middle term in
the hierarchy, nature-man-God. Atoms; cannot reveal them¬
selves in the way God reveals himself. So even though, all
scientific thinking is based on analogy and correspondence
we cannot say how or why these devices; work and must ult¬
imately appeal to some "pre-established harmony" or "miracle
119 j
of comprehensibility" as Einstein did. In theological




1.5 The Subject-Object Relation and Complementarity:
In this section I hope to show how the requirements
of unambiguous communicability and of classical language
lead to the principle of complementarity. The argument is
informal and follows Bohr's- analysis of the subject-object
relation. Polanyi's "from-at" relation will be cited for
comparison.
From our discussion of the correspondence principle
we know that a sharp distinction must be made between the
(incommensurable) classical and quantum levels of reality,
and hence between the measuring apparatus (the observing
"subject") and the atomic object under observation.
These two levels are not related mechanically, as they were
thought to be in classical physics, but indivisibly as form,
122
and content. During an observation the measuring
instrument constitutes the environment of the atomic object
and so defines the very (boundary) conditions for its exist¬
ence, its behaviour, and its properties. ^ Hence, a
well-defined "observation" includes specification of the
total environment of the object, and in this sense it is; not
permissible to discuss; an object "in itself", outside of
12k
the conditions of observation. The object certainly
exists while it is not being observed (e.g. radiation in
125
free space), but its; properties; and behaviour are never
independent of its macroscopic environment (free space).
Hence to discuss; the object meaningfully one must specify
its- environment, but this is precisely what we mean by
"performing an observation". The issue here is actually
one of definition (of the conditions under which the object
20
exists) rather than observation in the (classical) taechan-
-i p/*
ical sense. " " The unknowabillty of the object as it is.
"in itself" is not due to the disturbance caused by the act
of observation but to its dependence on the conditions of
1P7
observation for its very existence. ' The "thing-in -
itself", with its inherent attributes, is not unknowable
as if it were hidden; it is an idealization or abstraction
1 pO
that does not really exist. In short, the existence
] 29
and attributes of an object are relational, not absolute.
Part of the confusion caused by Bohr's line of
argument is due to his unusual use of the terms "observation"
and "measurement" as the specification of experimental
conditions5 which he also refers to as: "definition"."^0
His treatment of the measuring apparatus or experimental
conditions as "subject" is also unusual. The closest
parallel is Polanyi's concept of' "indwelling": man indwells
the measuring apparatus when he uses it to define the con-
111
ditions of observation and so makes; it "subject". J
Further confusion is caused by Bohr's dialectic of "sharp
distinction" and "indivisibility". On one hand, Bohr will
say that a. sharp distinction is necessary between the
observing subject, which exists; on the classical level and
must be described using the laws of classical physics;, and
the observed object, which, exists on the quantum-mechanical
level and is subject to quantum conditions like the
112
uncertainty principle. * On the other hand, he will
insist that no sharp distinction, is possible since; one is
necessary for the definition of the other, and the two are
111
inseparable or indivisible. Hence his numerous
references to the "indivisibility11"^ 1 or "individuality ""^2
or "wholeness" "•* or "completion"* of atomic phenomena.
10g
which arej in this sense, "closed". J The paradox is
troublesome but necessary as in any discussion of form and
content? the two are inseparable yet utterly distinct.
Now the principle of complementarity can be
approached from either side of this paradox, granted the
requirement of unambiguous communicability. Since atomic
object and experimental arrangement are inseparable one
cannot abstract sin object-in-itself and must always specify
the experimental conditions in order to describe the object
] ^9
unambiguously J and satisfy the criterion for objective
llfO
knowledge. However, different types, of experimental
conditions are mutually exclusive even in classical physics.
1*4-1
There are kinematical variables like position and
time, which require stationary measuring instruments for
their definition, and dynamical variables like momentum and
1*4-2
energy, which require freely-movable instruments;.
Since these experimental conditions are mutually exclusive,
so are the kinematical and dynamical properties of the
1*4-0
atomic object which they define. J Hence the atomic
object exists in one of two modes which are "complementary"
to each othert a particle-mode in which the kinematical
variables are defined Ci!§pace-time coordination") and a
wave-mode in which the dynamical variables are defined ("the
1*4-*+
claim of causality"). In this sense, an atomic'object,
is either a wave or a particle depending on its situation.
On the other hand, since object and experimental
arrangement must be sharply distinguished, one must clearly
specify the location of the boundary between them in order
1 her
to ensure unambiguous description. ' Bohr stressed that
the location of the boundary is often a matter of choice on
the part of the observer but i-J- has a definite location in
i Ifg
each experiment and cannot be shifted arbitrarily,.' A
change in the location of the boundary means- a different
1V7
experiment. With regard; to a measuring instrument,
for instance, the boundary may be drawn on either side, and
hence the instrument may belong to either of two ontologieal
1^-8
levels. If the instrument is used as. a tool to observe
an atomic object, the boundary is drawn between the instru¬
ment (A) and the object (BO and the instrument is indwelt





However, if the behaviour or structure of the instrument is
analyzed, perhaps to determine the effect it has on the
atomic object, it no longer functions as a tool and the






Clearly, these two cases are mutually exclusive, hence the
measuring instrument exists in one of two "complementary"
modes, - either as. a (classical) tool or as a (quantum -
mechanical)object of investigation.
The use of a measuring instrument or tool
23
illustrates the most general form of complersentarity, that
between the analysis of A and the immediate application, of
A, or between A--analyzed and A-applied* Here "A" may
152 153 3 5V
represent a tool.,, a concept, ' an emotion, - free-will,
3 55 156
life, or the stability of an atom. In each case,
the ontologies! status; of A (i.e. its; mode of existence)
"L5n
depends; on whether it is analyzed or applied."
Take, for instance, the peculiar '"supra-mechanical"
stability of the atom, which was the puzzle that first led
to the development of quantum physics and the principle of
158
complementarity. This stability requires the precise
definition of energy and momentum by means, of the classical
conservation laws; and is incompatible with any detailed
observation of the atom's constituent particles: in space and
time. Any attempt to analyze this stability or the con¬
servation laws, themselves, in terms of space-time pictures
will result in a group of free particles rather than a
159
stable atom. Hence the atom exists in one of two modes,
a stable wave-mode, in which momentum and energy states of
the atom are well-defined and the "claim of causality" is
satisfied, and an unstable particle-mode, in which the space-
time location of the particles is observed."^0 In this *
sense, Bohr referred to space-time coordination and the
claim of causality as "complementary but exclusive features
of the description, symbolising the idealisation of obser-
163
vation and definition respectively." In general, he
regarded the complementarity between analysis and application
as a confirmation of "the old truth that we ace both on-
"i /! n
lookers and actors in the great drama of existence."'
<£'r
The use of a measuring instrument also illustrates,
the general connection between, the principles of corresnon-
-j ^
dence and complementarity, '°' Correspondence is the
relationship across the subject-object boundary, between
the classical laws and concepts that apply to the measuring
instrument and the non-classical features of the observed
object."*'^ In Polanyi's terminology, it is the "from-at"
relation between the "proximal term" which man indwells and
16 S'
the "distal term" to which he attends. ' Complementarity,
on the other hand, is the relationship between the measuring
instrument used as a classical tool for the investigation
of a non-classical object and the same measuring instrument
as a non-classical object of investigation in its own right.
In Polanyi's scheme, it is the relationship between the
instrument as "tacitly known"' (applied) and as "specifiably
1 66
known" (analyzed). The logical connection is that the
correspondence principle requires a. sharp distinction between
the ontologica! levels of the subject and the object, and
proper attention to the placing of this boundary leads to
the principle of complementarity. Alternatively, the corr¬
espondence principle implies the indivisibility of measuring
apparatus and atomic object, and proper attention to the
experimental arrangement leads again to the principle of
complementarity.
The example of atomic stability brings out 'an
important feature of Bohr's subject-object (correspondence)
and analysis-application (complementarity) relations which
is not present in the case of human artifacts (.instruments
and concepts)j they do not depend on the presence or even
25
on the existence of a human, subject. We know that atoms
were stable long before man ever existed even though it is
only as human subjects that we can. speak of the laws of
conservation and the demand of causality. Hence, Bohr's
position is essentially realist; the structure of human
knowledge (epistemology) has been adapted to the structure
of reality (ontology) rather than the other way around.,:
The principles of correspondence and complementarity are
developed from an anthropocentric perspective, as; they must
be, but they are believed to reflect actual relations of
being independent of and prior to man's knowledge of them.
In this regard, Bohr's position must be clearly distinguished
from that of Michael Pclanyi.
Polanyi's "from-at" conception was cited above as
a parallel to Bohr's subject-object relation. There are
several important differences, however. For Polanyi, the
shift from specifiable knowledge of A to tacit knowledge of
A is really a change in the appearance of A due to the
change in our awareness of A as we shift the focus of our
-i go
attention from A to ' For Bohr, on the other hand,
the shift from specifiable to tacit knowledge of A reflects
a change in the actual conditions under which A exists.
The shift is ontological as well as epistemological for Bohr
whereas it is basically epistemological for Polanyi.
To illustrate this difference we may compare Bohr's
and Polanyi's treatment of the use of a stick as a probe in
a dark room. Both men agree that the subject may be aware
of the feeling of the stick in his hand or else of the
contact between the stick and the objects in the room, but
not both at the same time. Polanyi explains this as a
shift of awareness from one end of the stick to the other
•{69
due to an interpretive effort on the part of the subject.
But Bohr sees it as a change in the actual handling of the
stick itselfs when it is held loosely it appears as an
object in the hand, but when it is held farmly it functions
as a probe and the sense of touch is automatically trans-
170
ferred to the other end. '
This basic difference leads to several others which
we can only note briefly. Both Bohr and Polanyi apply their
ideas to the relationship between ontological levels like
those of physics and biology or those of body and mind.
Bohr treats the relationship as one of complementarity
171
between alternative modes of a single reality, but
Polanyi treats it as one between the proximal and distal
terms of the knowing relation (Bohr's correspondence
relation). ^ Hence, for Polanyi, it is not the higher
level itself, but only our knowledge of it, that is unspec-
17^i
ifiable in terms of its lower level particulars. ' Both
exist simultaneously, but only one can be-specifiably known
at a time. But for Bohr the two levels' or modes' are
mutually exclusive in reality as well as in thought, hence
it is not just our knowledge of the higher level, but the
level itself, that is unspecifiable in terms of its lower
17lf
level particulars.
Finally, we may note that the use of "boundary
conditions" by Bohr and Polanyi is entirely different.1^
In both cases the boundary conditions relate the proximal
and distal terms of the knowing relation. However, for
2?
Polanyi, the distal term is always the higher oncological
level, hence it imposes the boundary conditions on the
lower level proximal term which is not complete in itself.
For Bohr, on the other hand, the proximal term is always
the experimental environment of the distal term, hence it
defines the (boundary) conditions for the existence of the
177
distal term," There are no boundarjr conditions between
tvo complementary modes or levels, and both higher and lower
1 7$
levels are complete in themselves.
Having studied the philosophical background of the
principle of complementarity, our purpose in the next
chapter will be to examine in detail the structure of the
complementarity relationship itself.
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Essays, pp. 1-7)*
53• "Every scientist, however, is constantly confronted with
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iwr Many of Bohr's critics have entirely missed this
point and accused Bohr of! basing his case on the limits
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Wartofsky, eds., Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Science. Vol. 5, Dordrecht, 19&9, p.2*+7.
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36
indispensable for a conscious recording of sense imp¬
ressions ." APHK, p.21. cf. "The Quantum Postulate., etc.",
p. 560 = ATMs p. 5H-. Hence "the subjective character of
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I", pp.80-8l); see below, ch.5»8.
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97. Whereas general relativity relates space-time geometry
directly to the energy-momentum tensor, quantum theory
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definition of energy and momentum; cf. A.Einstein, The
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99. ATM, p.97.
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106, Ibid, pp.27,L'7-L8.
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in Theology. Volume One,. London, 1970, pp.217fT. This
is really correspondence (and incommensurability).
The problem of equivocity is resolved when the dipolar
nature of the analogue is kept in mind.
110. Sometimes via metaphysics; see E.A.Burtt, The Meta¬
physical Foundations of Modern Science, New. York, 1952;
M.Hesse. Forces and Fields, London, 19ol; and M.Jammer,
articles on "Ehergy", "Force", and "Mass" in The New
Catholic Encyclopedia. New York, 1966. Concepts of
Force, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, Concepts of Mass,
Cambridge, Mass., 1961, and Concepts of Space. Cambridge,
Mass., 19o9.
111. See above, esp. fn.?8.
112. The correspondence principle requires; description "by
means of different analogies taken from our usual
ideas." APHK, p..27. Note; since these are taken from
classical physics they are really second or third order
analogies.
113. See above, fn.82.
Ilk. e.g. P.Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory,
Princeton, 195k, Part 1, ch."k; N.R.Campbell, Physics,
The Elements, Cambridge, 1920, ch.6; E.Nagel, The
Structure of Science, pp.90-116; R.B.Braithwaite,
Scientific Explanation, Cambridge, 1953> ch.k, and
"Models in the Empirical Sciences", in E.Nagel et al.,
eds., Logic, Methodology and. Philosophy of Science,
Stanford, 1962, pp.22k-231; C.G.Hempel, Aspects of
Scientific Explanation, New York, 1965, pp»^33~9V/>
M.Bunge, fntuition ana Science, Englewood Cliffs, 1962,
p.107, and "Analogy in Quantum Theory; From Insight to
Nonsense", B.J.P.S. 18, 1967, esp. pp.280-282 from
which the following quote is taken: "If we want to
build or learn new theories then we are likely to use
analogy as a bridge between the known and the unknown.
ll
But as soon as the new theory is on hand it should be
subjected to a critical examination with a view to
dismounting its heuristic scaffolding and reconstruc¬
ting the system in a literal way - this being one of
the uses of axiomatisation.. .To suggest that, scien¬
tific explanation is metaphorical is to mistake
scientific theories for biblical parables or to
subscribe to instrumentalism."
115• e.go S.Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science, London, 1953?
ch.2.1; M.Hesse, "Models in Physics", B.J.P.S. 1, 1953?
pp.198-211, Forces and Fields-. pp.13-28, and Models and
Analogies in. Science. London, 1966; H.. Freud,enthai, ed.,
The Concept and the Role of the Model in Mathematics;
and Natural and Social Sciences, Dordrecht, 1961; M.
Black, op. cit., ch.13? P.Achinstein, "Models, .Analog¬
ies, and Theories", Phil.Scl. 31? 1961, pp.328-350?
"Theoretical Models", B.J.P.S. 16, 1965? pp.102-120,
and Concepts of Science, Baltimore, 1968, chs.7-8;
M.Spector, "Models and Theories", B.J.P.S. 16, 1965?
pp.121-1^2; J.W.Swanson, "Oh Models", B.J.P.S. 17,
1966, pp.297-3H; E.McMullin, "What Do Physical Models
Tell Us?", in B.van Rootselaar and .T.F.Stall, eds.,
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam,
1968, pp.385-396; H.Byerly, "Model-Structures and
Model-Objects", B.J.P.S. 20, 1969, pp.l35-lll; an.d J.C.
Carloyc, "An Interpretation of Scientific Models Invol¬
ving Analogies", Phil.Sci. 38, 1971? pp.562-569•
There is considerable difference in detail among uhese
authors, but they share the fundamental conviction that
models and analogies are essential and irreducible in
scientific method. On the irreducible role of metaphor
in both science and literature see e.g. M.Black,
"Metaphor", Proc.Arist.Soc. 55? 1951? pp.273-295 (re¬
printed in op.cit., ch.3); M.C.Beardsley, Aesthetics.
New York, 1958", pp.l3l-lH, I32-137; P.Henle, "Meta¬
phor", in P.Henle, ed., Language. Thought,and Culture,
Ann Arbor, 1958, pp.173-195? D.Bergren, "The Use and
Abuse of Metaphor", Review of Metaphysics 16., 1962-63?
pp. 237-258,150-172; D.Schon, The Pisplacement of Con¬
cepts , London, 1963; W.P.Alston, Philosophy of' Language,
Englewood Cliffs, 1961, pp.96-106; M.Hesse, "The
Explanatory Function of Metaphor", in Y.Bar-Hillel,
ed., op.cit.. pp.219-259 (reprinted in Models and
Analogies in Science, pp. 157-177? end E.R.MacCormac,
"Meaning Variance and Metaphor", B.J.P.S. 22, 1971?
pp.115-159.
116. e.g. K.Popper and M.Bunge; see below, ch.5«7»
117. On. the use of models in theology see D.Emmet, The, Nature
of Metaphysical Thinking, London, 3.9l5? chs. 1-5? I.T•
Ramsey, Religious Language, New York, 1963? ch.2,
Models and Mystery, and Christian Pis course, London,
1965? F.Ferre, Language, Logic and God, New York, 1969?
and "Mapping the Logic of Models in Science and Theol¬
ogy"? The Christian Scholar 16, 1963? pp.9-39 (reprinted
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in D.High, ed., New Essays on Religions Language,
New York, 1969-, pp. 5I+~9o); A.A. Glenn, "Criteria for
Theological Models", Scot.JVTh. 25, 1972, pp.296~300;
and R.P.Scharlemann, "Theological Models and Their
Construction", J.Rel, 53? 1973? pp.65-82.
118. Hilary, On the Trinity, Oxford, .189^, 1.19, IV.2, VI.9,
VII.30, VIII.16: K.Earth, Church Dogmatics. II.I, ch.
27, pp. 22.7"*228,236, and ch.29,
119« Ideas and On.In.ions, pp.226,292.
120. cf. T.F.Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, London,
1965, pp.30,56,93-WT?-57.
121. "The main point here is the distinction between the
o'b.1 ects under investigation and the measuring instru¬
ment s which serve to define, in classical terms', the
conditions' under which the phenomena appear." APHK,
p. 505 cf. p.91? and Essays., pp. 3"*+, 78.
122. "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description, etc.", p.700,
APHK, pp.63~6lf,72-7^,90,98-99. The importance of
Bohr's denial of a mechanical connection has been rec¬
ognized by J.Bub ("The Danerl-Loinger-Prosperi Quantum
Theory of Measurement", Nuo.Cim., Series- 10, 57B, 1968,
p.507, "Hidden Variables and the Copenhagen Interpret¬
ation - A Reconciliation", B»J.P.S_. 19, 1968, p.190)
and D.Bohrn ("On Bohr's Views: Concerning the Quantum
Theory", pp.33,37«38); see also D.Faggiani, "Fisica
Quantistiea e Tradizione Filosofica", Scientia 106,
1971, pp.993™1003. On the relation between form and
content see fn.70 above.
123. "In quantum physics, we can in fact no longer uphold
customary ideas of properties and behaviour of the ob¬
jects under investigation as separate from the inter¬
action between such objects and the measuring instru¬
ments, indispensable for the definition of the circum¬
stances under which the phenomena occur." "Physical
Science and the Study of Religions", p.387; cf. APHK.
pp.39-1+0 ,h7, 50, 52, and Essays, p.78.
12^. "On the lines of objective description, it is indeed
more appropriate to use the word phenomenon to refer
only to observations obtained under circumstances whose
description includes an account of the whole experi¬
mental arrangement." APHK, p.73; cf. p.6*+.
125. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p. 580 - ATM, p. 55. If
asked whether there is sound when a tree falls in the
woods with nobody around to hear, Bohr would answer
"yes" because the conditions of the phenomenon have
been specified and an "observation" (here a "thought
experiment") has been performed in this sense; cf. J.
V/ahl, "Physiaue Atomique et Conaissance Humaine", Rev.
Met.Mqr. 67, 1962, p.253.
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126. The word "observation" is used here in two opposite
senses; a classical sense in which Bohr contrasts it
with "definition" (see ch.1.3 above) and a quantum-
mechanical sense in which it means the specification
of circumstances or environment (the experimental
arrangement) and hence involves the idea of definition.
Incidentally, there is no connection here with Bridg-
m&n's use of "operational definitions" (op.clt., p.5)
since Bohr's reasoning is fundamentally ontologies!
rather than epistemological.
127. "All confusion arises, in fact, from the use of such
utterances as 1 disturbance of phenomena by their obser¬
vation' , a phrase equally irreconcilable with any unam¬
biguous meaning of the very words 'observation' and
'phenomenon'." "Newton's Principles, etc.", pp.59-60;
cf* APHK, pp.6^,73) and Essays, p. 3* ^or Bohr the lim¬
its of knowledge are imposed by nature, not by man; see
AM, p.115. As Feyerabend points out, Bohr's ban on
"disturbance"-talk is late (19^7) and reflects: the
objections of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (loc.cit,);
see "Complementarity I", pp.97-98, and "Problems of
Microphysics", p.219. However, it was always- implicit
in Bohr's distinction between the possibilities of obs¬
ervation and the possibilities of definition; see ch.
1.3 above.
128. "The whole situation in atomic physics deprives of all
meaning such inherent attributes; as the idealizations
of classical, physics; would ascribe to the object."
"Causality and Complementarity", p. 293; cf. J). 291, and
"The Quantum Postulate, etc. ", pp.581, 58*+, 586, 587•
The reference to "hidden secrets" in APHK, p.9 =
"Light and Life", p.*+58 was an unfortunate figure of
speech which Bohr never repeated.
129. "...no result of an experiment concerning a phenomenon
which, in principle, lies outside the range of classic¬
al physics can be interpreted as giving information
about independent properties of the objects, but is in¬
herently connected with a definite situation in the
description of which the measuring instruments inter¬
acting with the objects also enter essentially." APHK.
p.26. It is in this context that one should properly
understand Bohr's most criticized statement: "We meet
here in a new light the old truth that in our descrip¬
tion of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real
essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so far
as it is possible, relations between the manifold asp¬
ects of our experience." ATDN, p.l8; cf. P.K.Feyerabend,
"Problems of Microphysics", pp. 217-220. Bohi' rejected
both idealism and realism as philosophical positions
since he accepted neither an ultimate subject nor an
independent object; see APHK. pp.51,79.
130. See fn.l26 above. Among critics who have missed this
point are E.E.Witmer, "Interpretation of Quantum Mech¬
anics and the Future of Physics", Am.J.Phys. 35, 1967,
bb
pp-.b5~b6j and B. d1Espagnat, "Things, Structures and
Phenomena in Quantum. Physics", in B.van Rootselaar and
J .F.Stall, eds«, op.cit., 0,381.
131» M.Polanyi: "Our subsidiary awareness of tools and probes
can be regarded now as the act of making them form a
part of our own body...We poor, ourselves out into them
end assimilate them as parts of our own existence. We
accept them existentially by dwelling in them." Pers¬
onal Knowledge, London, 1958, p.59; cf. The Tacit""
Dimension, New York, 1967, p.l6. Bohr also spoke of
tools as extensions of man, drawing an. analogy:*between
the process of repair and the process of healings, see
W.Heiserxberg, Physics and Beyond, p. 109.
132. "The essentially new feature in the analysis of quantum
phenomena is, however, the- introduction of a fundamental
distinction between the measuring apparatus and the
objects under investigation. This is a direct conseq¬
uence of the necessity of accounting for the functions
of the measuring instruments in purely classical terms,
excluding in principle any regard to the quantum of
action.1"' Essays, pp«3"b; cf. p.78, and APHK. pp.50,91.
133• "This crucial point...implies the impossibility of any
sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic ob¬
jects and the .interaction with the measuring instru¬
ments which serve to define the conditions under which
the phenomena appear.11 APHK, pp.39-^-0; cf. pp.30,by, 52,
98, and ATM, pp. 11,15.
13b. e.g. APHK, pp.73,90.
135. e.g. APHK, pp.bO,51,90,99.
136. e.g. APHK, pp.98,99. This feature has- been exploited
by J.Bub ("Hidden Variables, etc.") and D.Bohm ("On
Bohr1s View, etc.").
137. e.g. Essays, p.6l.
138. e.g. APHK, pp.73,89,90,98.
139. These "atomic objects" include atoms, electrons, phot¬
ons, etc.
lbO. "The characteristic new feature in quantum physics- is
merely the restricted divisibility of the phenomena,
which for unambiguous description demands; a, specifi¬
cation of all significant parts of the experimental
arrangement." Essays, p.92; cf. pp.b,60.
bbl. ATDN, p.19, APHK., pp.l5,bl,b7, Essays, pp.5,12; see ch.
2.8 below.
Ib2. "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description, etc.", pp.697-
701, APHK, pp.bO,72,90, Essays, pp. 5,7?-. The frame of
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reference here is the laboratory. On the problem of
extending the notions of space and time into the quan¬
tum domain see B..Hoffmann, The Strange Story of the
Quantum, New York, 1959, pp.196-199; and E.J. Zimmer¬
man, "The Macroscopic Nature of Space-Time", Am.J.PMys.
30, 1962, pp.97-105-
lb-3« APHK, pp. 5,7,26,30, "Newton's Principles, etc.", p.6c.
ib-b-. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", pp.580,532 - ATTN, pp.
5b,60, APffiC, p.52. N.B. Momentum and energy belong to
the wave-mode because they are directly related to
wavelength and frequency in quantum mechanics by the
deBroglie and Einstein relations; cf. C.F.von Weizs'ack-
er, The World View of Physics. London, 1952, pp..32-33•
l1+5, API, pp.78-79,80,91-92; cf. A.Petersen, "The Philos¬
ophy of Niels Bohr", p.11.
lb-6. "Can Quantu.m-Mechan.ical Description, etc.", pp.699,701;
cf. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p.580 -ATM, p. 5b-,
APHK, p.51, "On the Notions of Causality and Complemen-
tarity", pp.316-317; contrast J «von Neumann, qp„. e.it,,
pp AlQ-b-2.0, and W.Heisenberg, Physi.cs and Philosophy,
New York, 1958, pp.55-57"
lb-7* APHK, pp.b-0,72,90,99. M.Sachs misses this point in his
"Positivism, Realism, and Existentialism in Macb's
Influence on Contemporary Physics", Phil.Phen.Res. 30,
1970, p.b05.
lb-8. "This necessity of discriminating in each experimental
arrangement between those parts of the physical system
which are to be treated as measuring instruments and
those which constitute the objects under investigation
may indeed be said to form a principle distinction, bet¬
ween classical and cman turn-me cbanleal description of
physical phenomena." "Can Quantum-Mechanical Descript¬
ion, etc.", p.701.
lb-9. "For the instruments cannot be included in the investi¬
gation while they are serving as means of observation."
"Light and Life", p.b-23; cf. Essays, p. 5 • I have chosen
the symbols A,B, and G to correspond with J.Mclntyre's
"revelation model" - "A reveals B. to C" (The Shape of
Christology. Philadelphia, 1966, p.lb-6).
150. "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description, etc.", p.698.
"Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary
physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena
nor to the agencies of observation." "The Quantum
Postulate, etc.", p.580 = ATM, p.5b-«
151. Similarly the analysis of the structure of a tool excl-
the free exercise of its function. This complementar¬
ity of function and structure in the use of tools has
a close parallel in the tagmemic analysis in linguistics
!+6
(see W.A.Cook, Introduction to Tagmemic Analysis,
London, 1969? pp.5~9)~ For instance, an expression
like "the short man." can be .treated either functionally
as the subject (or object) of a larger unit or else
structurally as a noun phrase which is composed of
smaller units (limiter, modifier, and head). Hence
function and structure of a given unit relate to diff¬
erent grammatical levels in linguistics as they to
different ontological levels in physics. Of course, in
grammar itself these levels coexist, but in actual
speech they appear under mutually exclusive conditions;
"the short man" constitutes a single stress unit when
it functions as the subject of a longer clause, but it
is- subdivided into two or three stress units when it is
isolated as a structure in its own right. Hence the
shift from functional mode to structural mode involves
a phonetic change in the unit itself and is not just
the result of a shift in the focus; of our attention
from one level to another. Note that since function is
complementary to structure in this sense, it cannot be
entirely eliminated from science, even in physics.
Hence the logic of complementarity conflicts with the
aims of traditional structuralism; see e.g. J.Piaget,
Structui-allsm, London, 1968, pp.69,102,U6,llf2.
152. "Indeed, strictly speaking, the conscious analysis of
any concept stands in a relation of exclusion to its'
immediate application. " ATDN, p.96; cf. p.20, and API21.
p.52.
153' "We all know the old saying that, if we try to analyze
our own emotions, we hardly possess them any longer..."
APHK, p.27; see ch.3'3 below.
151+. "...that harmony which is experienced as free villi and
analyzed in terms of causality." ATDN, p.2'+; see ch.3-3
below.
1"Light and Life", p.l+58, "Causality and Complementar¬
ity", p.296, APHK, pp,9,?6; see ch.3'2 below.
156. "...the unambiguous use of the concept of stationary
states stands in a similar relation of complementarity
to a mechanical analysis of intra-atomic motions as do
light quanta to the electromagnetic theory of radia¬
tion." APHK-, pp.6-7; cf. ATDN, pp.23,77-78.
157. contra A.Petersen who claims that Bohr gradually purged
his philosophy of ontological ideas; see Quantum Phys¬
ics and the Philosophical Tradition, pp.163,180.
153. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p. 587 = ATDN, p.8.1: cf.
"Causality and Complementarity", p.29^, APHK, p,6.
Essays, pp.2,11,3'+,8*+. From the standpoint of
classical mechanics and electrodynamics all atoms-
should collapse instantaneously; the electrostatic att-'
paction between the positive nucleus and the negative .
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electrons rules out a static equilibrium configuration,
and if the electrons should revolve around the nucleus
like little (charged) planets they would radiate away
their energy and spiral rapidly into the nucleus.
Quantum theory avoids this dilemma by treating the el¬
ectrons as standing waves rather than particles»
159» "...any imaginable procedure aiming at the coordination
in space and time of the electrons in an atom will un¬
avoidably involve an essentially uncontrollable exchange
of momentum and energy between the atom and the measur¬
ing agencies, entirely annihilating the remarkable reg¬
ularities of'atomic stability for which the quantum of
action is responsible. Conversely, any Investigation
of such regularities, the very account of which implies
the conservation laws of energy and momentum, will in.
principle impose a renunciation as regards the space-
time coordination of the individual electrons in the
atom." APHK, p.19; cf. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.",
p.587 = ATDN. pp.78—793 and Essays, pp.5,11,63.
160. "...the complementary relationship between the stability
properties of the atoms themselves and such behaviour
of their constituent particles as allows of a descript¬
ion in terms of space-time coordination." APHK. p.21;
cf. p.85, ATDN, pp.23,78, and C.F.von Weizsacker, op.
cit., pp.53-5^»
161. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p.580 = ATDN, pp.5b—55*
162. ATDN, p.119; cf. "Newton1 s- principles, etc.", p.60, "On.
the Notions of Causality and Complementarity", p.318,
and APHK, pp.20,81.
I63,. For a rather confusing analysis, see K.M.Meyer-AMch,
op.cit., pp. 185-186.
16b-. See ch.l.b-, above.
165. e.g. The Tacit Dimension, pp.9-10, and Knowing and
Being. London, 1969, pp.235-236.
166. ibid; cf. Polanyi's distinction between subsidiary aware¬
ness and focal awareness (Personal Knowledge, pp.55-56,
Knowing and Being, p.128) and between tacit knowledge
and explicit or articulate knowledge (Personal Know¬
ledge, pp.87,317, Knowing and Being., p.iWJ; cf. Marcel's
distinction between "pensee pensante" and "pensee pensee"
(Du Refus a 1' Invocation, Paris, 19b-0, pp. 21-22; cf.
R.M.Zaner, The Problem of Embodiment, The Hague, 196b-,
pp.6-7); and Tlllich's distinction between "receiving
knowledge" and "controlling knowledge" (Systematic Theol¬
ogy, Vol.1, London, 1953, pp.l09f).
167. e.g. The 'Tacit Dimension, pp.9-11,16.
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168. Pol.an.yi attempts a transition from his epistemologioal
considerations to an ontological structure but in
effect he reduces ontology to epistemology; see ibid,
p. 13'
169. Personal Knowledge, pp..95-56, The Tacit Dimension, pp.
5.2-13, and Knowing end Being, p. 127.
170. ATM, p.99« Although it only appears- once in the lit¬
erature, this illustration was often used by Bohr in
conversation; see P.A.M.Dirac, "The Versatility of
Niels Bohr", in S-.Rozental et al>, op,pit f, p.306; and
O.Klein, loc.cit., p»93«
171. e.g. APHK, p.10, ATM, p.2^-.
172. e.g. Knowing and Being, pp.219-220,235-236,237-238.
173. "...strictly speaking, it is not the emerged higher
form of being, but our knowledge of it, that is unspec-
ifiable in terms of its lower level particulars."
Personal Knowledge, pp.393"39^; cf. pp.390-393*
17*+. cf. the possibilities of observation and definition
discussed in ch.1.3? esp. fn.66.
175• The Tacit Dimension, pp.Ll-l,lf5.
176. ibid.
177* See f"n.d23, above.
178. See ch.2.3 below.
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Chapter 2
Bohr's; Use of Complementarity in Atomic Physics
"...complementary modes of thought and comple¬
mentary descriptions of reality are an old,
long-enduring part of our tradition. All that,
the experience of atomic physics- can. do in
these affairs is to give us a reminder, and. a
certain reassurance, that these ways; of talking
and thinking can be factual, appropriate, pre¬
cise, and free of obscurantism." J.R.Oppenheimer,
Science and the Common Understanding, p.83.
Before we examine the relationship of complementar¬
ity itself, we should clarify what the terms; are between
which the relationship is supposed to hold. A survey of
Bohr's usage of the concept shows; a bewildering variety of
terms which seem to be used interchangably even within the
limited scope of atomic physics."" Most frequently Bohr
speaks of complementarity between two types of aspects of
2 2 Lf.
phenomena, or kinds of informationJ or of experiences or
5 6
of observations or of evidence obtained under mutually
exclusive experimental conditions and visualizable by mut-
7
ually exclusive ideas. In the same phenomenal!st style,
he speaks of complementarity between pictures of the
phenomena,^ or between modes'' or features"'"0 or asp ecus"'""'" of
description, or between aspects of well-defined knowledge
12
of objects. In a more rationalist vein there is; eomple-
3 2
mentarity between different classical concepts, '-J between
lk
the ideas of wave and particle, between the Scbro'dlnger
3 ri' '
wave mechanics and the Heisenberg matrix, mechanics,
between the definition of space and time and the definition
50
16
of momentum and energy, between "space-time coordination"
and the dynamical conservation laws ("the claim of causal-
1 7
ity"), between the applicability of the concept of
stationary states and the mechanical analysis of intra-
X8
atomic motions, and hence between the viewpoints of chem-
10
istry and physics:. ' But the structure of these obser¬
vations and descriptions and concepts simply reflects the
structure of nature. Hence there is complementarity between
20
the undulatory and corpuscular character of light,^ between
the spatial continuity of light propagation and the atomicity
2X
of light absorption (the photoelectric effect), and between
the stability features of atoms and molecules: and the space-
22
time behaviour of their constituent particles. In
general, therefore:, we may speak of a "wave-mode", in which
momentum and energy are well-defined, light propagates and
atoms are stable, and a "particle-mode", in which space-time
location is well-defined, but light is absorbed (or emitted)
2~\
and atoms are unstable. J Then what exactly is the relat¬
ionship between these two modes of physical nature?
Bohr's first use of the term "complementarity"
suggests that the basic idea is a relationship between two
equally-important sectors of a< total description which some-
2k
how exclude each other in reality. However, Bohr never
gave an explicit definition of the term. In fact, in his
very next paper he temporarily abandoned the term "comple-
mentarity" in favor of "reciprocity", but he later returned
to "complementarity" explaining that it "may perhaps be more
suited, also to remind us of the fact that it is the combin¬
ation of features which are united in the classical mode of
51
description but appear separated in the quantum theory that
ultimately allows us to consider the latter as a natural
a/
generalization of the classical physical theories."" But
Bohr continued to regard the term as being somewhat artif¬
icial and pointed out that it was? not taken from our every-
27
day language.
In view oi these points, we cannot derive the
meaning of complementarity from its ordinary usage in rel¬
ation to complementary angles, complementary colors, etc.,
and only a complete survey of Bohr's use of the term will
28
provide an adequate definition.. I find eleven distinct
points in Bohr's usage which cannot be reduced to one
another even though some are closely related. Together




The complementary modes belong to one and the same
10
object.- What appears to be a wave under some circum¬
stances and a. particle under others is; in fact the same
physical entity. In contrast, this could not be said of
dualistic relationships like those between male and female,
11
"yin" and "yang", or good and evil. Hence, complement-
12
arity is to be distinguished from duality or dualism, and








that they share some common properties. In the non~
relativistic (electron-volt) domain appropriate to atomic
phenomena, these are rest mass, electric charge, and spin
'->5
angular momentum. However at higher energies;, comparable:
to the rest-mass; energy of the particles; (millions" of
electron-volts), suitable for the exploration of atomic
nuclei, the particles themselves become unstable and the
definition of their mas;s; and charge is possible only within
the stable "wave-mode" (i.e. not during the localized inter¬
action of particles)Even for the constituents of stable
nuclei there is an uncertainty of mass .and charge due to the
highly-localized "strong-force" interaction and the continual
exchange of virtual mesons. In this case the "common prop¬
erties" would be the baryon (or- atomic) number, hypercharge,
isotopic spin, spin angular momentum and parity.J These
are considerably more abstract than rest mass and electric
charge. At even higher energies;, as yet unexplored, there
may be an even more abstract, set of "common properties"
Q
between the modes or perhaps none at all.
It is tempting to treat these common properties as;
the "invariants" of a "complementarity transformation", thus
imbuing them with a greater or deeper degree of reality
than the "conjugate properties" which are not shared by the
19
two modes. For instance, Max Born regards the isolation
of a set of invariant common properties as; the only final
I.S.Q
assurance that a physical entity is objectively real.
But what would then happen to objective reality if at some
higher energy no common properties- could be found at all?
It would be a mistake to identify objectivity with
53
Vi
invariance. * In fact, it would simply be a repetition
of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" which Whitehead
cites in connection with the seventeenth century dist-
1+2
inction between primary and secondary qualities. For
example, Margenau has drawn this very distinction between
what he calls "possessed observables", like mass; and charge,
and "latent observables", like position and momentum, and
he ends up with a complete bifurcation between "physical
reality", which is lawful but unobservable (cf. mundus
intelliglbills), and "historical reality", -which is observ-
. . Lo
able but completely unpredictable (cf. mundus sensibills). ~
In other words, for Margenau, this table In front of me,
this particular table, is an historical but not & physical
reality!
In any case, the quest for invariance is inconsist¬
ent with Bohr's own philosophy. For Bohr, there is; no
Llf
thing-in-itself independent of its particular environment.
So the modes of reality are not Illusory just because they
are relative; they do not correspond to "secondary qualit¬
ies". To use a distinction made by Barth, they are "modes
of existence" within which the object exists;, rather than
modes of an object behind which the object exists as a dist¬
il q
inct essence. y The object is fully present in each of its
modes. ' This brings us to the third point of the logic of
complementarity.
2.3 Individual Completeness"?
Each, mode is- complete in itself in the sense that
the object may be completely described, in a given situation.,
in terras of the appropriate mode without any explicit ref¬
erence to the alternate mode. Only as, the situation
changes does the alternate mode enter the picture. For
instance, the propagation and interference of light can be
completely accounted for by the electromagnetic wave theory
while the interaction between radiation and matter can be
completely understood in terms of the concept of the light
3+6
quantum introduced by Einstein.
Mother way of putting this is to say that each
mode is well-defined in the sense that given a particular
experimental situation (e.g. light propagating in free
space), the mode of existence is unambiguously determined
(i.e. the wave-mode) even though the physical state of that
I\..r?
mode (frequency, wave-length) is left undetermined.
The condition of completeness distinguishes, comple¬
mentarity from the relationship of orthogonality or dimen¬
sionality or modality. It is often said that complementary
modes represent the same object as seen from different
'
*1-8
viewpoints- or perspectives. One must somehow synthesize
the various pro.1 ections or dimensions', in order to get a
complete picture. However, this relationship would, not
qualify as, complementarity in Bohr's sense because the
object is never completely described by any one of its dim¬
ensions. In orthogonality the object exists 'behind' the
modes rather than 'within' them, hence the modes are modes'
of the object rather than modes of the object's existence.
2. *+ Coex.haustj.vene ss s
The two modes, are coexhaustive in the sense that
together they are sufficient to exhaust all possible
Lj.Q
knowledge of the object under all possible conditions.
In other words.-, the object is never known, and never exists.
other than in : one of its two modes; there is no third
?0mode.
It was specifically due to this eoexhaustiveness
that Bohr regarded complementarity to be a: rational gener¬
al
alization of the classical principle of causality,' " and
5?
hence to satisfy the correspondence principle.' " In class¬
ical physics the evolution of a physical body is completely
determined by its position and momentum at any instant of
time. In quantum physics this determinism breaks down
because position and momentum can never be defined simul¬
taneously, yet both are Included in the complementary
description (.in the particle and wave modes', respectively),
and there is no loss of generality.
2.5 Equal Importance:
58The two modes are equally essential,J equally
5I1.
important, equally .indispensable, - and equally necess-
56
ary in the sense that both together are necessary (as well
as sufficient) for an exhaustive treatment of the atomic
57
object. It follows that the modes are mutually irreduc¬
ible; that is, one cannot be analyzed in terms of the other,
58 5Q
and one is just as real as the other.
The condition of equality clearly distinguishes'
complementarity from equivalence or sut?p1ementar1ty. a rela¬
tionship with which it is often confused. It is often
said, for instance, that the wave and particle pictures' (or
representations) are two alternate, equivalent models- for
atomic objects, and that one can transform from one to the
other at will.^0 This is. true only if the terms "wave5'
and "particle" are taken in their strictly classical senses?
a "wave" is an oscillation of any form in space, and a
"particle" is a point mass, with well-defined position and
momentum. Then the wave and particle pictures- are equival¬
ent for several reasons? (l) According to the Einstein-de
Broglie relations, the momentum of a particle is inversely
proportional to the wavelength of an associated wave and the
energy of a particle is directly proportional to the freq¬
uency of the wave. Hence one can transform from particle-
language (momentum,energy) to wave-language (wavelength,
frequency) simply by dividing or multiplying by a cohstant
(Planck's constant). (2) As de Broglie first showed, a
particle can be represented by a wave-group such that the
velocity of the particle is equal to the group-velocity of
6 2
the waves:-. (3) Atomic structure can be treated either
in the Schro'dinger formalism in terms: of standing waves, or
in the Heisenberg formalism in terms; of position and momen¬
tum operators subject to commutation rules- (the "uncertainty
principle"). As: S.chrodinger, himself, showed the two
formalisms are mathematically equivalent even though t-hey
are conceptually incompatible and one can transform from one
to the other.^ (1+) Any wave function (the mathematical
representation of SchrdTdinger' s standing waves) can be
expanded mathematically either in terms of an indefinite
set of simple harmonic waves (a Fourier series-) or in terms
of an infinite set of possible particle positions (Dirac
delta-functions) as- Born showed by his theorem of spectral
decomposition.^ (5) In quantum field theory one treats
various force fields as if they were due to the exchange of
virtual particles; photons for the electromagnetic field,
mesons for the strong-force field, "W-particles" for the
weak-force field, and "gravitons" for the gravitational
65
field. Since this transformation is accomplished by the
purely formal process- of "second quantization", the field
theory and the quantized field theory are mathematically
66
equivalent. In this sense it is; true that particles; and
fields are equivalent (though incompatible) pictures which
£rj
can be transformed into one another. But this is not
complementarity in Bohr's sense because both pictures; are;
not needed; one could choose either one and work exclusively
within it. Hence it is a relationship of supplementarity,
not complementarity.
However, whichever picture one chooses, one finds;
/ O
an alternation between two complementary modes. In the
de Broglie-Schrodinger wave-picture one starts with a
simple harmonic wave with well-defined frequency and wave¬
length propagating in free space (the "wave-mode"), but this
wave collapses to a point (represented by a superposition of
waves or else a single Dirac delta-function) when it inter¬
acts with matter (the "particle-mode")Similarly, in
the Heisenberg particle-picture one has either a well-
defined momentum and energy when propagating in free space
("wave-mode") or a precise position at a particular instant
of time when the particle interacts or "collides" with
another particle ("particle-mode"), but not both at the same
58
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time. Similarly, in quantum field theory one has either
well-defined field variables or a definite number of "par-
73
tides", but both cannot be defined at the same time.
The following table briefly summarises the relat¬
ionship between complementarity (wave and particle modes)
and supplementarity (wave and particle pictures).
complementary wave-mode particle-raode
(in free space) (interaction)
simple harmonic superposition
supple- wave-picture ■ wave of waves
mentary wavelength., freq.
particle-picture momentum, energy position, time
Moving from top to bottom is a purely formal transformation
(supplementarity); moving from right to left represents the
evo3.ution in time (complementarity). This brings us to the
next point.
2.6 Alternations
The temporal evolution of the physical entity pro¬
ceeds by a continual alternation between one mode and the
other as the entity passes from one situation to another.
The example most frequently cited is that of single-slit dif-
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fractions a photon (or electron) is fired at a screen with
a narrow slit (from a large distance). If it passes through
the slit it is diffracted and finally it impinges upon a
second screen behind the first. If it doesn't pass through
the slit it is absorbed by the first screen.
From the viewpoint of complementarity the situation
is as followss before the photon arrives at the first screen
it is a plane wave with well-defined frequency and wavelength.
Single-slit Diffraction
1st screen 2nd screen
incident
photon
When it interacts with the first screen, whether by absorp¬
tion or diffraction, it 'becomes' a particle with well-
defined position (the time of diffraction can be determined
by using a shutter over the slit). If it passes; through
the slit it is diffracted and propagates from one screen to
the other as a spherical wave, and when it hits; the second
screen at some particular point it 'becomes' a particle
again. Hence the photon (or electron) adjusts; to each new
situation by changing its mode of existence. Incidentally,
this "experiment" clearly illustrates Bohr's distinction
between the possibilities of definition and the possibili¬
ties of observation. The photon is only 'observed' when
it hits one of the screens. However, its: modal -existence
is defined at all points of its evolution because the
experimental arrangement is completely specified.
It is possible to associate the relationship of
kinematical (space-time) and dynamical (momentum-energy)
variables with the philosophical relationship of "being" and
7I1
"becoming". For free particles the wave-mode applies to
propagation in free space (ef. "becoming") and the particle-
mode applies to instantaneous location (cf. "being") as in
impact of
photon
the single-slit diffraction experiment just described.
However, the correlation is just the reverse for the evol¬
ution of an atoms the wave-mode corresponds- to the
stationary states of the atom ("being") and the particle-
mode corresponds to transitions between these states'
("quantum jumps", "becoming").'7*7. Therefore, one should not
take these connections too seriously. Rather, one should
regard either mode as an interval of becoming between the
states of being of the other mode. In relation to the
single-slit experiment, for instance, the spherical wave rep¬
resents a transition from a particle located at the slit of
the first screen to a particle located at a point on the
second screen. Alternatively, the particle at the slit of
the first screen represents; a transition from a plane wave
to a spherical wave. The relationship between the two modes
is strictly symmetrical in this regard.
2.7 Coinherence:
If the two modes pertain to a single entity and
that entity evolves by an alternation between the modes,
then there must be some positive connection like an "inter -
penetration" or "coinherence" between the modes. Bohr says
very little about this connection, and what little he does
say is not entirely, definitive. In his treatment of the
single-slit experiment, for instance, he speaks of "the train.
1
of plane waves corresponding to the state of motion of the
n /
particle". Since there is no permanent particle embedded
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m the wave for Bohr, I take this to mean that the particle
exists as a potentiality in the wave in the sense that the
6.1
wave is capable of "collapsing" and producing a particle
when it interacts with the screen.^ Bohr goes on to speak
of "the diffraction of the wave connected with the motion of
the particle" as it penetrates through the slit in the first
'79
screen. Since this diffraction consists of the ''coll¬
apse" of the plane wave on one side of the slit (producing a
particle at the slit) and the expansion of a new spherical
wave on the other side, there is actually no single wave at
the instant of diffraction. However, the wave exists as: a
potentiality in the particle as it passes through the slit
in the sense that the particle is capable of "expanding"
go
and producing a wave once it enters free space. Finally,
Bohr says that, "the state of motion of the particle is rep¬
resented by a spherical wave train" after it emerges from
Si
the slit, again meaning that it exists as a potentiality
within the spherical wave though it is not actualized until
it impinges upon the second screen. Hence, the two modes;
of an atomic object might be said to coinhere or interpene¬
trate each other, and in this sense an atomic object is both
a wave and a particle (or, in the case of an atom, a group
of particles).^'"
A corollary of this coinherence or interpenetration
is that there is 1nter ~par t i c ip ation or co-operation between
the modes. Whenever the actual mode does something, the
potential mode participates in and cooperates with that
action since it exists as a potentiality in the actual mode
during the action. Thus Bohr speaks of the "motion of a
particle" in free space (wave-mode actual), on one hand, and
of "waves passing through the hole /i.e. the slit7"
62:
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(particle-mode actual), on the other. -
Note that in each of the examples given the capabil¬
ity or potentiality in question is only one of response to
a change in the. physical environment and not an intrinsic
capacity. This is best seen in the case of atomic structure;
a stable atom is only capable of producing "free" particles
in response to the stimulating effect of radiation (or coll-
% 8
isions with free electrons). ' Hence it would not have this
capability in intergalactic space where the density of
radiation is negligible. Conversely, the constituent part¬
icles of an atom are only capable of forming a stable atom
in the absence of disturbing effects. Hence they would not
have this capability in the interior of a star where the
radiation is very intense. Therefore, this capability or
potential must always be viewed in relation to the environ-
+ 85ment.
2.8 Mutual Exclusiveness:
In spite of the element of coinherence, each mode is
complete in itself (condition 3) and, moreover, the two modes
are mutually exclusive in the sense that they are concept¬
ually incompatible and cannot be combined into a single
picture. In the first instance, this incompatibility per-
86
tains to the experimental arrangements or to the conditions
necessary for the unambiguous application of classical con-
87
cepts, especially the concepts of space and time, on one
88
hnnd, and the dynamical conservation laws, on the other.
89
But it also applies to the phenomena themselves, to the
kinds of information or evidence obtained about the behaviour
,63
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of atomic objects,' to the ideas (taken from classical
\ 9-1
physics; by which such information can be visualised, " and
92
to the properties of atomic objects and the laws which
91
appear under different experimental conditions. J Hence
there is a relation of mutual exclusion between the corpus-
/ • 9'+
cular and undulatory characters of light (or matter
between "space-time coordination" and the "claim of causal-
99
ity", ^ and between the application of the concept of
stationary states to an atom and the description of the be-
96
haviour of the of the constituent particles. But however
incompatible these opposing aspects of quantum phenomena
may be, they can never be brought into direct contradiction
with each other because the experimental conditions required
97
for their very definition are mutually exclusive. In
short, the two modes exclude each other in thought, exper¬
ience and in reality.
The condition of mutual exclusiveness again dist¬
inguishes complementarity from the relations of orthogonality
(modality) and equivalence (supplementarity). Two equiv¬
alent pictures may exclude each other in thought or even in
experience, but they coexist in reality. For example, the
electromagnetic force is both a field and an exchange of
virtual photons even though we can only use one of tnese
pictures at a time. Similarly, two orthogonal dimensions
or projections coexist in an object even though we may only
be able to observe or imagine one at a time. However, it
is sometimes possible to adopt en intermediate viewpoint
from which both dimensions are partly visible. Hence orth¬
ogonal dimensions are not strictly exclusive even in thought
and. experience.
2.9 Conjugate Properties - Reciprocity:
At least some of the properties of an atomic object
are not held in common by the two modes5 they are well-
defined in, and characteristic of, only one of the modes,
not the other. These properties occur in conjugate pairs
98
like position and momentum, or time and energy. For
clarity, we shall refer to the characteristic properties of
a given mode as the explicit properties of that mode. The
properties that are neither common nor characteristic arc
the implicit properties of that mode in the sense that they
are ill-defined in that mode but well-defined in the alter¬
nate mode which inheres within it. The explicit properties
of one mode are the implicit properties of the other, and
vice versa. For instance, position and time are explicit
properties of the particle-mode and implicit properties of
the wave-mode. The reverse holds for momentum and energy.
As the atomic object alternates between its two modes, the
(complementary) modes alternate between being actual and
potential and the conjugate properties alternate between
1
being explicit and implicit.
This leads us to the Heisenberg uncertainty prin¬







of the logic of complementarity. Since only one mode can
be. actualized at a time (mutual exclusiveness), it follows
that only one of a pair of conjugate, properties can be
explicit at a time. There can. be no simultaneous defin¬
ition or measurement of the. explicit properties-, of both
09
modes. The unambiguous: definition (or precise, measure¬
ment) of one implies the exclusion or "renunciation" of the
unambiguous definition of the other leaving a gap or
"rupture" in the corresponding description."'"00 In the
Heisenberg formalism this reciprocal relation is symbolized
by a s-et of commutation rules: the mathematical operators;
corresponding to two conjugate properties do not commute with
each other.10"1" From these rules Heisenberg developed, his.
famous "indeterminacy relations": there is a reciprocal
latitude or uncertainty between two conjugate properties;
the better defined one is, the less well-defined the other,
102
and vice versa. The product of the uncertainties is", on
the order of Planck's constant (the quantum of action, h).
103 Bohr referred to this as a relation of reciprocity
between the two modes, or a reciprocal symmetry between their
lO^f
explicit properties-. Heisenberg's indeterminacy (or
uncertainty) relations, he said, gave quantitative or sym-
10 9'
bolic expression t<3>. the idea of reciprocity,
One consequence of the uncertainty principle is that
there is real becoming in the evolution of an atomic object.
The alternation between modes is not simply a repetitious
cycle and the evolution is not just the unfolding of a pre¬
exist ent plan because the state of the potential mode, that
is, the value of its explicit property, is not predetermined
66
by the state of the actual mode even given the experimental
106
conditions. The term "inde termini sin" is perhaps mis¬
leading because the classical ideal of determinism is only
limited by the magnitude of Planck's constant, a very small
10'7
number by everyday standards.' Complete determinism
would correspond to a zero-value of Planck's constant, and
complete indeterminism would correspond to an infinite
value. Hence "limited determinism" or "partial indetermin™
ism" would better characterize the situation. Nature, is
allowed just enough "elbo\* room", so-to-speak, for real
. , 108becoming.
Two further consequences can only be briefly men-
tioned: (l) The evolution of atomic objects is governed by
109
statistical laws, as first demonstrated by Max Born.
These are not the result of ignorance as they are in the case
of life insurance statistics or betting odds;"'"1"^ they are
111
inherent .in the nature of reality. Like the uncertainty
principle, the use of statistics has a positive as; well as a
negative side; it represents definite laws and regularities
in the quantum domain even though it falls short of the
classical ideal of complete determinism. Thus it repres¬
ents a rational generalization of the principle of causality
112
in Bohr's terminology. (2) The evolution of atomic
objects is irreversible since their interrelation with the
macroscopic environment is holistic and cannot be analyzed
11^
in mechanical terms. J Therefore an atomic object will
not usually return to its initial state if it is turned
j ib
around and sent back into its previous environment. Bohr
frequently spoke of this irreversibility as inherent in the
67
very concept of "observation", i.e. the specification of
the experimental conditions, and illustrated it by the irr¬
eversibility of amplification processes that take place in
any act of (quantum) measurement.^"''
The results of this section can be brought together
into a rather simple picture. A set of (uncommon) proper¬
ties that may be specified simultaneously constitutes a
four-dimensional space. For instance, the set of ordinary
space and time coordinates constitutes a four-dimensional
geometric or kinematical space, and the set of momentum and
energy coordinates constitutes; a (conjugate) dynamical space.
When an atomic object exists in the wave-mode, it is repre¬
sented by a point in dynamical space (well-defined momentum
and energy) arid by a complete blur in kinematical space (a
wave is continuous over all space and time). When the
atomic object transforms into its particle-mode, the point
in dynamical space spreads out into a blur and the blur in
116
kinematical space collapses to a point. • The fact that
one of the two conjugate spaces is always filled with a blur
illustrates the inherent uncertainty of definition, arid the
fact that the blur may collapse to any point within its
-l -17
volume illustrates the lack of complete determinism. "
An even further simplification can be made by com¬
bining these two'conjugate spaces into a single eight-
dimensional "'phase space". Here the atomic object is repre¬
sented by a phase cell of (approximate) volume h* (Planck's
constant raised to the fourth power, once for each pair of
conjugate properties). The volume of the cell is constant,
but the shape changes from ohe mode to the other. In the
68
wave-mode it is* very narrow in its: momentum and energy dim¬
ensions and very broad in its space and time dimensions.
When it converts: to the particle-mode it becomes, very narrow
in its space and time dimensions and very broad in its mom¬
entum and energy dimensions. The sketches below illustrate
this oscillating phase cell in just one pair of its: conjugate










The volume of the cell is invariant, The shape of the cell
is determined by the experimental conditions' (in accordance
with- the modality), but the location of the cell is only
statistically determined,Briefly this scheme summarizes
the nine points of the logic of complementarity we have
covered so far. Note that the relationship between the
modes thus far is completely symmetrical. 119
2.10 Emergence:
There is also an important element of asymmetry
between the modes in that one of them, the wave-mode, allows
a greater degree of stability and regularity than the other as
is evident from the contrast between stable atoms and free
particles„
120
In fact, it was- just the impossibility of
69
explaining atomic stability in classical physics that led to
the development of quantum theory and the principle of eom-
121
piemen-carity in the first place. The stable wave-mode
accounts for most of the characteristic properties; of matter
122 103
treated in physics and chemistry? " atomic processes;,-'
1 2*+
characteristic atomic spectra, homopolar chemical bonds,
and chemical reactions."*"^1 Therefore, the principle of
complementarity leads to a unification of the disciplines; of
127
physics- and chemistry. As Bohr put it, they represent
two complementary viewpoints, equally indispensable for the
comprehension of the laws of nature.
Clearly there is a greater degree of wholeness,
unity and coordination in the wave than in the particle-mode.
We could think of them as representing the whole and the
parts, respectively, provided we remember that the difference
is not simply the result of a wgestalt switch", a shift in
the focus; of our attention from the pattern to the individual
features', but rather a complete transformation in the object
itself correlated with a change in its objective situation.
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The wave-mode exhibits greater wholeness and stability
because it involves the definition of momentum and energy
and hence satisfies the "claim of causality". But this def¬
inition is only possible in the absence of strong interfer¬
ence from the environment. Hence the greater wholeness: and
stability of the wave-mode are contingent upon a greater
degree of independence and Integrity so that the conservation
laws are allowed to operate freely. Such freedom is; incom¬
patible with close observation or control of the constituent
129
particles, as we- have seen.
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2.11 The "Pointing" Relationship:
Parallel to the onto.log.ical asymmetry of emergence
there is an epistemological asymmetry between the two modes
as between the analysis', of A (here an atomic object) and the
immediate application of A or between A-analyzed and A-
applied. As we have rioted, Bohr regarded this relationship
3^0
to be the most general manifestation of complementarity>
It implies that the wave-mode cannot be known directly or
specif.iably like the particle-mode, but only indirectly and
tacitly as the laws of conservation end the principle of
3 13
causality are allowed to function freely. *-> " This does not
mean that the wave-mode cannot be observed at all: the mom¬
entum of an atomic object can be measured by the Doppler-shift
of scattered light provided that the wavelength of the light
is sufficiently long (and hence the momentum of the light
sufficiently small) that it does; not appreciably disturb the
momentum balance of the wave-mode, and the observed Doppler-
shift can be interpreted as a true (though indirect) measure
112
of the object's momentum. Also, the various stability
properties mentioned above are all indirect evidence of the
existence of stationary states;. But the constraint remains
that in order to know the wave-mode we must respect .its int¬
egrity, use it in accordance with its proper function, and
refrain from analyzing it as; a space-time structure. To
use Polanyi's idiom, we must "indwell" the atomic object in
order to know it (tacitly) as a wave just as; we must indwell
111
ai stick in order to know it as; a probe.'
In addition to the epistemological asymmetry between
the modes and corresponding to it, there is an ontologies.!
connection which, is more difficult to formulate. When we
are confronted with an unfamiliar object our first reaction
is usually to analyse it in terms of structural categories'.
According to the principle of complementarity we might never
exhaust the object by such an analysis; because there might
be another mode of its existence which cannot be analysed, in
terms of the first (equal importance). In this casre, the
second mode exists as a potentiality within the first (coin-
herenee), and we are invited, so to speak, to discover the
new mode by indwelling the object, using it in accordance
with its proper function and learning to know it tacitly as-
well as specifiably. Thus when presented with an unfamil¬
iar artifact for the first time we begin by handling it and
examining its structure, and as our attention is drawn to
its most peculiar' features and their relationships we are;
often able to intuit the function of the artifact. Simil¬
arly, when physicists first explored the atom they analyzed
it in terms of space-time pictures; (the Rutherford "planetary
model"), and only gradually learned tea understand it in
terms of stationary states and wave mechanics. In each
case the structure suggests or points to the function even
though we cannot reduce one to the other. This ontology is
presupposed by Bohr's contrast between analysis and applic¬
ation though never explicitly stated by Bohr himself.
We have seen that Bohr's concept of complementarity
is; both complex, and highly specific. Of the eleven points
discussed, some might be grouped together under a single com¬
posite heading while others might be subdivided into two or
more distinct points depending on one's individual taste.
The fact is that it is impossible to define an organic con¬
cept by any analysis or enumeration of distinct points.
The only way to fully understand the concept is through its
use or application. Nonetheless, an analysis of this sort
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W.lleitler, The Quantum Theory of Radiation, London, 19H-9-,
pp.63-69-, and D.Bohm, Quantum Theory, pp. 107-108),
However, this annihilation is readily understood as a
consequence of the theory of relativity; light travels
at the speed of light in all inertial systems, hence it
cannot have a rest frame. Moreover, the space-time loc¬
ation of a photon can be determined without its anni¬
hilation either by the scattering of another photon or
by the use of a slit-shutter combination (see ch.2,,6
below). Besides, if complementarity were abandoned for
photons alone, then a. unified treatment of all "part¬
icles" would be impossible (cf. M.Born and W.Beim,
"Dualism in Quantum Theory", Physics Today 21 (N0.8),
1968, pp.51-55)• On the analogy of polarizatiqn of
light and the spin direction of elementary particles see
D.Bohm and Y. Aharonov, "Discussion of Experimental
Proof for the Paradox of Einstein, Rosen, and Podolsky",
Phys.Rev. 108, 1957, p.1073) and "Further Discussion, of
Possible Experimental Tests for the Paradox of Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen", Nuo.dm. Series 10, 17, PP«973"~
979j E.P.Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections. Bloomlngton,
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1967, p.53. For a recent review see M.O.Scully and. M.
Sargent III, "The Concept of the Photon", Physics
Today 25 (N0.3), 197?-, pp.38-1+7.
"The very nature of the quantum theory thus .forces us:
to regard the space-time coordination ahd the claim of
causality, the union of which characterises the class¬
ical theories, as complementary features of the des¬
cription, symbolising the idealisation of observation,
and definition respectively." "The Quantum Postulate,
etc.", p.580 - ATDM, pp.5*+~55»
25* "Wirkungsquantum und Naturbesehreibung", Maturwis. 17,
1929, pp .1+83-*+86 (E.T. "The Quantum of Action and the
Description of Nature", in ATDM, pp.92-101).
26. ATDM. p.19. This is a typical example of Bohr's tortuous
style of writing.
27. "In the last resort an artificial word like "complement¬
arity" which does not belong to our daily concepts serves
only briefly to remind us of the epistemological situa¬
tion here encountered, which at least in physics is of
an entirely novel character." "Causality and Complemen¬
tarity", pp.293-29*+. The concept of complementarity is
not found in classical physics; (except perhaps in ther¬
modynamics; see ch.3.1 below), but individual terms of
the complementary relation are taken from classical phy¬
sics in accordance with the correspondence principle.
28. contra D.M.Mackay, "Complementary Descriptions'8, Mind
66, 1957j p.392, and "Complementarity II", Proc■>Arist.
Soc., Supplement. 32, 1958, pp. 10 5)H*4"*
29. To my knowledge no systematic attempt has previously been
made to map out Bohr's logic in this way, Only a few of
the eleven points listed here have previously been rec¬
ognized, the most being given by T.R.Blackburn ("Sensu-
ousrlntellectual Complementarity in Science", Science
172, 1971) pp.IOO3-IOO7)• Blackburn's seven points cor¬
respond to six of the points listed here.
30. "Information regarding the behaviour of an atomic object
obtained under definite experimental conditions may...
be adequately characterized as complementary tc any in¬
formation about the same object obtained by some other
experimental arrangement excluding the fulfilment of
the first conditions." APHK, p.26; cf. ATDM. p.96.
31. When Bohr was; awarded the Danish Order of the Elephant
in 19^7 he had to design a coat-of-arms to be placed in
the church of Frederiksborg Castle at Eillere(d. The
design he chose was the ancient Chinese yin-yang symbol
with the insignia, "Contraria sunt complementa", above
(see Illustration facing p.305 in S.Rozental et al.,
op.cit.). There was never any question, however, that
the relation of complementarity could be visualised in
this (or any other) manner.
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32c A.vail der Mensbrugghe distinguishes between "dualism"
and "duality" in such a way that his "duality" is
roughly equivalent to Bohr's "complementarity". See his
From Dyad to Triad. London, 1935> esp.pp.lkff.
33. contra M.Born, Physics in My Generation. London, 19% >
p.106? Physics and Politics. Edinburgh, 1962, p.57 fn.,
and Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, New York,
196k, p.1055 see below ch.k.5°
3k. It is important to realize that the existence of common
properties is neither a necessary nor a sufficient con¬
dition for unity of substance (singleness of being). A
caterpillar changes into a butterfly and thus maintains
continuity of being, yet the two modes of being have
few, if any, common properties (they differ in weight,
color, shape, structure, etc.). On the other hand, any
two electrons are identical,'in fact, indistinguishable,
due to their common rest mass, charge and spin.
35. "...an electron may be called, a charged material particle,
since measurements of its inertial mass- always- give the
same result, and any transmission of electricity between
atomic systems always amounts to a number of so-called
unit charges." APHK, p.93. "...the ultimate electrical!
particles, beside their mass and charge, are endowed with
a magnetic moment due to an angular momentum determined
by the quantum of action." ATDN, p.88. Note: the basic
unit of magnetic moment is known as the "Bohr magneton"
in recognition of Bohr's early work on the quantum theory.
36. "Chemistry and the Quantum Theory, etc.", p.357, and
"Causality and Complementarity", p.29k.
37. See G.F.Chew et al., "Strongly-Interacting Particles",
Sci.Am. 210 (No.2), 196k, pp.7k-93*
38. In this case the ultimate complementarity would be between
"invariants" (the properties of stable particles which
give them identity; and "events" (space-time location
limited, to a single point) and hence between "particles"
(or fields) and "interactions". Note: Heisenberg has
suggested that there may be a universal, "minimum length"
of about 10-^3 cm. (e.g. Physics and Philosophy, pp«l6k-
165). This would simply set a lower limit on the poss¬
ible precision of "space-time coordination"*, cf. W.Your-
grau, "Some Problems Concerning Constants in Physics",
in H.Feigl and G.Maxwell, eds., op.clt., pp.326-328.
39. The "invariarxce" in question is one of continual defin¬
ition, not necessarily one of constant value, as the
atomic object alternates between one mode and the other.
In either case invariant means "invariable", not "objec¬
tive" or "intrinsic" as in T.F.Torrance, "Newton, Ein¬
stein and Scientific Theology", Eel.Stud. 8, 1972, p.2k2.
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^0, M.Born, "Albert Einstein und das Lichtquantum", Naturwis.
*+2, 1955? P*lK3°5 Physics in My; Generation., pp.lG5?i60-
161,187, and Physics and Politics, p. 30*
lf-1. cf. M.Bunge's criticism of Rosenfeld ("Strife About. Coni-
lementarity", pp.9-12) and W.Yourgrau's criticisms of
Planck, Einstein, Born and. Heisenberg ("On the Reality
of ' Elementary Particles", in M.Bunge, ed., The Critical
Approach to Science and Philosophy. Glencoe, 19^+, pp.
37l-37TfT. "
!+2« Science and the Modern World, New York, 196?, pp«50ff.
h-3. "Reality in Quantum Mechanics", Phil.Sci. 16. 19^9, pp.
297-3°l; The Nature of Physical Reality., New York, 1950,
pp.3,175-17^327,^187^52, "Advantages and Disadvantages
of Vario\is Interpretations of" the Quan.tum Theory",
Physics To day 7 (No.10), 195h, p.10, and Open Vistas,
New Haven, 1961, pp.136,13+1,183; see below, ch.5*.6.
!+^-, See above, ch.l.5»
^-5. "God is completely the person tie purports to be in His
manifestation and gift of Himself to us. To hasten past
Him who addresses us as-- Thou in a threefold confrontation
according to the Biblical witness, can only be to hasten
into the void." Church Dogmatics, .1.1, ch.9,1, p.**39.
It seems that high-energy physics is "hastening into the
void" in its endless quest for symmetry and invar-lance.
The quest should go on, by all means, but the asymmetry
and variance should not be regarded as less real than the
other, or else we may completely bypass important aspects
of reality in our haste; cf. A.N.Whitehead.' s "actual ent¬
ities" or "actual occasions"; Process and Reality, New
York, 1969, p.23.
*+6. "The Quantum postulate, etc.", p.580 = ATDN, p.55? see
A.Einstein, "liber einen die Erzeugung und Verwandlung
des Lichtes betreffenden heuristischen Gesichtspurikt",
Ann.Phvs. 17, 1905, pp.132-1^+8.
¥/. "However great the constrast exhibited by atomic phenom¬
ena under different experimental conditions, such phen¬
omena must be termed complementary in the sense that
each is well defined and that together they exhaust all
definable knowledge about the objects concerned." APHK,
p.90. The further condition of coexhaustiveness is
cited in this pass-age.
LS. e.g. M.Born, Physics in My Generation, pp.l60,l87? C,A.
Coulson, Christianity in .an Age of Science, London, 1953?
pp.20-33, Science and Christian Belief, London, 1958,
pp.86-107, "The Similarity of Science and Religion", in
I.G.Barbour, ed., Science and Religion, London, 1968. pp.
72,75? D.M.Mackay, "Man as Observer-Predictor", in ill
West-man, ed., Man and His Relationships, London, 1955?
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pp.19,23-21+5 "Complementary Descriptions"j p.391, and
"Complementarity II", pp.116-117j and J.Baillie, The
Sense of the Presence of .God, London, .1962, pp.217-11.
"In order to characterize the relation between phenom¬
ena observed under different experimental conditions,
one has introduced the term complementarity to empha¬
size that such, phenomena exhaust all definable inform¬
ation about the atomic objects." APHK, p.99; of. ppJ+0,
7^,90, and Essays, pp.!+, 12,19,29,^0,92.
"...the one or the other of Wo aspects of the descript¬
ion of physical phenomena, - the combination of which
characterizes the method of classical physics, and which
therefore in this sense may be considered as complemen¬
tary to one another..." "Can Quantum-Mechanical Des¬
cription, etc.", p.699°
ATDM, pp.19,56, and "Newton's Principles, etc.", p.60.
See ch.l.U- above.
"Indeed, however contrasting such experiences might app'
ear when attempting to picture a course of atomic pro¬
cesses on classical lines, they have to be considered as
complementary in the sense that they represent equally
essential knowledge about atomic systems and together
exhaust this knowledge." APHK, p.7li-; cf. p.26, "Causal¬
ity and Complementarity", p.291, and "On the Notions of
Causality and Complementarity", p.31*+•
"Physical Science aid the Study of Religions", p.387,
APHK. p. 5. .
"Chemistry and the Quantum Theory, etc.", p.376.
ATM, p.10.
"Although the phenomena in quantum physics can no longer
be combined in the customary manner, they can be said
to be complementary in the sense that only together do
they exhaust the evidence regarding the objects, which
is unambiguously definable." "Newton's Principles,
etc.", p.60; cf. ATM, p.56, and APHK. p.*f0.
e.g. "...the essential non-analyzability of atomic stab-
ility in mechanical terms presents a close analogy to
the impossibility of a physical and chemical explanation
of the peculiar functions characteristic of life." APHK.
p.9; cf. p.6.
"...the concept of stationary states may indeed be said
to possess, within its field of application, just as;
much, or, if one prefers, just as little 'reality' as
the elementary particles themselves." ATM, p. 12; cf. p.
87.
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60. e.g. N.R.Hanson, The Concept of the Positron, pp.2-35
A.Land'e, Principles of Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge,
1937, pp.x, 3-9, Quantum Mechanics. London. 195-1, pp.
22,298; and W.H.McCrea, "Action at a Distance", Philos¬
ophy 27, 1952, pp.75-76.
61. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p. 58-1 - ATDN, pp. 57-59;
see L.ne Broglie, "Recherches sur la Th'eorie des Quanta",
Annales do Physique 3, 1925, pp.22-128.
62. ibid.
63. E.Schr'6dinger, "tfber das Verbaltnis der Heis-enberg-Born-
Jordanschen Quantenmechanik zu der in e in en ", Ann.Phys.
79, 1926, pp.73^-756; cf, fn.15 above; N.R.Hanson, "Are
Wave Mechanics and Matrix Mechanics Equivalent Theor¬
ies?", in H.Feigl and G.Maxwell, eds., op.cit., ppJ+01-
^-25; and P.A.M.Dirac, "Foundations of Quantum Mechanics"
Nature 203, 196*f, pp.115-116.
6*+. M.Born, "Quantenmechanik der Stossvorgahge", Zeit.Phys.
38, 1926, p.805.
65. The latter two kinds of particles are still largely hypo¬
thetical. For a good semi-popular presentation, see
V.Guillemin, The Story of Quantum Mechanics - New York,
1968, ch.12. For a mathematical treatment, see e.g. D.
Lurie, Particles and Fields', New York, 1968. Note that
when acceleration occurs fields become waves and virtual
particles- become real particles.
66. Unfortunately, Bohr never fully developed his thoughts--
on the role of complementarity in quantum field theory;
but see N.Bohr and L.Rosenfeld, "Field and Charge Meas¬
urements in Quantum Electrodynamics", P.bys. Rev. 78,
1950, esp. pp.79^,798.
67. e.g. M.Born, "Bemerkungen zur statistischen Deutung der
Quantenmechanik", in F.Bopp, ed., op.clt., p.113, and
A.Lande, "Dualismus, Wissenschaft und Hypothe'se", ibid,
pp .122-123 •
68. cf. Reichenbach's "principle of anomaly"; e.g. Philos¬
ophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Berkeley, 19^1-,
p.33; see below, chA. 9«
69. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p.581. The difference
between the propagation and collapse of a wave corres¬
ponds to von Neumann's distinction between automatic,
continuous, reversible, causal changes of a "pure state"
and arbitrary, discontinuous, irreversible, statistical
changes to a "mixture" (J.von Neumann, op.cit., pp.351,
357-358; cf. E.P.Wlgner. op.clt., p.1553. However, for
von Neumann (and Wigner) the "wave-function31 is merely
the statistical description of an ensemble of identical
systems and its collapse does net occur until the res¬
ults of a measurement enter human consciousness, whereas
8g
for Bohr the "wave-mode" is a physical system in itself
which collapses whenever its macroscopic environment
r equir e s it (see Jo von N eumann, op,.cit. , pp. 298, fn♦ 156,
and *+18-*+20; and E.P.Wigner, op.cit., pp.i72,l?6). On
the difference between Bohr and von Neumann see A. Shim-
ony, "The Role of the_Observer in Quantum Theory", Am.J.
Phys. 31, 1963) pp.758-768; L.Rosenfeld, "The Measuring
Process in Quanturn Mechanic s ", Prog.Th,Phys., Supplement,
Extra No., 1965, p.223, "Questions of Method in the Con¬
sistency Problem of Quantum Mechanics", hue .'Phys. AlOS,
1968, pp.2i+l-2h2: D.L.Schumacher, "Time and Physical
Language", in I.Gold and D.L.Schumacher, eds., The Nature
of Time. Ithaca, 1967) pp.196-213; T.En5tin, ed~, op.
cit., pp.*+,65j71)86,95) and C.A.Hooker, loc.cit,., pp.
158-159.
70. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p.585«
71. "Maxwell and Modern Theoretical Physics", p.692, "Field
and Charge Measurements, ete.":, p.79'+; cf. C.F.von Weiz-
sh'cker, "Komplementaritat-und Logik", p.523; andL.de
Broglie, New Perspectives in Physics, Edinburgh, 1962,
pp.9-11.
72. e.g. APffiC, ppA2-k3.
73' If a; shutter is used to define the instant of passage
through the slit the wave will start out as a narrow
wave-packet with poorly defined wavelength and frequency,
but it will rapidly spread out in space, and as the un¬
certainty in position and time increases;the uncertainty
in momentum and. energy (hence in wavelength and frequen¬
cy) will decrease; cf. E.P.,Wigner, op.cit., p.156.
7*+« de Broglie has-' even drawn a parallel with Zeno's paradox;
an arrow cannot be in motion at the same time that it is
located at a particular point: Matter and Light, London,
1939) p«2.5*+; see also A.Lande, "Causality and Dualism on
Trial", in M.Bunge, ed., The Delaware Seminar in the
Foundations of Physics, Berlin, 1967) p-339- '
75* "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p.586 = ATDN, pp..75-76,
"On the Notions of Causality and Complementarity", p. .
31^. This is similar to James's analysis of the stream
of consciousness; into "an alternation of flights and per-
chings" or of "transitive parts" and "substantive parts"
(Principles of Psychology, pp.2^3-2kk) as pointed out
by M.Jammer, (The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mech¬
anics , p.178).
76. APffiC, p.1+3.
77« "It is a purely formal matter to say that these waves
consist of photons since the conditions under which we
control the emission and reception of the radio waves
preclude the possibility of determining the number of
photons they should contain. In such a case we may say
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that all trace of the photon idea, which is essentially
one of enumeration of elementary processes, has completely
disappeared." "Maxwell and Modern Theoretical Physics",
p.692.
78. In terms of the theory of spectral decomposition the
collapse represents the selection of one actual particle
position (Dirac delta-function) out of an infinite set
of possible particle positions'; see above. fn.-SU-.
7,9» APHK, p.b-2; cf. "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description, etc.",
p. 697 •
80. In terms of the theory of spectral decomposition the ex¬
pansion of the spherical wave with, well-defined frequency
and wavelength represents the selection of one: actual
wave out of an infinite set of possible; waves. The sel¬
ection in this case is governed by the conservation laws
for energy and momentum, hence the frequency and wave¬
length of the spherical wave will be the same as those
of the plane wave before it; cf. fn.78 above;.
81. APHK. p. 1*3.
82. See above, p.21.
83. APHK. p.*f3.
81*. "Free particles" here are particles with well-defined
position and poorly defined momentum. They are produced
during transitions bet\roen stationary slates (correspon¬
ding to waves or "bound particles") either by emission
or absorption or ionization.
85. See ch.1.5 above. The. notion of 'potentiality' is; intro¬
duced here as an aid to interpreting Bohr's statements
about photons and electrons and. to working out the imp¬
lications of the logic of complementarity. Bohr never
uses the term 'potentiality' himself, but I am arguing
that the concept is implicit in his writings. In order
to avoid misunderstanding, therefore, the concept must
be viewed in the context, of the passages I have cited
and in relation to the logic of complementarity as a
whole. It should not be identified with the Aristotel¬
ian notion of 'potency', for instance, although
Aristotle does seem to take account of environmental
conditions in his own definition (Metaphysics., Book
Theta, ch.5)•
86. "...the study of complementary phenomena demands mutually
exclusive experimental arrangements." APHK, pAl; cf.
pp.5}19>^7»90, and Essays, pp.5>12,60.
87. "...a new mode of description designated as; complement -
ary in the sense that any given application of the
classical concepts precludes the simultaneous use of
other classical concepts..." ATPIT, p.10; cf. p.l9j and
Essays, pp. 5}6l.
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88o APHK, pp.73>90, and Essays, p.63.
89. "...the impossibility of combining phenomena observed
under different experimental arrangements' into a single
classical picture, implies that such apparently contra¬
dictory phenomena must be regarded as complementary..»"
Essays. p.25«
90. "Consequently, evidence obtained under different experi¬
mental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single
picture, hut must be regarded as complementary..." APHK,
p.^0; cf. pp.7,26, and Essays, pp.b-,12,92.
91. APHK. pp.30,Vo.
92. "Newton's Principles, etc.", p.60, APHK. pAo.
93* "Causality and Complementarity", p.293*
9^. ATM, p. 107, "Causality and Complementarity", p.29-f-, and
APHK. p.kO.
95* "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p.580 = ATM, pp.
"Chemistry and the Quantum Theory, etc.", p.376, and
"Physical Science and the Study of Religions", p.387.
96. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", pp. 587? 589 = ATM, pp.77-
78,85; cf. p.35.
97. APHK, pp.5,19. N.Brody and P.Oppenheim call this "non-
compatibility" rather than incompatibility: "Application
of Bohr's Principle of Complementarity to the Mind-Body
Problem", J.Phil. 66, 1969, p.98.
98. e.g. ATM, pp.71,73,76,95* As Meyer-Abich points' out
(op.cit., p.152), Bohr never called conjugate properties
themselves complementary. Only the modes in which they
are respectively defined are complementary (contra P.
Bernays, "(Jber die Ausdehnung des Begriffes der Komple-
mentaritat auf die Philosophie", Synthese 7, 19^-8, p.66).
The term "conjugate" comes from the canonical Hamilton-
ian formulation of classical mechanics in terms of
generalized position and momentum coordinates. The pro¬
duct of two; conjugate quantities (like position and
momentum) always has the units of angular momentum or
"action" (hence the "quantum of action").
99. ATM, p.11.
100. ATM, pp.68,98,nA, and APHK, pp.b-0,72.
101. M.Born and P.Jordan, "Zur Quantenmechanik", Zeit.Phys.
3®+, 1925, p.871; and M.Born, W.Heisenberg, and" P.Jordan.,
"Zur Quantenmechanik II", Zeit.Phys. 35, 192.6, pp.562,
577; of. N.Bohr, "The Quantum Postulate, etc. p.585 ~
ATDN, p.71, and Essays, pp.5,6l.
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102. W.Heisenberg, Uber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quan-
ten-theoretischen Kineraatik und Mechanik.", Ze.it.Phys.
^3. 1927, p.175; cfo N.Bohr, "The Quantum Postulate,
etc.", pp.581,582,583,585 = ATM, pp.57,60,63,72-73,
APHIC, p.72, and Essays, p.5- On the problem of inter¬
preting the role of time in the uncertainty relations:
see D.Bo'hm and. Y.Aharanov, "Time in the Quantum Theory
and the Uncertainty Relation for Time: and Energy",
Phys.Rev. 122, 1961, pp.16^9-1658.
103. e.g. ATM, p.95- It is variously cited as h, h/2,
h/2v and h/W.
10b. ATM, pp. 18-19,9'+~95.
105. e.g. ATM) p.60, APHK, p.72, an.d Essays.. p. 5*
106. e.g. ATM) P«87«
107. h =? 6.55 x 10"erg seconds.
108. On the reinstatement of real becoming in modern physics
seeM.^apek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary
Physics. Princeton, 196.1, ch.17.
109. M.Born, "Quantenmechanik der Stossvorgahge", p.Bflf; cf.
N.Bohr, "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p.586 = ATM,
pp.7^-75.
110. APHK, p.3^) and Essays. p.*+.
111. ATM, p.12, APHK, pp. 5,71,90, and Essays, pp. 11-12,25,
60,92.
112. See ch.l, fn. 82.
113. See ch.l.5, esp. fn.122.
11^. Hence this "irreversibility" is itself statistical; cf.
D.Bohm, Quantum Theory, ppAl5, 608f; and Y.Aharonov
et al., "Time Symmetry in the Quantum Mechanical Pro¬
cess: of Measurement", Phys.Rev. 13^f, 196^4-, pp.Bl^lO-
Bli-i-l6. On the perennial problem of time reversal see
D.Williams, "The Myth of Passage", J.Phil. *+8, 1951,
pp.*+57-^72; H.Reichenbach, The Direction of Time, Berk¬
eley, 1956; M.tfapek, op.cit.. chs.llff; H.Mehlberg,
"Physical Laws- and Time's Arrow", in H.Feigl and G.
Maxwell, eds., op.cit., pp.105-138; R.Schlegel, Time
and the Physical World, East Lansing, 1961; G.J.Whitrow,
The Natural Philosophy of Time, London, 1961, ch.6,
and What Is Time?, London, 1972, ch.7; A. Grtfnbaum,
"The Nature of Time", in R.G.Colodny, ed., Frontiers of
Science and Philosophy, pp.lV7-l88, and Philosophical
Problems of Space and Time. London, 1961+; J ,J .C.Smart,
Philosophy and Scientific Realism, London, 19,63, ch.7>
and Problems of Space and Time, New York, 196k; 0.Costa
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ae Beauregard, "Irreversibility Problems", in Y.Bar-
Hillel, ed., op.cit., pp.313 "34-2; R.Fischer, ed., Inter¬
disciplinary Perspectives of Time (Annals of the New
York Academy of Sciences, 138, 1967, pp. 3*67-9157, Part
1; T.Gold and D.L.Schumacher, eds., The Nature of Time,
Ithaca, 1967; J.T.Fraser, ed., The Voices of Time, Lon¬
don, 1968, part 4-; R.Swinburne, Space and Time, London,
i960, R.M.Gale, The Language of Time and The Philosophy
of Time, London, 1968; J.Zeman, ed., Time in Science
and Philosophy, Prague, 1971, Part 1; J.T.Fraser et al.,
eds., The Study of Time, New York, 1972, Part 1, B.Gal-
Or, "The Crisis About the Origin of Irreversibility and
Time", Science 176, 1972, pp.11-17; and R.G.Sachs, "Time
Reversal", Science 176, 1972, pp.987-597.
115. APRK, pp.89,98, and Essays, pp.3,24-25,61,92.
116. "In the language of the relativity theory...a general
reciprocal relation exists between the maximum sharp¬
ness of definition of the space-time and energy-momentum
vectors associated with the individuals. This circum¬
stance may be regarded as a simple symbolical expression
for the complementary nature of the space-time descrip¬
tion and the claims of causality." "The Quantum Postu¬
late, etc.", p.582 = ATM, P*60.
117. The probability of collapse to any point is proportional
to the density of the "blur" at that point.
118. Bohm has stressed the fact that the shape of the cell in
phase space is determined by experimental conditionsi
"On Bohr's Views Concerning the Quantum Theory", pD.36-
38.
119. Perhaps this is the best point at which to discuss the
difference between the complementarity of modes and
Karl Heim's 'contact of spaces' (God Transcendent, Lon¬
don, 1935, pp.70ff). Heim is concerned with the point
of intersection between two perpendicular lines or dim¬
ensions (in fact, there is 110 real 'contact' since the
lines have no width) like those shown in the sketches-
above. The point of intersection obviously satisfies
the condition of unity, and the two lines which define
it are equally important and mutually exclusive, as
well. But they do not satisfy the condition of indi¬
vidual completeness for, in spite of the fact that the
point belongs "wholly and completely" to both lines
(op.cit., p.70), it can only be described in terms of
their intersection and not in terms of either of the
lines individually. In fact, the point of intersection
does not share any of the characteristic properties of
the two lines since only an infinitessimal portion of
either line is present in the point; in other words,
they are not 'fully present'. Moreover, the two lines
are not coexhaustive since more dimensions can be added
indefinitely, and there is no coinherence or alterna¬
tion between them. Either of the sketches above would
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describe the point of intersection for all time since
Helm's idea is static and lifeless. Finally, the 'con¬
tact of spaces' is entirely symmetrical with respect to
its two dimensions ana hence will not satisfy the two
conditions that we are about to discuss, emergence and
pointing.
120. "...the complementary relationship between the stability
properties; of the atoms themselves: and such behaviour of
their constituent particles as allows; of a description
in terms of space-time coordination." APHK, p.21; cf.
pp.6,9,19,21, ATM, pp.23,81, and Essays, pp.2,11,63.
121c "Here, the complementary description offers indeed the
adequate approach to the problem of atomic stability
with which we were faced from the very beginning. Thus,
the interpretation of spectral regularities and chemi¬
cal bonds refers to experimental conditions mutually
exclusive of those which permit exact control of the
position and displacement of the individual electrons;
in the atomic systems." Essays, p.63; cf. above, ch.l,
fn.158.
122. "Causality and Complementarity", p.296, and APHK, pp.7,
99.
123. "...just this complementary mode of description leaves
room for regularities in atomic processes foreign to
mechanics but as essential for our account of the be¬
haviour of living organisms as for the explanation of
the specific properties of inorganic matter." APHK, p.7,
cf. Essays, p. 5«
12*+. APHK, p.99, and Essays, pp.25,63.
125« "Chemistry and the Quantum Theory, etc.", p.373, APHK,
p.99, and Essays, pp.25-63.
126. "Chemistry and the Quantum Theory, etc."', p.369, APHK,
p..99, and Essays, p.2.
127. "Chemistry and the Quantum Theory, etc.", pp.3lf9,376;
cf. fn.19 above.
128. Contrast Polanyi's "complementarity" of analysis and
integration: Knowing and Being, p.125*
129. ATM, pp.23,35, 5^-55,77-78, APHK, pp.6-7,19, 21, 99, and
Essays, pp.5,11,25,63.
130. See p.23 above.
131* Essays, p.5; cf. the application of the concept of stat¬
ionary states (ATM, pp.23,77-78, APHK, pp.6-7) and the
non-analyzability of atomic stability in mechanical
terms (APHK, p.9)•
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132. "The Quantum Postulate, etc.", p. 582 - ATD1-I, pp. 62-63.
For the parallel treatment of energy measurement, see
ibid, pp.587-588 = ATDN, pp.80-81.
133. See ch.I, fn. 169 • Note that the "pointing relation"




Bohr's Use of Complementarity in Other Fields;
"Around these ideas the philosophical and theo¬
logical battle has raged for centuries because
men have, always set their hearts: on bringing
everything into one system. Now the impossib¬
ility of this has. become apparent oven in
physics;, that most rigorous and simple of
sciences5 even here the complementary attitude, to
differing aspects is necessary. Hence we must
expect this everywhere." M.Born, Physics; and
Politics;, p. 57•
From the very start Bohr drew analogies between the
principle of complementarity in atomic physics; and older,
more familiar relationships in biology and psychology."1"
He did this for a twofold purpose: to help explain the
novel developments; in physics and, conversely, to provide a
basis; for reinvestigating the more familiar problems in
2
other fields. For Bohr these analogies were not merely
heuristic guides, however, for behind them lay a logical
kinship due to the universality of the basic principles of
epistemology and ontology.
3.1 Statistical Thermodynamics - Microstate. and Macrostate:
Statistical thermodynamics is a complex subject,
and, unfortunately, Bohr has not given us. a thorough treat-
ment. From the viewpoint of complementarity the essential
features are these: a large system of identical atoms or
molecules exists in one of two modes, either as a mechanical
system with a well-defined microstate (the positions and
\ 5
momenta of all the molecules are determined)-^ or as a thermo -
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dynamic system with a well-defined macrostate (the tempera-
/
ture and entropy of the system as-a. whole is determined)0.
One of the most striking paradoxes of classical physics is;
the fact that the basic laws of mechanics (Newton's laws)
are strictly reversible whereas irrevers1bi1itv is an
essential feature of thermodynamics (the second law of
thermodynamics" - entropy increases monotonically in isolated.
n
systems) . Bohr regarded this paradox as a clear example
of complementarity between laws of nature which require
mutually exclusive experimental conditions'. On one hand,
there is the complete control or detailed description of the
motions of individual molecules; on the other hand, there is
the definition and application of the concepts of temperature
Q
and entropy. All of this holds true in classical physics
itself and is completely independent of the existence of
complementarity in quantum mechanics.
Now the temperature of a. thermodynamic system can.
be defined in one of three ways:; (1; In the Maxwell-
Boltzmann treatment of kinetic theory temperature is defined
as a parameter determining the breadth of the velocity
distribution of molecules based on the assumption of "mole¬
cular chaos" (complete randomness in the motions of the
individual molecules)"*"^. This" can be interpreted in one of
two ways; either that the temperature itself is a measure of
uncertainty in the individual velocities; of the molecules
or that the very definition of the temperature presupposes
this uncertainty."1"^ (2) In the more general Boltzmann
treatment of statistical mechanics, temperature is defined
as a measure of the breadth of the energy (and hence velocity)
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distribution of the molecules based on the assumption of"
equal a priori probability (hence equal uncertainty) of all
the available inicrostates (Liouville's theorem).(3) In
the Gibbs treatment of statistical mechanics, temperature is
defined by means of a "canonical ensemble" of identical sys¬
tems in thermal equilibrium with a heat reservoir. While
their temperature is determined their energies fluctuate
about a mean value, and hence their micro states are uncertain.
Conversely, the definition of energy requires a "microcanon¬
ical ensemble" in which the systems are all isolated and their
11
temperatures are uncertain. J Since this approach is Inher¬
ently statistical, treating large ensembles of identical
Ik
systems rather than individual systems, it is less- convincing
than the Maxwell-Boltzmann approach which treats individual
systems. Bohr utilized it, however, because it brings out
"I 5
the complementarity relationship so clearly."
A comparison of this use of complementarity with the
eleven points of complementarity in atomic physics shows almost
16
complete agreement. The only questionable point of com¬
parison Is the condition of evolution by alternation between
the two modes. It is not generally recognized that a thermo¬
dynamic system evolves by alternation between the definition
of microstate and macrostate in response to environmental
changes because the environment is usually assumed to be
constant. Hence,a thoroughly compleraentarist treatment will
require an analysis of the non-equilibrium thermodynamics of
17
interacting systems.
Two further points should be emphasised to dist¬
inguish Bohr1s treatment from the alternative notion of
"orthogonality". The mechanical and thermodynamic modes
are mutually exclusive in reality since they require mutually
vo
exclusive conditions for their definition, and under a given
set of conditions the system is completely understood in
terms of the appropriate mode of existence (conditions 3 and
8). The more usual view of thermodynamics is represented
by Polanyi, who likens the emergence of randomness in ther¬
modynamic systems to the "emergence" of randomness: .in a
!18
shuffled pack of cards'. In both cases, according to
Polanyi, the emergence depends' on our not knowing the
detailed ordering of the system, an ordering which nonethe¬
less exists. Since it depends: on individual knowledge, the
emergent quality may exist for one observer, who is- ignorant
of the details, but not for another, who has discovered
them. In fact, the second lav; of thermodynamics will hold
19
for the one observer, but not for the other. In other
words, for Polanyi, the two modes represent two ways of
looking at the same reality, two orthogonal dimensions of
the object itself which exclude each other in thought and
experience, but not in reality. Eence, the modes coexist
in reality, and neither one of them fully accounts for the
object as it exists; in any given circumstance. Here the
contrast between orthogonality and complementarity carries
over from atomic physics into thermodynamics;.
Even though Bohr said relatively little about the
role of complementarity in thermodynamics, the importance
of this application cannot be overstressea. Statistical
thermodynamics is the only field of application outside
atomic physics which has been rigorously formulated, or in¬
deed is capable of being completely formalized mathematically.
Therefore, the existence of complementarity in thermodynamics
91
gives strong support to Bohr's contention that the parallels
he draws between different fields are not just."vague analo¬
gies", but "clear examples of logical relations which, in
,-20
different contexts, are met with in wider fields*"
Furthermore, the examples of complementarity in
atomic physics and thermodynamics are not only logically-
parallel; they are also hierarchically related (though physi¬
cally independent). The mechanical mode of a physical
system consists of individual atoms or molecules-, but these
atoms- or molecules', in turn, exist in one of two modes,
either as waves- (stable atoms;) or as groups of elementary
particles. In other words, the microstate of a classical
system of molecules consists- of specifying the positions and
momenta of all the individual molecules, but quantum-
mechanically these can be defined only under- mutually exclu¬
sive conditions. In fact, a very precise definition of the
positions is incompatible with the stability of the molecules;
themselves. Consequently, the complementarity of atomic
systems can be treated as a subdivision of the complement¬
arity of systems of atoms, or physical systems; in general.






Here we have a hierarchical structure with three
levels J that of stable physical systems (of many atoms.),
2J
that of stable atoms, and that of elementary part.ic.ces.
The tree-diagram is misleading in some respects, however.
It makes the relationships appear static like those of a
grammatical hierarchy whereas the modes in complementarity
are continually in alternation. It also makes the higher
levels appear to be invariant as if they could exist amodall
themselves. To counteract these tendencies, one must alway
remember to work his way downwards as far as possible along
a given branch of the tree and to repeat this process when¬
ever the object switches from one. mode (represented by a
branch) to another. For instance, if a physical system is
in the thermodynamic mode no further specification is necess¬
ary. But, if it switches to the mechanical mode, then one
must further specify whether it is in the wave or particle
branch. Under these conditions, the tree-diagram will be
an extremely useful tool in our mapping of 'the logic of com¬
plementarity.
3.2 Biology •- Atom and Organism:
Bohr treated the application of complementarity to
biological science more thoroughly than any other, thus
reflecting the deep interest in the problem of mechanism and
2 0
vitalism instilled in him by his father.' His basic
thought is that a biological entity may exist in one of two
modes, either as a system of atoms and molecules governed
by the laws of physics and chemistry or as an organism gov¬
erned by peculiar laws of its own.Which mode is
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actualized depends, of course, on the experimental condit¬
ions, i.e. whether the entity is experimentally analyzed as
a. physico-chemical system, in which case no life can exist,
2b
or whether the integrity of the organism is respected
and indwelt as part of "that nature to which we belong"
ourselves. J It follows that there is no violation of the
laws of physics and chemistry in life processes, on one
hand; they fully account for those situations in which they
are well-defined (individual completeness). ° But, on the
other hand, life processes; cannot be reduced to physico-
27
chemical terms (equal importance). Hence, the mechanistic
and vitalistic viewpoints are not contradictory, but comple-
OA
mentary, to each other. The characteristic features that
emerge in the organismic mode include individual uniqueness,
^
organization, freedom,rhythm2^ 'wholeness-, self-
3b 39
stabilization, self-preservation and regeneration,
irreversibility and memory,^ purpose^ and function,2U and
phylogenetic evolution.But the fundamental, irreducible
feature, analogous to the quantum of action in atomic
bo
physics, is the fact of life itself.
Bohr's argument for the irreducibility of life
processes is based on an analysis of the possibilities of
bl
both observation and definition. Clearly, the individual
atomic processes can not be observed without destroying the
organismic features, but neither can they be suitably defined
in a living being. Bohr argued the latter point in two
ways; (l) In his earlier writings he based his reasoning on
the necessity of a sharp boundary between the biological
b2
object and its environment for unambiguous communication.
9^
On the ecological level this distinction is possible, but
on the atomic scale it is not possible since life processes
involve a continual exchange of atomic matter with the
environment. Therefore, the very definition of life is
incompatible with the unambiguous definition of individual
Lj,o ^
atomic processes. (2) In his later writings' Bohr stressed
the fundamental complexity of biological organisms due to
the huge number of atoms involved in the maintainance of life
l+lf
processes and, in contrast to machines or crystals, the
extreme inhomogeneitv or irregularity of structure on the
if5
atomic scale. Together these conditions imply the utter
impossibility of defining the atomic state of an organism,
even by statistical methods, while life processes are going
1+6
on. The two arguments; Bohr used are closely related since
the continual exchange of matter is one aspect of the com¬
plexity and irregularity of living organisms on the atomic
scale.
Certainly these arguments are much more intuitive
and fallible than the more rigorous reasoning for complemen¬
tarity in atomic physics and thermodynamics. In fact, it
may never be possible to formalize biological science to the
point where they can be decisively evaluated. Complemen¬
tarity may always have to be regarded as an hypothesis in
biology, accepted by some and repudiated by others (as
indeed it still is in atomic physics). Nonetheless, comple¬
mentarity is to be expected in biology, even though it cannot
be rigorously demonstrated, because of the parallel to
thermodynami. cs. where it can. Just as complementarity in
thermodynamics is related hierarchically to complementarity
in atomic physics, so it its (plausibly) with biology and
physicso In fact, biology and. thermodynamics represent
tyro possible directions of emergence above the atomic level,
one of radical inhomogeneity and the other of relative
homogeneity* The emergence itself, then, is a matter of
complementarity, but the direction of emergence is a matter
of the degree of homogeneity. Just as one group of atoms
or molecules may belong to a thermodynamic system, so another,
less homogenous- group may belong to a biological organism.
physical biological
■Therefore, Bohr's heuristic arguments for complementarity
in biology are supported by a fundamental belief in the
common structure of the sciences, reflecting a. common struc¬
ture of the various levels of reality which they study.
In reality, of course, the situation in biology is
usually much more complex than that in thermodynamics. A
highly-evolved organism is not simply composed of atoms and
molecules like a thermodynamic system. There are also
intermediate levels of organization like those of organelles,
lf'7
cells, tissues, organs and. organ systems. ' In fact, at
each of these levels there is a relation of complementarity
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between the structure of the unit at that level and the
us
function the same unit fulfils at the next higher level.
Such a function-structure unit is called a "tagmeme" in
LlQ
linguistics. Originally designed for use in grammatical
analysis5, '•tagmemlcs" can be applied to a variety of fields
90y and is ideally suited for the complementarist approach to
biology. Suppose an organism is composed of several organ
systems: a circulatory system, a digestive system, a resp¬
iratory system, a nervous system, etc. Each of these terms
designates a function within the organism as a whole, but
they are ambiguous in that they couple structural ideas tog¬
ether with functional ones. In tagraeml.es (or complemen¬
tarity) we must- clearly distinguish function from' structure,
hence we shall restrict these terms to their functional sense
and use the terms heart-system, stomach-sysbem, lung-system,
and brain-system to designate the structural counterparts.
Then a tagmemic formula for the organism in question would
, 5-1read:
Organism ~ + circulatory system: heart-system
+ digestive system: stomach-system
+ respiratory system.: lung-system
+ nervous system: brain-system + etc.
Then each of these structural units would have to be further
analyzed at the organ level. Again the units are function-
structure composites or tagmemes. For example, the formula
for the heart system would read:
heart-system = + pumping mechanism: heart
+ distribution system: arteries
+ collection system: veins
+ connecting system: capillary system
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Each of these organs would then have to be analyzed at the
tissue level, and so on. The difference between an organism
and a grammatical structure, however, is that the levels of
an organism do not coexist (from the complementarist view¬
point) but continually alternate as the organism evolves
92(ontogenetically). Using the tree-diagram again, we may
represent the alternative levels of branches as follows J
biological
■ system
For simplicity, we shall use the abbreviated form on the left
since we shall be more concerned with the relation of biology
as a whole to other sciences rather than with the detailed
92
structure of biology itself. J
3.3 Psychology - Body and Mind:
After biology and physics, psychology was Bohr's
favourite field of application for the principle of comple-
99-
mentarity. There are two distinct approaches to this
98
subject in Bohr's writingsj one is "subjective"} based on
the problems of introspection, and the other is "objective",
based on the problems of applying the laws' of physics and
physiology to the study of psychic phenomena.
In any unambiguous reference to our own conscious
states, says Bohr, we must make a clear distinction between
the content of consciousness, upon which we are focusing
our attention, and the background which we call "ourselves",
qq
The immense richness of mental life is due to the
variety of possible locations for this subject-object boundary
56
and the continual shifting back and forth. Normal healthy
people instinctively adapt to these alterations and so
hardly notice them, but there are psychiatric cases of "con¬
fusion of the egos" or "split-personality" in people who
fail to make the necessary adjustments.*' Alternatively,
Bohr argues that a sharp distinction between psychic phen-
58
omena and their conscious perception is never possible
since any act of introspection shifts the subject-object
boundary inwards and automatically alters the content of
59
consciousness. Either way, an emotion felt and an emotion
z o
analyzed are two different things, not to be confused.
The same is true of a decision made and a decision analyzed.
The analysis of one's motives can never provide an. argument
against free volition because the two phenomena are comple¬
mentary and therefore never in direct conflict.0"'" In the
same manner, Bohr frequently spoke of complementarity
between seriousness- and humor, ' thoughts and feelings, ^
6'+ 6 5
reason and instinct, and knowledge and belief. '
For comparison, Bohr's shifting-boundary model of
99
consciousness can be .related to the internal stimulus -
response cycle of DoHard and Miller or to the inner speech
model of Vygotsky. Bohr would say that mental life pro¬
ceeds by a continual shifting of the subject-object boundary
so that at one moment a thought or feeling or perception is
indwelt (subject) and at the next moment it is analyzed
(object). If we view this process from the rest frame of
the subject-object boundary itself, then it will appear that
the thought moves back and forth across the boundary line
as it changes from one mode to the other. In Polanyi's.
idiom, it is alternatively "interiorized" (in our subsidiary



















Then the process of thinking is an internalized form of the
familiar cycle of writing down an idea, looking at it, ref¬
lecting on it, thinking of the next step, and writing it
down. It is a kind of "reflex circuit"^*7, or "functional
circle" (Funktlonskrels) or "stimulus-response"i cycle^
that has been internalized. There may be a large number
of these internal responses, by which we visualize our next
move and anticipate its consequences, before the final
100
commitment to an outward response in the external world.
The ability to carry on sustained thought in this way is, of
course, characteristic of man and clearly distinguishes him
70
from other animals.
Moreover, this ability to think involves the use
of language so its development in the individual must be
related to the development of language behaviour. Years
ago, Vygotsky suggested that the development of thought in
a child takes place as the phenomenon of "egocentric-speech"
71
is transformed into, "inner speech". Young children
(three to seven years) often talk to themselves as they
play, but as they grow older and learn to play with other
children this "egocentric-speech", as it is called, gradually
fades away. Piaget originally suggested that it simply
72
vanishes as the child becomes more socialised, but Vygotsky
disagreed with this interpretation and tried to ■show that
it is really internalized and gives rise to conscious
thought. This notion is certainly plausible, at least in¬
tuitively, and it may help to clarify Bohr's more unusual
presentation of the structure of consciousness.
What then is the relationship between the conscious¬
ness or mind and the body? Bohr suggested that the usual
view of "psycho-physical parallelism" could be generalized
and reinterpreted in terms of complementarity. There can
be no violation of causality in the physiological processes
of the nervous system since the laws of physics and biology
fully account for those phenomena in which they are well-
defined. However, such a detailed analysis of another
person's nervous system is clearly incompatible with his
101
Oh
exercise of free will* Therefore, the laws of physics
and biology are not applicable to mental phenomena themselves,
and the fact of ffee will, which we know intuitively, must
be taken as an irreducible postulate in psychology just as
75
the existence of life is .in biology. In fact, the only
way to predict another person's actions while respecting his
ri /
freedom is to put oneself in his place. This concept of
"indwelling" is very close to Diltliey's concept of Verstehen
or "empathy", except that it is not inconsistent with
rationality or objectivity and it is not restricted to the
77
"sciences of the spirit". It can also be compared with
Polanyi's concept of indwelling except that, for Polanyi,
one knows another person's mind by indwelling his physiogn¬
omy and behaviour and attending away from these to his
#70
mind. Hence the mind is specifiably known while the body
(actually only Its surface) is known tacitly. For Bohr,
however, mijid and body are the two modes of man's being; to
indwell man as man, is to know his mind (tacitly), and to
79
analyze him as an animal is to know his body (specifiably).'
Hence the relationship between mind and body is one of com¬
plementarity and not a "from-at" relation in. Polanyi's
80
sense.
When we treat mind as complementary to body we
automatically avoid the pitfalls of dualism (by the condition
of unity) and epiphenomenalism (by the conditions of indivi-
3~L
dual completeness and equal importance). Man is a single
being existing alternately in one of two modes, the mental
and the physical, where the physical mode or body is further
102
subject to modal existence as we have seen in the previous
O p
section. A full representation of the alternative






A man can be treated either as a group of particles (physic¬
ally) or as a compound of atoms and molecules (chemically)
or as a living organism (biologically) or as a conscious
mind (psychologically), and all four of these views are
O ^
correct in their respective circumstances. J None of them
can be reduced to the others. Of course, the real situa¬
tion is far more -complex: the atom-organism unit is really
an abbreviation for the more elaborate structure shown on
page 97, and a more detailed investigation of the mind-body
unit would undoubtedly reveal a series of intermediate
levels there as well. However, the basic structure is
not affected by these refinements, and the underlying logic
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Is most vividly portrayed by a simple model like this one.
At this stage we can better understand the nature
of the use of tools with which we began our study of
85
complementarity.-. When not being used, a. tool is simply
a compound of atoms and molecules. In the case of a
machine, it may be a thermodynamic (or some other kind of
higher) system. But, when it is used by man in accordance
with its proper function, it becomes an extension of man's
body and enters into complementarity with man's mind. In
other words, there exists a relationship of complementarity
between every artifact and the idea which originally inspired
86
its design and continues to inspire its proper use. The
ideas exist properly only in the mind of man so they may be
distorted or even forgotten. Wre are surrounded by the
lifeless artifacts of previous generations whose meaning or
purpose has been lost in this way. Nonetheless, they bear
silent testimony in the sense that they "point" to the ideas:
which gave them meaning and thus tantalize the research
worker, so that the rebirth of those ideas always remains a
potentiality within them (conditions of pointing and coin-
87herence). ' An obvious example would be the hieroglyphs
of ancient Egypt which were unintelligible for over two
thousand years until Francois Champollion deciphered them in
the early nineteenth century. The science of archaeology
also shows this complementarity: an archaeologist will
ignore hundreds of chipped stones in his excavation, but he
will put a few of these stones in a museum just because they
show signs of human workmanship. There is, an "infinite
qualitative difference" between two objects of similar size
lob
and apnearanee simply because one is capable of evoking the
idea which inspired its design.
Mans then, is characterized by the ability to extend
the limits of his own body through the use of tools. In
fact, the subject-object boundary can be moved outwards to
include a whole series of artifacts as in games of skill like
billiards where three or four artifacts may be indwelt at a
time (e.g. a combination shot in "eight bail" or snooker).
Subhuman animals like chimpanzees can design and use simple
tools under special conditions, but their ability to extend
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themselves in this way is severely limited. Moreover,
man is not limited to indwelling objects of his own making.
Science, history and religion are all based on his ability
to indwell and interpret objects and events in various ways.
For instance, by constructing and indwelling appropriate
models (systems of ideas) with his mind, man is able to extend
his subjecthood into the natural world indefinitely. And in
the religious experience of ecstasy the mystic attempts to
indwell all of nature and extend his subjecthood to include
the universe as a whole. If complementarity is valid here,
89
this indwelling should point him beyond nature to God.
Man is also capable of shifting the subject-object
boundary indefinitely inwards. Just as one can treat an
external object as a part of one's body by indwelling it, so
one can treat a part of one's body as an external object by
exteriorizing or alienating it. If I concentrate on my arm
as. an object, it becomes lifeless as if paralyzed. In
order to move it I must reoccupy it as subject, but then it
105
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ceases to be an object for me. This exteriorization or
alienation is a common technique in forms of meditation like
yoga. !hes:e methods involve a withdrawal from, the world
and a retraction of subjecthood in a movement of enstasy.
In fact? the two basic forms of religious awareness, the
91
enstatic and the ecstatic, can be understood as the direct
consequence of man's ability to shift the boundary between
subject and object. Then the fundamental issue of salvation
by works or by grace is determined by whether the boundary
shift is controlled by man or by God or both.
We have seen that there is a close connection bet¬
ween the use of tools and the nature of mind. From the
complementarist viewpoint, then, we may define mind (the
characteristic of man) as the capacity for subjecthood, i.e.
the ability to extend the limits of one's body, to enter
into complementarity with external objects (as with one's
body) and fill or indwell the proximal side of the subject-
object boundary; hence the ability to follow shifts in that
boundary (whether or not these are under one's control) and
to recognize the proper function of objects, the meaning of
symbols, and even the presence of God. Furthermore, it is
by the creation and "manipulation" (interiorization and
exteriorization) of ideas or thoughts that man's mind exer¬
cises this capacity. In order to use a tool properly or
interpret an event correctly and thus include it within his
"body", man must discover the function or significance of
the tool or event and indwell it with his mind. Hence,
there are two dimensions of complementarity involved in the
everyday behavior of man.: a "horizontal" co rap 1 en tentar A ty
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between a tool-analyzed and the~same~tool~applied (on the
bodily level) or an idea-analyzed and the-same-idea-
applied (on the mental level - this is Bohr's "subjective"
use of complementarity in psychology discussed above), and
a "vertical" comp1ementarity between each tool and the idea
behind it parallel to that between body and mind (Bohr's
"objective" use of complementarity in psychology). Hence
Bohr's two uses of complementarity in psychology are intim¬
ately related, though quite distinct.
Here we cannot avoid the issue of the existence of
a world of ideas comparable to the world of physical objects.
Ideas exist only in the mind of man, but do they exist separ¬
ately in many isolated minds or is there a single world of
ideas common to all (or most) rnen?^ in other words, are
the minds of men isolated like their brains, or is there
some higher unity in the realm of ideas, some kind of common
mind?^ A fully adequate answer to these questions (from
the complementarist viewpoint) would require a more elabor¬
ate formulation of complementarity than I have attempted
ot¬
here, but this much can be said at any rate: one would
expect from the logic of complementarity that a higher
degree of unity would be possible in the mind than in the
body, just as- a higher degree of unity is possible in an.
organism than in a group of atoms, or in the wave-mode than
in the particle-mode (condition of emergence). However,
while nothing can unify men like a belief or an idea, it is
also true that nothing else can divide men so strongly. The
potential for greater unity is there, but along with it is
96the potential for greater division. This is also true at
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the biological level, though to a lesser degree; two diss¬
imilar organisms can be united in a symbiotic relationship
while another two will destroy each other ant1~blotica1ly„
Even at the chemical level, atoms with reciprocal valences
readily combine to form molecules (homopolar bonds: or eon-
vaient bonds) while others are mutually inert (e.g. the
"inert gases").
Some degree of "common mind" may be inferred from
the existence of a common culture since men who indwell the
same artifacts must be inspired, to a large extent, by the
same ideas. Hence the integrating influence of language,
art and religious symbols. Such common artifacts literally
create and preserve a common mind by drawing out the sub-
jecthood of individual men onto a common ground. In fact,
it may be questioned whether those individuals who refuse or
fail to be drawn out in this way (solipsists or autistic
children) can be said to possess any knowledge or mind in
97
the proper sense. "
Before leaving the subject of psychology we should
note the gradual shift that has taken place in the logic of
complementarity from its original formulation in quantum
theory through its applications to biology and psychology.
For one thing, in atomic physics there is virtually no co¬
rrelation between the states of alternating modes <» A pure
wave can give rise to a particle over a wide volume of space
and a particle can give rise to a wave within a wide range
of momenta (although the selection must satisfy the conser¬
vation laws). Clearly this will not do for living
organisms in th9ir natural state,^ if an animal interacts
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with it a- environment on the molecular level (e.g. through
the senses of perception) and then converts to the organ is-*
mic or even the mental level, there must be some degree of
correlation or propriety between the states (the explicit
properties) at each of these levels (a kind of translation)
if the animal is to respond appropriately and survive. -1-00
This need is less- critical for plants than for animals, but
even for them there is a greater degree of correlation than
in the case of atoms or molecules. Bohr attributed this:
correlation to amplification effects between the various
levels of existence and noted the striking irreversibility
of sense perception (i.e memory) in organisms as a parallel
to the irreversibility of the measuring process in physics.
Furthermore, a kind of mirroring or imaging of the
whole enters into psychology while it is absent from physics
fend biology. "Mind" can be related both to the Individual
and also to the entire race of man (or at least large
portions of it). Hence, the individual is a microcosm.
reflecting or Imaging in some sense the being or essence of
man as a whole. On one hand, the individual does not exist
except as a part of the whole, and., on the other, the whole
10?
is fully present within each individual. This paradox
is quite distinct from the general problem of particulars
versus, universale or of parts- versus wholes since it only
occurs for social relations and is not present in the case
of particles in an atom or atoms in an organism. It is
related to the problem of individuality - the electrons of
an atom completely lose their individuality because they are
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identical to each other. The same is true of atoms of
the same kind in an organism. However, an organism it*
utterly unique and cannot lose its individuality even when
it enters into social relations. Instead it internalises
these relations in the:-forms of language, emotion, a self-
1 Q
image, etc. - all the characteristics of 'mind".x J
Therefore, an individual person cannot be isolated or abst¬
racted from social relations as an individual atom or even
an animal can. A person embodies those relations and
carries them around with him, as it were; they enter into
his very being. Hence the ambiguity of the word "man" (cf.
Hebrew Adam):■ it may refer to the individual or else to
the entire race. The same cannot be said of "Helium atom"
or even "German shepherd". Hence, in the transition from
physics to biology there is an emergence of "correlation"
or "propriety" between the states of the alternate modes,
and in the transition from biology to psychology there is an
emergence of this "mirroring" or "imaging" 'of the whole in
each individual. It should be noted, therefore, that the
logic of complementarity is not a rigid scheme that can be
imposed a priori on new areas of study. Rather it is a
flexible tool that must be adapted at each level of appli¬
cation in accordance with the progressive changes in the
levels themselves. A knowledge of the individual levels
and of their corresponding sciences must always be presupp-
t
osed.
To summarize: there are four basic ideas in the
overall logic of complementarity: (l) the eleven-point
complementarity relationship between alternate modes, (2)
lie
the relationship of homology or structural para.1.1 e1.1 smP-04'
between the applications of complementarity in various
fields, (3) the hierarchical relationship of these appli¬
cations, and (if) the progressive adaption of the basic
complementarity relationship from one end of the hierarchy
to the other .
3.lf Cultural Anthropology and Sociology - A Counterexamples
Bohr sometimes referred to different human cultures
as being complementary.He stressed the mutual exclus-
iveness of cultural traditions, the difficulty: in
appreciating the traditions of one culture in terms of those
of another,-'-0^ and the difficulty of separating cultural
phenomena from the process of ethnological observation.109
Of course, the same things could be said about different
religious or political traditions or even about different
paradigms within science.-'-'-0
However, Bohr stated repeatedly that the word "com¬
plementarity" was not being used here in the strict sense in
which it is used in atomic physics or psychology.111 In
particular, he pointed out that cultures are not strictly
exclusive because of their contact with one another and the
frequent fusion to form a new culture. Moreover, the
difficulty of appreciating other traditions can often be
overcome by dialogue based on the many common features which
cultures share. In other words, the relationship bet¬
ween cultures does not satisfy the important condition of
mutual exclusiveness; nor, for that matter does it satisfy
the conditions of alternation, coinherence, emergence or
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pointing. The real, value of Bohr's occasional references
to anthropology and sociology is as a counterexample vo show
that the idea of complementarity is not so ubiquitous that
11 q
it is simply meaningless.
3.5 Ethics and. Religion - Justice and Charity:
Justice and charity were also judged to he comple¬
mentary by Bohr, his principle argument being that the strict
application of law leaves r.10 room for the free display of
love, and, conversely that the free exercise of compassion
11R
may conflict with the ideal of justice. "" " In religious
mythology according to Bohr, this reciprocity is often por¬
trayed by a struggle between deities personifying the two
opposing ideals.11^ Apparently he regarded this analog3r
to complementarity as a major contribution to theological
science, but very few theologians have followed him up on
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it. ' From a biblical standpoint, of course, the dichot-
1 1 O
omy of love and justice is totally unacceptable. The
two ideals are united in the ideal father, whether human or
divine. There can be no true justice without charity and
no true love without justice so the two ideals are not
exclusive in principle even though they may often be in
119
practice. Even in dualistie traditions with opposing
deities, complementarity would not hold since love and just¬
ice would then be conflicting realities rather than comple¬
mentary modes of a single reality. Granted that theology
was not Bohr's strong point, it is still surprising that he
should have slipped so badly.
Considerable light has been thrown on the subject
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by Jerome S.Bruner who reports a conversation he had with
Bohr in 19l!-3 or early 19Mf. 120 Bohr told him that he had
first experienced the dichotomy of love and justice when he
found himself unable to discipline one of his children who
had done something very bade As Bohr expressed it, "You
cannot know somebody at the same time in the light of love
and in the light of justice.." Apparently this experience
made a deep impression on Bohr and provided the Sltz ini
Leben for his later discussions of the complementarity bet¬
ween the love and justice of God. Still it is surprising
that Bohr should have extrapolated his personal experience
so far particularly in view of his own words; of caution to
Einstein about ascribing attributes to Providence in every-
day language.
According to John Baillie, who attended the Gifford
Lectures, Bohr also hinted at the possibilities of comple¬
mentarity between human freedom ana divine grace and between
l?o
physical causation and divine providence. Here we are
dealing with two aspects of the doctrine of creation, the
integrity of the creature and the sovereignty of God. We
shall examine the logic of this relationship in chapter
eight, but here we can at least note that a relationship of
complementarity between man (representing creation) and God
would provide a plausible extension of the hierarchy of
complementarities discussed so far.
Finally, von Weizsacker reports that Bohr referred
in conversation to a complementarity between the immanence
and transcendence of God with respect to time both in Eastern
religions and in the Old Testament ("for You a. thousand
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year's are but a day": Ps.90A, 2 Pet.3.8). It is unfor¬
tunate that Bohr never developed this idea in print because
it turns out to represent a critical stage in the progressive
adaption of the logic of complementarity as we shall see in
chapter eight. The idea of sn alternation of modes in
complementarity presupposes some kind of temporal framework
and hence must be adapted to the limit if it is to be trans¬
lated from time itself to eternity. On the other hand, God
must not be thought of in static terms' even in his transcen¬
dence, so the concept of eternity must allow dynamic features
like "generation11, "procession", and alternation.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this survey
of Bohr's applications of complementarity outside the field
of atomic physics. First, Bohr saw complementarity as a
quite general principle, not limited to any one field but
basic to the structure of all knowledge and all reality.
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though in varying contexts. Secondly, Bohr saw comp¬
lementarity as an inherently hierarchical structure. The
emergence of novel features in the tacit mode of one comp-
plementarity relation (e.g. free particles -stable atoms)
allows that relation to nest within another parallel rela¬
tion at a higher level (atoms - organism). Though this
hierarchical structure was never explicitly worked out by
Bohr, it can be inferred directly from his writings as we
have seen. Finally, complementarity is to be seen as an
adaptable form rather than a fixed mold. While the eleven
points of definition are to be found at every level of
application they cannot be imposed a priori and can only be
compared and identified with the given features of each
ll^f
level individually. When we eome to discuss the "hole of
complementarity in theology, therefore, our principal con¬
cern will be to ask whether these eleven points have
counterparts in the various theological doctrines and whether
they are, in fact, comparable.
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Footnotes; Chapter 3.
. "The Quantum Postulate, etc. "'5 p. 590 - ATDN, p. 101; c;f.
pp.96-101,11?-119.
. ATDN, p.20; cf. L.Rosenfeld, "Niels Bohr in the Thir¬
ties", p.116.
. "...the gradual development of an appropriate terminology
for the description of the simpler situation in physical
science indicates that we are not dealing; with more or
less vague analogies, but with clear examples of logical
relations which, in different contexts, are met with in
wider fields." Essays, p.7; of. pp.60,77-78, and ATDN,
p. 20.
The only published references are in Bohr's 1930 Faraday
Lecture, "Chemistry and the Quantum Theory of Atomic Con¬
stitution" (J.G'hem.Soc., 1932, Part 1, pp.376-377) and
in his 19^9 Steno Lecture, "Physical Science and the
Problem of Life" (APHK, p* 97) • But Bolxr often dis¬
cussed the problem with his friends; see W'.Hei senberg,
Physics and Beyond, pp.105-107•
In classical thermodynamics and statistical mechanics
this can be done exactly since there is no uncertainty
principle.
"A typical example /of the recourse to probability con¬
siderations when there is no possibility of defining the
initial conditions/ is afforded by the statistical theory
of heat, according to which the very concept of tempera¬
ture stands in an exclusive relation to a detailed
description of the behavior of the atoms in the bodies
concerned." "Chemistry and the Quantum Theory, etc.",
p.376; ef. W.Heisenberg, op.cit.. p.l05»
See ch.2, fn.ll^f for references on the problem of time
reversal.
"The peculiar contrast between the reversibility of simple
mechanical processes and the irreversibility typical of
many thermodynamic phenomena was thus clarified by the
fact that the application: of such concepts as temperature
and entropy refer to experimental conditions incompat¬
ible with complete control of the motions of single
molecules." API-IK, p.97; cf. "Chemistry and the Quantum
Theory, etc.", p.376.
ibid.
i.e. the velocity of molecules is uncorrelated with their
position; see K.Huang, Statistical Mechanics, New York,
1963, p.65.
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11. cf. W.Heisenberg, loc.clt.
12. See K.Huang, op.cit.. pp.75-78,139-1^1.
13. Bohr's reasoning on this point is nicely clarified by
J.L.Park, "Quantum Theoretical Concepts of Measurement",
Phil.Sci. 35s 1968, p.2195 cf. L.Rosenfold, "Foundat¬
ions of Quantum Theory and Complementarity", Nature
190, 1961, p.337.
Ik. These "ensembles" are not actual groups of systems that
interact with each other; they are collections of iden¬
tically prepared systems that are strictly isolated from
one another. The systems of an ensemble need not be
studied all at the same time or even exist at the same
time, and an ensemble could simply consist of a single
system prepared and studied at many different times; cf.
K.Huang, op.cit., pp.75}76,-lkl.
15. "Chemistry and the Quantum Theory, etc.", p.376. On the
difference between the two approaches see E.T.Jaynes,
"Foundations of Probability Theory and Statistical Mech¬
anics", in M.Bunge, ed., Delaware Seminar in the Foun¬
dations of Physics, pp.77-101.
16. An uncertainty principle for temperature (representing
the macrostate) and energy (representing the microstate)
has been worked out by Rosenfeld in which Boltzmann's
constant takes the place of Planck's constant in quantum
theory; see his "Questions of Irreversibility and Ergo-
dlclty", in P.Caldirola, ed., Ergodie Theories. New York,
1961, pp.6-7.
17. For a qualitative analysis see W.M.Elsasser, Atom and
Organism, Princeton, 1966, pp.79-81, arid "The Mathemat¬
ical Expression of Generalised Complementarity", J'.Th.
Biol. 25} 1969} pp.29lM-295; see below, ch.k.7«
18. Personal Knowledge, pp.390-393} esp. the footnote on p.
392 where Polanyi comments on Bohr's Faraday Lecture and
takes exception to it; cf. J.R.Oppenheimer, Science and
the Common Understanding, London, 1955-5 pp.83-B7.
19. cf. Knowing and Being, p.17k.
20. Essavs. p.7},cf. fn.3 above.
21. cf. L.Rosenfeld, "Foundations of Quantum Theory, etc.",
p.387-
22. See ch.1.2 above. Bohr's most important papers on biol¬
ogy are "Light and Life" (Nature 131} 1933? PP«*+21-'+23,
k57-k59} revised in APHK, pp.3-12), "Causality and Com¬
plementarity" (Phil.Sci. k, 1937, pp. 295-297)} "Biology
and Atomic Physics", TNuo.Cim. n.s.15, 1938, pp.k29-k38?
reprinted in APHK, pp.13-227, "Physical Science and the
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Problem of Life" (delivered in 19^9, revised in APHK,
pp.9^-101), "Quantum Physics and Biology", in Models;
and Analogues in Biology (Symposia of the Society'for
Experimental Biology, No .1*171 Cambridge, I960, pp.1-5,
"Physical Models and Living Organisms" (in VEE.MeElroy
and B.Glass, eds», A Symposium on Light and Life,
Baltimore;, 1961, pp.l-J^? and "Light and Life Revisited"
(delivered in 1962, reprinted in Essays, pp.23-29).
23. "In fact, we are led to conceive the proper biological
regularities as representing laws of nature complement¬
ary to those appropriate to the account of the properties
of inanimate bodies, in analogy with the complementary
relationship between the stability properties of the
atoms themselves and such behavior of their constituent
particles as allows of a description in terms of space-
time coordination." APHK. p.21; cf» pp. 10,76, ATM,
pp.22-23, and "Causality and Complementarity", p.296,
cf. L.von Bertalanffy, Problems of Life, London, 1952,
p.155. Note that the concept of complementarity is now
used analogically as are the concepts cf atom and organ¬
ism. The concept of "atom" is taken from ordinary
language via metaphysics (Epicurean), classical physics
and chemistry, and quantum physics. The concept of
"organism" is taken from ordinary language via metaphys¬
ics (Aristotelian) and classical biology. But the
concept of "complementarity" is taken from quantum
physics alone and does not belong to our everyday con¬
cepts; even though the word is taken from ordinary lang¬
uage; see ch.l, fn.110 "and ch.2, fn.27«
2b. "...there is set a fundamental limit to the analysis of
the phenomena of life in terms; of physical concepts,
since the interference necessitated by an observation
which would be as complete as possible from the point
of view of the atomic theory would cause the death of
the organism." ATDN, p.22; cf. APHK, pp.9,20,76,92,100.
25. "...the notion of life is elementary in biological
science where, in the existence and evolution of living
orgahisms we are concerned with manifestations of possi¬
bilities in that nature to which we belong rat-her than
with the outcome of experiments which we can ourselves
perform."' APHK. p.76; cf. pp.9,101, and ATM, p.23.
26. "I think we all agree with Newton that the real basis; of
science is the conviction that Nature under the same con¬
ditions will always exhibit the same regularities.
Therefore, if we were able to push the analysis of the
mechanism of living organisms as far as that of atomic
phenomena, we should scarcely expect to find any features
differing from the properties of inorganic matter."
"Light and Life"', p.b58; cf. APHK, p.9, and "Causality
and Complementarity", pp.295~297»
27. "The asserted impossibility of a physical or chemical
explanation of the function peculiar to life would in
11.8
this sense be analogous to the insufficiency of the mech¬
anics! analysis for the understanding of the stability
of atoms.". "Light and Life", p.bpB? cf. APHK, p.9, and
"Causality and Complementarity", p.295«
28. e.g. APHK, pp,21,62,76,92,100.






35. APHK, p.10, Essays, p.21.
36. "...it is important to recognize that the essential ele¬
ment of irreversibility involved in the description of
the organic functions is the very basis of our notion of
time direction." "Physical Science and Man's Position",
in Proceedings of the International Conference on the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic lliergy (Geneva, 19!?3?), New York,
1956, pp.59-60; cf. APHK. p.100.
37. APHK, pp.10,92, Essays, p.21.
38. APHK, pp9,92, Essays, p.26.
39. "Physical Models and Living Organisms", p.3.
^0. APHK, pp.9,10,21,76, and Essays, p.26.
b-l. "Causality and Complementarity", p.296, and APHK, p.21;
see ch.l.k- above. Unfortunately, critics have focused
attention on the former; e.g. J.Needham, Order and Life,
Cambridge, Mass., 1968.
b-2. See ch.l, fns.l32,lb-8 above.
b-3. "In a living organism, however, such a distinction bet¬
ween the measuring instruments and the objects under
investigation can hardly be fully carried through, and
we must be prepared that every experimental arrangement
whose aim is a description of the functioning of the
organism, which is well defined in the sense of atomic
physics, will be incompatible with the display of life."
APHK, p.92; cf. pp.10,20-21,92.,100, and "Causality and
Complementarity", p.296.
b-b-. "The basis of the complementary mode of description In
biology is not connected with problems of controlling
the interaction between object and measuring tool,
already taken, into account in chemical kinetics, but
with the practically inexhaustible complexity of the
organism." "Physical Models and Living Organisms", p.35
cf. "Quantum Physics and Biology", p.5*
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)+5« Essays, pp.20-21,27.
k-6. i.e. because the inhomogeneity makes each organism
unique so that statistical methods cannot be applied at
the atomic level as they can for thermodynamic systems.
This argument was later amplified by W.M.Elsasser (The
Physical Foundation of Biology, London, 1958, pp.150-
16>0; see below, chA.7)? but already in 19^-9 Max Del truck
attributed it to Niels Bohr with whom he had discussed
the issue in 1937? over twenty years before Elsassfir's
work was published. Delbruck had decided to study biol¬
ogy after hearing Bohr's 1932 address on "Light and
Life" and when he assumed the directorship of the new
Institute for Genetics in Cologne in 1962 he invited Bohr
to give the inaugural address on "Light and Life Revis¬
ited". See M.Delbruck, "A Physicist Looks at Biology",
Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and
'Sciences 38, 19!+9, pp.173-190 (reprinted in .T.Cairns et
al., eds., Phage and the Origins of Molecular Biology,
Cold Spring Harbor, 1966, pp.9-22"), and "A Physicist' s
Renewed Look at Biology: Twenty Years Later" (Nobel Prize
address, 1969), Science 168, 1970, pp.1312-1315; N.Bohr,
"Light and Life Revisited", in Essays, pp.23-29; and 1.
Rosenfeld, "Niels Bohr in the Thirties", p.l3!+.
^7« cf. W.M.Elsasser, Atom and Organism, p.13^-.
*f8. "In the study of regulatory biological mechanisms the
situation is rather that no sharp distinction can be made
between the detailed construction of these mechanisms and
the functions they fulfil in upholding the life of the
whole organism. Indeed, many terms used in practical
physiology reflect a procedure of research in which, start¬
ing from the recognition of the functional role of the
parts of the organism, one aims at a physical and chemical
account of their finer structures and of the processes in
which they are involved. Surely, as long as for practi¬
cal or epistemological reasons one speaks of life, such
teleological terms will be used in complementing the ter¬
minology of molecular biology." Essays, p.26. Bohr might
just as well have said that functional ism and structural¬
ism represent "complementary viewpoints";, cf. A.Meyer-
Abich, "The Principle of Complementarity in Biology",
Acta biotheoretlca 11, 1955? p.62; see chA.ll below.
For the views of Niels's father on this subject see L.
Rosenfeld, "Niels Bohr in the Thirties", p.132.
h9. W.A.Cook, og.clt., pp.7?l5; cf. ch.l. fn.151 above. The
term "tagmeme" was coined by Bloomfield (Language, London,
1935? p. 166) and adapted by Kenneth Pike T"fasernes and
Immediate Constituents", Language 19? 19^3? PP•65-82;
and "On Tagmemes, Nee Gramemes", I.J.A.L. 2lf, 1958, pp.
273-278).
50. K.L.Pike, Language In Relation to a Unified Theory of the
Structure of Human Behavior, The Hague, 1967.
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51. For the rules governing the formation of these equations,
see V/. A.Cook, oo.cit., pp,17ff. The colon between the
functional and. structural terms means "filled by" or
"fulfilled by the class of".
52. The period of time needed for this alternation must be
smaller than the threshold for reflex action or even
subliminal vision. The alternation itself cannot be
observed because all physical observations involve
interaction at the molecular level and are limited to
the surface layer of the organism.
53. A similar hierarchy of biological levels is proposed by
J.H.Woodger in his Biological Principles. London, 1929,
pp.308-317. Like Bohr, Woodger stresses the change that
takes place in any 'part' when it functions within the
'whole' as well as the necessity for investigating each
level of organization on its own terms.
51*-. Brief comments on psychology appear in almost all of
Bohr's writings. The three principal references are
"Wirkungsquantum und Naturbeschreibung" (Naturwis. 17,
1929, pp.>+83-k86, translated in ATDN. pp.92-101 h/ "Unity
of Knowledge" (in L.G.Lewis, ed., The Unity of Knowledge,
New York, 1955? pp.7ff, reprinted in APHK, pp.67-82),
and "The Unity of Human Knowledge" (delivered in I960,
reprinted in Essays, pp.8~l6).
55» "Every unambiguous communication about the state and act¬
ivity of our mind implies, of course, a separation between
the content of our consciousness and the background
loosely referred to as 'ourselves1, but any attempt at
exhaustive description of the richness of conscious life
demands in various situations a different placing of the
section between subject and object." Essays, pp.12-13;
cf. JPHK, pp.52,77,93* For the analogy to atomic physics
see "Newton's Principles, etc.", p.60, and "Physical
Science and the Study of Religions", p.389.
56. "The rich vocabulary used in the communications of the
states of our mind refers indeed to a typical comple¬
mentary mode of description corresponding to the continual
change of the content on which attention is focused."
APHK, p.101. On Bohr's use of an analogy to Niemann's
treatment of multiform complex functions, see L.Rosenfeld,
"Niels Bohr's Contribution to Episteraology", p.'+9.
5?. APHK, p.77; see ch.l, fn.k3 on William James's theory of
hysteric diseases.
58. ATDN, p.15, "Causality and Complementarity", p.297,
APHK, pp.21,27. On Bohr's dialectic of the necessity and
impossibility of a sharp distinction, see p»20 above.
59. For the analogy to atomic uhysics, see ATDN, p.100, and
APHK, p.11.
ltZJL
60. "We all know the old saying that, if we try to analyze
our own amotions, we hardly possess them any longer, and
in that sense we recognize between psychical experiences,
for the description of which words such as 'thoughts'
and '.feelings' are adequately used, a complementary rel¬
ationship similar to that between the experiences regard¬
ing the behavior of atoms obtained under different
experimental arrangements and described by means of
different analogies taken from our usual ideas." APHK,
p.27; of. Essays. p.l'-K
61. "Thus, words like contemplation and volition, referring
to situations which are mutually exclusive but equally
characteristic of conscious life, have been used in a
typical complementary manner since the very origin of
language." Essays, pp.21-22; cf. p.13, and APHK, pp.21,
77,93-
62. APHK, pp.79-80, and Essays, p.15; cf. A.Koestler's polar¬
ity between the "logic of laughter" and the "logic of
the moist eye"; The Act of Creation, London, 1961-!-.
63. e.g. APHK, pp. 21,27, 52, 93» and Essays, p.28.
6*f. "This use of concepts, in fact, not only is to a large
extent suppressing instinctive life, but it stands even
largely in an exclusive relationship of complementarity
to the display of inherited instincts." APHK., p.28; cf.
pp.27,76; and T.R.Blackburn, "Sensuous-Intellectual
Complementarity in Science."
65* APHK, pp.80-8l; cf. "Physical Science and the Study of
Religions", p.386; and W.Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond,
p. 90.
66. Personal Knowledge, p.55? Knowing and Being, pp. 128,1^-6;
cf. de Saussure's distinction between the receptive side
(la langue) and the executive side (la parole) of the
psychological circuit of speech (Course in General Lin¬
guistics. New York, 1959, p.13). The langue-parole
duality was later reinterpreted to signify the comple¬
mentarity between psychical ideas and physical sounds or
between phonology and phonetics (see de Saussure, or?.
cit., pp.lllff; and S.Ullmann, The Principles of Seman¬
tics, Oxford, 1957, pp.28ff,39f). The original dist¬
inction corresponds to Bohr's "subjective" use of
complementarity in psychology, and the later one to his
"objective" use. On the relation between the two see
below, p.l05f. R.Jakobson has suggested that the rel¬
ationship between 'encoding' (meaning to sound) and
'decoding' (sound to meaning) in communication theory is
one of 'complementarity' in Bohr's sense; see his "Lin¬
guistics and Communication Theory", Proceedings of
Symposia in Applied Mathematics 12, 1961, p.2*f9*
67. J.Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology", Psycho¬
logical Review. 35 1896, p.370.
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68. J. von Uexklill, Umwelt imd Inn enweIt der Tiere, Berlin,
1921} cf. E.Cassirer, .An Essay on Man. New Haven, 19'*V,
ch.2.
69* J.C.Dollard and N.E.Miller, Personality and Psychother¬
apy, New York, 1950? pp.98-100.
70. cf. E.Cassirer, An Essay on Man, ch.2.
71. L.S.Yygotsky, "Thought and Speech", Psychiatry 2, 1939?
PP«37*42, Thought and Language, Cambridge, Mass., 1965,
pp.11-20,136-13for a recent review see A.N.Sokolov,
Inner Speech and Thought, New York, 1972, esp. pp.'+6ff.
72. J.Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, London,
1926. .Piaget later revised this opinions see Comments
on Vygotsky's Critical Remarks, Cambridge, Mass., 19b2*
73* "...it must not be forgotten that, in associating the
psychical and physical aspects of existence, we are con¬
cerned. with a special relationship of complementarity
which it is not possible thoroughly to understand by one¬
sided application either of physical or of psychological
laws." ATDN, p. 2b; cf. pp.100,101, and APHK, p.11. On
Bohr's interest in Spinoza see L.Rosenfeld, Niels Bohr:
An Essay, p.12, and "Niels Bohr's Contribution to Epist-
emology", pA8. Unfortunately, von Neumann later
interpreted the subject-object relation as a "psycho¬
physical parallelism", thus confusing correspondence with
complementarity (see above, pp. 2b-25), and cited, one of
Bohr's statements as a precedent (Mathematical Form¬
ations of Quantum Mechanics, pp.*+18"-420, esp.fn.207} cf.
ATDN, pp.100-l6l7. As a result, many subsequent writers
have interpreted Bohr's concept of complementarity in
terras of von Neumann's subjective measurement theory;
see e.g. P.A,Heelen, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity,
The Hague, 1965? pp.b-7?57-58. On the differences between
Bohr and von Neumann see ch.2, fn.69 above.
ATDN, pp.2b,100,117? "Newton's Principles, etc.", p.60,
and "On the Notions of Causality and Complementarity",
p.318.
75« ATDN. p.2b, and APHK, pp.11,78.
76. "The decisive point is that, if we attempt to predict
what another person will decide to do in a given situa¬
tion, not only must we strive to know his whole back¬
ground including the story of his life in all respects'
which may have contributed to form his character, but
we must realize that what we are ultimately aiming at is
to put ourselves in his place." APHK, p.78.
77» W.Dilthey, Elnleltung in die Ge1stesw1ssenschaften (Ges-
ammelte Werke, Bawd I). Leipzig-Berlin, 1923, PP»32~33°
78. The Tacit Dimension, pp.16-17? Knowing and Being, pp.152,
219-220,23F.
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79• cf. Bruno Bettelheinrs thesis that w.«.the more the
object of the study is. man himself, and not just some
isolated aspects of his behavior, the more questionable
the value of the experimental method. The human mind
is' so complex that experiment can still clarify only
some rather simple aspects of its working. If we wish
to'understand the human being in all his intricacy, we
must fall back on the earliest method for comprehending
man: to know oneself so that one may also know the
other." B.Bettelheim, The Empty Fortress. New York,
1967, p.3.
80. The "from-at" relation is perpendicular to complemen¬
tarity; see above p.2k- find ch.2, fa. 1.33•
81. We also use the terms; "mind" and. "body" analogically
since they no longer have their strictly classical senses
(which presuppose some classical theory like dualism or
epiphenomenalism). The term "complementarity" is: also
being used analogically being taken from quantum physics
via complementarist biology; see fn.23 above.
82. For a similar analysis of the modal structure of man see
C.Robinson, "Biblical Theism and Modern Science", J.Rel*
k-3, 1963, p.126; and B.J.F.Lonergan, Insight, London,
1957, chs. xv.7»k- and xvi.k-*3.
83. In fact, the four modes must alternate in time in accor¬
dance with the hierarchical structure of their relations.
The alternation, itself, is; unobservable (by definition,
see fn.52 above), but it is consistent with theoretical
formulations like the "perceptual moment" hypothesis of
J.M.Stroud ("The Fine Structure of Psychological Time",
in H.Quastler, ed., Information Theory in Psychology,
Glencoe, Illinois, 1955, pp.17k--207» and its sequel in
R.Fischer, ed., op.cit., pp.623-631)* According to this
hypothesis, normal conscious perception takes place in
separate "moments"' of about one tenth of a second each.
From the viewpoint of complementarity, this interval is
readily understood as the relaxation time of the mind-
body alternation. Of course, the relaxation times for
the various levels of the atom-organism hierarchy would
be much shorter than 0.1 sec, decreasing all the way to
10 ® sec, the characteristic time for the wave-particle
alternation of atomic transitions. This whole subject is
still rather speculative, but for partial confirmation
of the hierarchical ordering of time scales in physiol¬
ogy and psychology see U.Neisser, Cognitive Psychology.
New York, 1967, pp.lSff ,36ff ,138ff; and. F.Smith, Under -
standing Reading, New York, 1971, pp.90-95, esp. ref.5
on p.95*
8k-. e.g. unconscious, preconscious, and conscious mind. For
a possible development of this idea see R.Fischer, "A
Cartography of the Ecstatic and Meditative States",
Science 17k-, 1971, pp. 897-90k*.
85. See above, pp.22f.
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Th e term "idea" is used here in its broadest sense to
include all mental phenomena. It may be a feeling
evoked by a work of art or a belief associated with a
sacred text.
P.A.Heelen ,has: applied, this use of complementarity to
the philosophical problems of hermeneuties; see his
"Towards a Hermeneutic of Natural Science". Main Currents
in Modern Thought 2, 1972, pp.85-93 > end "Nature and Its
Transformations", Theological Studies 33 > 1972, pp.592,
595.
The classic study on this topic is W.Kohler's The Mental-
ity of Apes (New York, 1925). Nor a review of recent
research see L.E.Jarrard, ed., Cognitive Processes of
Nonhuman Primates', New York, 1971 •
See below, ch.6.5 and ch.8.
cf. Marcel's distinction between body-as-existent (incar¬
nate) and body-as-object (disincarnate) (Metaphysical
Journal, London, 1952, pp.l9ff,265,273-282,3iff,332-339)
and Sartre's distinction between body pour sol and body
pour autrn.i (L1 Etre et le lieant, Paris, 195.3, pp.l98ff,
3§5ff"); cf. R.M.Zaner, The Problem of Embodiment, pp.
89f,107ff,120ff.
So M.Eliade differentiates between classical yoga and
shamanism (Le Chamanisme et les Techniques Archa'fquss de
I.' Extase, Paris, 1951, p. 375; cf. H.C.Zaehner, Mysticism
Sacred and Profane, Oxford, 1957, p.128); cf. N.Smart's
distinction between dhyana and bhakti (The Yogi and the
Devotee, London, 196F).
cf. Karl Popper's "third world" (Objective Knowledge.
London, 1972; which, however, includes artifacts as well
as- ideas.
Not quite the same as Teilhard's "noosphere" .which is a
structural layer of the earth rather than a mode of
man's1 existence; see The Phenomenon of Man, London, 1970,
pp.201-202, and Man's Place in Nature, London, 1971, p.
80. Note that Teilhard's approach is thoroughly dla-
chronic while Bohr's, though allowing for diachronic
categories, is primarily synchronic; it allows for evol¬
ution but says nothing positive about it; see "Physical
Models and Living Organisms", p»3«
In quantum theory a group of N particles may he treated
either in terms of a single wave in 3N-dimensional "con¬
figuration space" or (by means of second quantization)
in terms of N distinct waves in ordinary three-dimensional
space (see e.g. L.de Broglie, "Individualite et Inter¬
action dans le Monde Physique", Rev.Met.Mor. 55, 1937,
p.360; M.Born, "Bemerkungen zur statistischen Deutung
der Quantenmechanik", in F.Bopp, ed., op.cit., p. 10.5;
and W.T.Scott, Brwin Schrodinger, Amherst, 19o?, pp.77-
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80) . The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox (log.cit..,)
showed that when one of' these particles is observed,
the others are automatically affected as well. It is
conceivable that these considerations could also be
applied to groups of systems in "thermodynamic space"
(pressure, volume, temperature), "organismic space",
and even "mental space" (cf. topos noetos) although
the application could only be heuristic in the latter
two instances.
95* cf. Polanyi's concept of "risk"; Personal Knowledge, p.313'
96. cf. P.L.Berger and I.Luckmann, op.cit., pp.k9ff,173.
Note that Bohr's assumption of a common conceptual
framework in science (ch.l.!-i- above) is here validated
on the basis of complementarity in psychology.
9?. I.I.Mitroff, "Solipsism; An Essay in Psychological Phil¬
osophy", Phil.Scl. 38, 1971» PP«376-39k.
98. See above, eh.2, fn.80,
99. This may not apply to animals in a laboratory.
100. This correlation or propriety is not to be confused with
determinism (see p.65, above). What we have here is
the emergence of normative behavior ("ought"), not pro¬
grammed behavior ("must").
101. "...amplification effects similar to those permitting
observation of individual atomic particles play a
decisive role in many functions of the organism. In
this way is stressed the irreversible character of typi¬
cal biological phenomena, and the time direction inherent
in the description of the functioning of organisms is
strikingly marked by their utilization of past exper¬
ience for reactions to future stimuli." API-IK> p..100;
cf. p.77; and W.M.Elsasser, Atom and Organism, p.82.
102. See V.Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern
Church, Cambridge, 1957? pp.l23)17k.
I.03. This process of 'internalization' takes place during
'•primary socialization'; see P.L.Berger and T.Luckraann,
op.cit., pp.lk9-l57 •
10!+. N.Brody and P.Oppenheim call it "structural homology";
loc.cit., pp.97)111.
105. Eor parallels to ideas (2), (3), and 0+) in general sys¬
tem theory see von Bertalanffy's principles of "logical
homology", "hierarchical order", and "progressive indi¬
vidualization" (L.von Bertalanffy, General. System
Theory, London, 1973) pp.85}7kf,72f, respectively).
106. The principal reference is "Natural Philosophy and Human
Cultures", Nature lk3, 1939, pp. 268-272 (reprinted in
APHK, pp.23-31).
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10?c e.g. APHK, p.30.
108. APHK. p.81, and Essays, p.15°
109» APHK, p.30.
110. e.g. T.Soman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Creek.
London, I960, pp.207-208. Different biographical int¬
erpretations of Einstein are regarded, as complement¬
arity by G.Holton, "On the Origins of the Special
Theory of Relativity", Am.J.Phys. 28, I960, pp.632-633'
111. e.g. APHK, p.81.
112. APHK, pp.3O-3I?8l, and Essays, p.l5«
113. APHK. pp.81,93.
lib-, contra A.Lande, New Foundations of Quantum Mechanics,
Cambridge, 1965, p. 1^+6. Other counterexamplesTdual-
ity, orthogonality and supplementarity) have been
discussed in ch.2. On the other hand, the concept of
complementarity might be useful in discussions of
method in social anthropology, particularly with regard
to the relation between fieldwork and structural analy¬
sis; see E.E.Evans-PrItchard, Social Anthropology,
London, 1951, p.61.
115« "Atomic Physics and International Cooperation", p.138,
"Physical Science and the Study of Religions", p.389,
APHK, p.8.1, Essays, p.l5«
116. I am not sure which myths Bohr had in mind. Perhaps he
was thinking of the ancient Zoroastrian dualism between
good and evil which was portrayed as an eternal struggle
between Ahura Mazda (or Spenta Mainyu) and Angra Mainyu
(see e.g. R.Masani, Zoroastrlanlsm, New York, 1968, pp.
65-69). More likely he was referring to the confron¬
tation between the Lord and Mephi.stoph.eles in Goethe's
Faust, a play with which Bohr was quite familiar; see
S.Rozental et al., op.citp.236.
117. Only W.H.Austin has taken the idea seriously, and he
concedes that this "complementarity" applies only to
religious experience and not to systematic theologys
Waves. Particles and Paradoxes, p.93; see below, eh. 6. .
118. e.g. N.F.S.Ferre, The Christian Understanding of God,
London, 1951, pp.lP+ff.
119. So the Hebrew prophets, e.g. Hosea 6. On the bifur¬
cation of justice and mercy in Reformed theology see H.
Rolston III, John Calvin Versus .the Westminster Con -
fesslon, Richmond, Va., 1972, ch.5«
120. Private communication to G.J.Holton, Dec.25,1967; see
G.J.Eolton, "The Roots of Complementarity", p. 103'4-,
12?
121. APHK. pc»+7.
122. J.Baillie, Our Sense of the..Presence of God.. (Gifford
Lectures, 1961-2), London, 1962, p.217; cf» W.G.Pollard,
Chance and Providence, London, 1958, p.139 (the cita¬
tion here of Bohr's article "On the Notions of Causality
and Complementarity" is mistaken), and "Indeterminacy,
Mystery, and a Modern Episteraology", Zygon 1 , 1966, p.
181. Bohr's Gifford Lectures on "Causality and Comple¬
mentarity"' were given at the University of Edinburgh
from October 21 to November 11, 19®+9 (see the advert¬
isement in Nature 161+, 194-9, p.56l) but never published.
On the preparation and delivery of these lectures, see
ShRoze&tal, "The Forties and Fifties", in S.Rozental et
al., OP.cifc., pp.l82f.
123. 2um WeltMid der Physik, Stuttgart, i960, p. 2.66; cf.
J.R.Oppenhelmer, op.cit., pp.7^-75.
12!+. e.g. N.F.ShFerre, op.cit., pp.71-85; K.Barth, Church
Dogmatics. III.2 (Edinburgh,I960), ch.V/.l, p.^-37; and
S.M.Ogden, "The Temporality of God", in The Reality of
God and Other Essays, New York, i960, pp.1^-163; cf.ch.7'3^67~below.
125. "From this point of view we realize that Bohr's proposal
of the complementarity principle was nothing less than
an attempt to make the cornerstone of a new epistemology
.. .it. was the universal significance of the role of
complementarity which Bohr came to emphasize." J.G.
Holton, loc.cit., p.10^5; cf. fn«3 above.
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Chapter lf
Bohr's Allies on Complementarity
"For the 'Copenhagen Point of View!: as it is
understood by some critics, and, one must admit,
by some of its adherents-, is not a single idea
but a mixed bag of interesting conjectures, dog¬
matic declarations, and philosophical absurdit¬
ies..." P.K.Feyorabend, "On a Recent Critique
of Complementarity I", p.310.
Having established Bohr's own views on complement¬
arity, we turn now to those of his allies and critics. Our
focus will be on the contributions they make either by way of
coherent formulations, or of new applications, or of signif¬
icant criticisms. However, we shall also have to consider
alternative definitions of complementarity and numerous mis¬
understandings of Bohr in order to clear up the confusion
and sharpen our understanding of Bohr's own position. The
general philosophies of the men we study will be brought in
only insofar as it is necessary to interpret their statements
on complementarity.
The division into allies and critics is somewhat
arbitrary, as we shall see. Bohr's critics are often closer
to his intent than his supposed allies. However, the
distinction is helpful in that it coincides with the general
cleavage among modern physicists between the so-called
"Copenhagen school" and its numerous opponents.
The order in which we treat Bohr's allies is roughly
the order of decreasing personal contact with- Bohr himself.
Therefore, we might expect that those treated first would
have a better understanding of Bohr's position than those
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that follow. As it turns out, however, this expectation
is only approximately correct.
h.l Leon Rosenfeld s
Rosenfeld worked more closely with Bohr than anyone
else.^" and no one has championed Bohr's ideas, especially
2
complementarity, more outspokenly. His definition of com¬
plementarity is concise and to the point; "a logical rel¬
ationship between two physical phenomena both representing
aspects of a physical system equally necessary for its com¬
plete description, but corresponding to mutually exclusive
experimental conditions". This definition covers the
conditions of unity, equality, coexhaust!veness, and mutual.
exclusion. Elsewhere, Rosenfeld defines complementarity
k
in terms of reciprocity. At times, however, he seems to
suggest that the two modes of wave and particle are equiva¬
lent pictures since the wavelength and frequency of a wave
are directly related to the momentum and energy of the
corresponding "particle", thus confusing complementarity
£
with supplementarity. Thus he represents quantum theory
as achieving a synthesis between the classical concepts of
6
force (field, wave) and matter (particle). But here, one
suspects, his philosophical commitment to dialectical mat-
7
erialism begins to conflict with his allegiance to Bohr.
He sees complementarity as representing the final stage of
synthesis in the "dialectical movement of scientific
thought": classical determinism (material particles) was
the thesis which was negated by the discovery of the quantum
of action, and the "old quantum theory" (Bohr's 1913 model
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■ « s
which introduced stationary states) was the antithesis.
All of this has nothing to do with the philosophy of Bohr:
still it is significant that the leading exponent of Bohr's
thought is neither a Kantian idealist nor a. logical posit-
ivist»^
Rosenfeld applies the concept of complementarity
to thermodynamics and biology as well as atomic physics (he
stopped short of psychology), but here too the concept of
supplementarity prevails. fie regards the emergence of
characteristically thermodynamic features like irreversibil¬
ity as being due solely to our ignorance of the microscopic
initial conditions; statistical regularities do not replace
the laws of molecular dynamics, they are simply superimposed
10
on them. Hence, an imaginary demon ("Maxwell1s demon")
small enough to observe the motions of the individual mole¬
cules would find that reversibility holds at the microscopic
level even while we are experiencing irreversibility at the
.11
macroscopic level." Of course, this would make comple¬
mentarity completely subjective, a. matter of observation
12
rather than definition. But fortunately, according to
Rosenfeld, such a demon could never exist as it is- a self-
contradictory concept: the ability to think and observe
requires a complex brain (from the viewpoint of materialism)
1 "5
so a thinking being must be macroscopic by definition. °
This inherent limitation assures us that our science is
objective in the sense that intelligent; beings from another
planet would necessarily be subject to the same limitation
and hence would also observe effects like irreversibility.
An argument more in line with Bohr's ep.istemo.Xogy would be
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that the very conditions necessary for the definition of
Maxwell's demon exclude those for the definition of thermo¬
dynamic states. Hence the two can not exist at the same
15
time and do not contradict each other.
The same difficulty arises in Rosenfeld'.s treatment
of biology. In contrast to Bohr, Rosenfeld expects that
all biological behavior will one day be explained, in prin¬
ciple, by the laws of quantum mechanics, just as chemistry
is.^ However, he argues, even when this reduction is
achieved complementarity will not be eliminated because (a)
organisms are so complex in their structure that a complete
quantum-mechanical treatment would be impossible in practice,
and (b) we must know the function of an organ before we can
17
understand its structure. ' Since the concept of function
is absent from physics and chemistry (according to Rosen¬
feld), there is a relationship of complementarity between
the "functional causality" of biology and the ordinary cans-
18
ality of physics and chemistry. As we have seen, Bohr
also argued for complementarity on the basis of complexity
and the irreducibility of function, yet his reasoning was
really quite different. For Bohr; (a) the complexity of
organisms, together with their inhomogeneity, makes defin¬
ition of the molecular structure impossible in principle,
not just in practice,and (b) f\ihction and structure repre¬
sent complementary modes which are individually complete and
mutually exclusive; hence function is not simply an auxiliary
idea that is superimposed to complete a physico-chemical
20
description as it is for Rosenfeld.
The hierarchical relation of complementarity in
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atomic physics, thermodynamics and biology is brought out
by Rosenfeld, For individual atomic systems only the wave
particle complementarity is applicable. Thermodynamic
complementarity arises for systems of large numbers of atom
(on the order of Avogadro's number, 6.2 x 10^), and it is
completely independent of the existence of complementarity
21
at the atomic level. " Finally, biological complementarity
arises for systems of great complexity, both in molecular
structure and in the topological arrangement of molecules."
Thus thermodynamics and biology represent two different dir¬
ections of emergence above the atomic level as we have seen.
21J Again, however, for Rosenfeld the emergent qualities
are simply superimposed upon the atomic level; they do not
represent independent levels in their own right.
1+. 2 Wolfgang Pau.li;
Next to Rosenfeld, those closest to Bohr were Wolf
pL
gang Pauli and Werner He i senderg. " According to Roserifeld
report, Bohr respected Pauli' s opinions most of all, and "no
one better than Pauli understood the earnestness of Bohr's-
25
endeavour". When we examine Pauli's writings, however,
p&
we find very little in common with "Bohr's endeavour11.""
Pauli consistently maintained that complementarity is due to
the uncontrollable interference (Eingriff) involved in the
measuring process which invalidates the results- of all prev-
27
ious measurements. For instance the value obtained from
a momentum measurement is invalidated by any subsequent
measurement of the position of an atomic object, hence the
uncertainty principle. All of this is true, of course, but
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it is not an adequate basis for complementarity since it is
limited to the possibilities cf measurement and neglects the
possibilities of definition which Bohr stressed. In fact,
Bohr specifically warned against using terms like "disturb¬
ance" and "interference" in any unambiguous account of the
28
measuring process.
Pauli frequently used the term "complementarity"
in ways that are at variance with Bohr's position. For in¬
stance, he refers to complementarity between the classical
concepts of position and momentum (rather than conjugacy)2^,
between mutually exclusive experimental arrangements,-^0 and
even between, the means of observation and the object observed
(rather than correspondence).^
It is not surprising, therefore, that Pauli differs
with Bohr when it comes to the application of complementarity
outside of atomic physics. He completely rejects Bohr's
treatment of thermodynamics^ and ignores his treatment of
biology and turns instead to metaphysics and psychoanalysis;'
(a) In metaphysics Pauli sees a relationship of complementa¬
rity between the extremes of Western realism, in which
physical objects are completely independent of the manner in
which they are observed, and Hindu idealism, in which there
•3
is an absolute subject and no independent object. J It is
true that Bohr also sought a middle path between realism
and idealism, but he would hardly have called this a relat-
\
ionship of complementarity, even in the sense of a relation¬
ship between different cultural traditions.(b) When
Pauli turns to psychoanalysis he finds that the unconscious
self is complementary to the conscious self since it cannot
13'+
be observed directly but only through indirect means that
circumvent the conscious self (e.g. dreams, free association,
etc.).-^ The principle issue for us here is whether the
conscious and unconscious aspects of mind are mutually ex¬
clusive in reality as well as in our experience. In order
to settle this issue one must consider the possibilities of
definition as well as those of observation, and for this
one needs a psychological model. In the traditional Freud¬
ian and Jungian models the conscious mind is superimposed on
the unconscious,^ so the two would not be complementary in
the strict sense. A complementarist model would require
some kind of alternation between the two modes so that the
two never actually conflict. No such model has been con¬
structed, to my knowledge, however it remains a possibility
for the future.^ Traditional Freudian (or Jungian)
psychoanalysis could be used as a "classical model" and the
concepts of conscious and unconscious could be reinterpreted
^ O
analogically In keeping with the correspondence principle.
*+•3 Werner Heisenberg:
The principle of complementarity is closely related
to the uncertainty principle, as we have seen. In fact,
both principles were developed at the same time, during Feb¬
ruary of 1927, while Bohr and Heisenberg were working
together 011 the problems of the interpretation of quantum
theory. Yet the methods and starting points of the two
men were poles apart. Heisenberg valued mathematical eleg¬
ance and simplicity above all, while Bohr concentrated on
L>1
physical principles and questions of method. " It is not
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surprising, therefore, that their interpretations of comple-
Lf2
mentarity were entirely different.
Their common point of departure was the complemen¬
tarity of space-time coordination and the claim of causality.
Bohr used these two concepts to represent two modes, wave
and particle, of an atomic system. The particle-mode applies
when the space-time locations of the individual particles of
the system are observed, and the wave-mode applies when the
system is relatively isolated so that the conservation laws
h. o
and the claim of causality are suitably defined. -
Heisenberg replaced the physical idea of a wave-mode by the
mathematical wave-function and the transition to the particle-
L,
mode by the "collapse" or "reduction" of the wave"function.
Since the wave-function obeys Schro°dinger' s equation its
evolution is perfectly causal and hence "objective" (i.e.
independent of human perception), but it is unobservable
since it is defined in a multi-dimensional configuration
space rather than in the geometric space of ordinary exper-
5
ience. Its only connection with ordinary space and time
is statistical; it determines the probabilities of the
various space-time events that might occur when the system
k6
is observed and the wave-function collapses. Thus, while
the wave-function is perfectly objective (in Heisenberg1s
sense), it is not real; it is: only an "objective tendency"
or "potential for reality" or, in Aristotelian language, a
)f7
potentia or dunarais. Space-time events, on the other
hand, are actual occurrences that are real and observable,
but they are also acausal and partly su.bjactive because they
involve our perception of the atomic system rather than the
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J_, o
system as It is "in itself", and the transition from the
potential to the actual involves a disturbance of the system
through measurement which, in effect, creates its observable
ho
qualities. Hence,we are left with a relationship of
"complementarity" between classical description in terms of
space-time events which are actxzal and observable, but acausal
and subjective, and a quantum~mecha.nlcal description in terms
of wave-funcbions in configuration space which, are unobser-
an
able and potential, but causal and objective. In effect,
Heisenberg creates a. Kantian dichotomy between the phenomena
and the noumena, or between the "thing-for-us:" and the "thing-
51in-itself". Rather than Bohr's complementarity between
two modes of the object as it exists under different circum¬
stances (ontological or transverse complementarity), we have
complementarity between the object as it appears when obser¬
ved and as it is in itself (epistemological or longitudinal
complementarity). How could such a reversal of Bohr's:
position ever have happened?
First we must note that there is an asymmetry bet¬
ween the two modes in Bohr's thinking; one represents the
ideal of observation and the other the ideal of definition.
The stable wave-mode requires a greater degree of isolation
52
and independence than the unstable particle-mode.
Therefore, Heisenberg's Kantian interpretation might seem to
be a natural development of Bohr's concept provided that the
two essential points were overlooked; (l) In Bohr's ontology
there is no such thing as an isolated object in the strict
sense. Every object has an environment and the specifi¬
cation of this environment is essential to an adequate know-
137
ledge of the object Itself whether it interacts: strongly
53
with its environment or not. J Heisenberg considered only
the possibilities of observation and neglected the possi-
5b- / \
bilities of definition. (2) The wave-mode can be known
just as well as the particle-mode can. The only restrict¬
ion Is that it cannot be known directly or speeifiably, but
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only indirectly and tacitly. In general, however, it
was due to Bohr's emphasis on physical principles that he
avoided Kantian dualism. Heisenberg thought in terms of an
abstract mathematical formalism, and this naturally led him
to conceive the wave-mode as an abstract, unobservable Ding
an sich rather than a mode of existence in Bohr's; sense. ^
b-.b- Carl Fried.il.ch. von Weizsa!cker :
From his personal association with Bohr, Paul! and
Heisenberg, von Weizsacker could see the differences in their
concepts of complementarity, and he tried to classify and
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interrelate them in his own approach to the subject. He
divided them into two categories which he called "parallel
58
complementarity" and "circular complementarity". ,
"Parallel complementarity" holds between two con¬
cepts which are both derived from classical physics and.
hence belong to the same conceptual level. For instance;
(a) There is "complementarity" between the classical particle
concepts of position and momentum. This is whart Bohr
called "conjugacy" and Pauli called "complementarity". '
In the terminology of predicate calculus, it is complement¬
arity between two predicates of the same subject. The two
statements, "this electron has the position x" and "this
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electron has the momentum p", are complementary in this
sensed0 (b) There is also "complementarity" between ths
classical wave concepts of position and wavelength as Bohr
pointed out in his treatment of the uncertainty principle.
The term "position" here means the location of a wave-group
(in quail turn-mechanics the region in which there is a signif¬
icant probability of finding tne particle), which is quite
different from the meaning of "position" for a classical
particle. (c) Finally, there .is "complementarity" between
(a) and (b), that is, between the classical pictures of
particle (with position and momentum) and wave (with position
and wavelength). This is the relationship we have prev-
6?
iously referred to as "supplementarity" or "equivalence".
Von Weizsacker points out that the Heisenberg-Schro'dinger
quantum mechanics is derived by quantizing the classical
theory of particles while the quantum field theory is derived
by quantizing the classical theory of fields. Since quantum
mechanics and quantum field theory are equivalent theories,
the two limiting cases from which they are derived are also
equivalent pictures.^
None of these senses of "parallel complementarity"
is the sense in which Bohr used the term, von Weizsacker
argues. As we saw in chapter two, Bohr's complementarity
is not between conjugate properties or between equivalent
pictures, but between alternate modes in which the conjugate
properties are well-defined. According to von Weizsacker,
however, Bohr's complementarity was yet another relation,
that between the two classical pictures, on the one hand,
and the quantum-theoretical formalisms derived from them, on
the other.q!+ This "circular complementarity", as he calls
it, is clearly Bohr's concept of correspondence, however,
6 d
and is quite distinct from his idea of complementarity. J
But why did von Weizsacker get the two mixed up?
There are two reasons: (l) First he misunderstood
Bohr1 s use of complementarity between, space-time coordin¬
ation and the claim of causality as a relationship between
classical-mechanical description and quantum-mechanical
66
description just as Heisenberg did. When Bohr later rej¬
ected this interpretation in private correspondence, von
Weizsacker even admitted that he had based his interpretation
of Bohr on the writings of Heisenberg though he refused to
6 7
alter his approach. Heisenberg and von Weizsacker shared
a Kantian epistemology which gave them a greater affinity
for each other than either man had for Bohr.^ (21 Sec¬
ondly, von Weizsacker confused complementarity between,
application and analysis with the circular relationship
between a. -priori assumptions, which allow us to apprehend
reality, and a posteriori knowledge from experience, which
allows us to revise our assumptions. He called this the
"circle of knowledge" (Zlrkel der Erkenntnis) from which he
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got the term "circular complementarity". Two of Bohr's
ideas are cited as precedents: the complementarity between
70
the application of a concept and its strict definition,
and 'complementarity between our empathetic, subjective
understanding of life processes (Verstehen) and an objective
analysis in terms of physics and chemistry (Brklaren)P^~
In both of these cases our knowledge seems to progress by an
alternation between the two poles, one tacit and the other
specifiable• However, for Bohr, it is not just our know¬
ledge of the object, but the object itself, that evolves by
72
an alternation between modes. Von Weizscicker is thinking
of a subjective "gestalt-switch", whereas Bohr intended an
7^
objective "mode-switch".'J Of course, Bohr also believed
that the human mind undergoes "mode-switches" as it alter¬
nates between application and analysis, subsidiary awareness
7b
and focal awareness, but this "circle of knowledge" in the
mind is quite distinct from the "cycle of being" in the
external world. Von Weizsacker's mistake here was to
transfer complementarity from the modes of an object (onto-
logical or transverse complementarity) to the poles of our
knowledge of that object (epistemological or longitudinal
complementarity).^ The result is a Kantian relationship
between our forms of perception or the object as we perceive
n C.
it and the object as it is in itself.
Von Weizsacker1s other main contribution to the
study of complementarity is his: work on a formal, multi¬
valued "logic of complementarity" (Komp-lementaritatsloglk)«
^ The novel feature of this logic is the introduction
of a third truth value, "undecided" or "indeterminate". A
s
statement/need not be either true or false; it may be un¬
decided. For instance, the statement, "this electron has
position x", is either true or false when the electron is
in the particle-mode, but it is undecided or indeterminate
in the wave-mode. Conversely, the statement, "this elect¬
ron has momentum p", is undecided in the particle-mode.
A symbolic logic can be developed, and it turns out to have
several interesting features. For example, the statement,
1^1
"s is not true", does not entail i!s is false" as it does in
classical logic because s could also be "undecided".. This
"logic of complementarity" is also non-truth-functional
since the truth value of a compound statement is not necess¬
arily determined by the truth values of its components.
It is also non-tautologous since even the classically tautol¬
ogous disjunction of "s is true" and "s is false" is not
true when s itself is undecided. Further, the two distrib-
n8
utive laws are not satisfied as, they are in classical logic.
Bohr himself had no interest in the development of
a formal logic partly because he was suspicious of formal
79
systems in general, but particularly because he Insisted on
the use of classical (the refinement of ordinary) language
oq
and logic in all discussions of experimental method.
According to the correspondence principle, one is free to use
non-classical systems of logic only insofar as those systems
can be properly defined by making use of classical logic so
the difficulties of interpretation cannot be circumvented
simply by inventing a new logic. Classical logic can never
be entirely supplanted because it is the foundation of all
modern logic and it cannot be reduced to a mere limiting
On
case. " Von WeizeSfcker, on the other hand, maintained that
multl-valued logic is the "true logic" (die wahre Logik)
and that classical logic is only one of its: many limiting
cases, the relationship of the two being another example of
8?
"circular complementarity". " These issues could be debated
at great length, but the recurrent theme would continue to
be the nature of the classical forms of perception. If
l>i-2
these are basically arbitrary then reality will forever
elude us no matter how much we try to remold them, but if
they are essentially valid then we have already made contact
with reality and. all that is needed is further exploration
of this reality and the discovery of new aspects- by using
and building upon the conceptual tools or forms of perception
that we already have.^
h.5 Max Born?
We turn now to the Gottingen school of physicists
headed by Max Born. It was: at Gottingen that de Broglie's
8*4
idea of electron waves was first verified (by Elsasser),
that the formalism of matrix mechanics was developed (by
8 S'
Born and Jordan), and that the statistical interpretation
86
of the wave-function was discovered (by Born). There was
a good deal of cooperation between the physicists at Copen¬
hagen and Gottingen, and the philosophy of quantum mechanics;
that developed became known as the "Copenhagen interpretation"
87
only out of deference to the leadership of Niels Bohr.
Born readily acknowledged that leadership, particul¬
arly with regard to the philosophy of quantum mechanics and
88
the principle of complementarity. According to Born, Bohr
was neither a positivist nor an idealist, but a naive realist
due to his concern for unambiguous communication and the use
of ordinary language and his emphasis on physical intuition
89
rather than mathematical formalism. In contrast, he took
Einstein to be a. conventionalist like Eoincare because of
his insistence that all concepts; are free inventions of the
90mind! In view of Born's personal acquaintance with both
1^-3
of these men it is surprising that he understood them so
little.
Born's scattered comments on complementarity can
be very confusing and even contradictory on first reading.
To avoid confusion one should note his distinction between
91
"complementarity" and "duality" ' and his use of the terms
"wave" and "particles" to mean wave-function (or "probability
99wave"; and particle-events. Duality? Born regards the
relationship between wave (function! and particle (events)
to be one of duality in the sense that wave and particle are
two equally real, but conceptually exclusive, aspects of the
same object. He rejects Bohr's idea that wave and particle
91
are complementary. Several points should be clarified
here: (l) As we have already noted, this is technically a
misuse of the term "duality" since there is only one object,
9!+
not two. Undoubtedly, Born uses the term in deference
9'?
to the popularity of the phrase "wave-particle duality". 7
(2) Born treats the wave and particle aspects as conceptually
exclusive in the sense that only one of these interpretations
96
can be used at a time. For instance, the accumulation of
a diffraction pattern can be viewed either in terms of the
overall pattern (represented by the wave-function) involving
, . 97
a large number of spots (an ensemble of particle-systems),
or it can be viewed in terms of the individual impacts
(individual particle-events), but these two views cannot be
held at the same time. Nonetheless, the two aspects do
exist at the same time so they are not mutually exclusive in
98
reality. In fact, both aspects must be considered tog-
OO
ether for a complete understanding of a given phenomenon.7
l¥f
Hence, Horn's wave-particle "duality" differs from Bohr's
wave-particle complementarity in that it violates the con¬
ditions of individual completeness and mutual exclusiveness.
It is rather like the relationship between the whole and
100
the parts in Polanyi* s philosophy or in Gestalt psychology.
For Born, wave and particle represent two dimensions or pro¬
jections of reality rather than two modes of existence.
We have termed this relation one of orthogonality or modal¬
ity."'*0^ (3) However, Born also maintains that the wave and
particle pictures are not strictly orthogonal since they are
connected by the statistical, interpretation of the wave
102
function. Moreover, they are mathematically repres
by the Scliro'dinger and Heisenberg formalisms, respectively
so one can transform from one to the other mathematically 103




field theory. Hence the two pictures are mathematically
equivalent even though they are conceptually exclusive.
At times, Born even spoke of the possibility of el¬
iminating particles10^ or else eliminating waves.10'' altog¬
ether! In this respect, he suggests that their relationship
may be one of equivalence or supplementarity. To summarizes
Born regarded the relationship between wave and particle to
be one of "duality" rather than complementarity; however,
what he meant by duality was really orthogonality, though
sometimes he modified it to supplementarity. Moreover, what
he meant by "wave" and "particle" was what we have called
wave and particle pictures rather than wave and particle
, 108modes.
(b) Born regarded the wave and particle aspects to
be equally real because both are Invariants of observation.
Particles are invariants because they always have the same
109
rest mass, charge and spin. The wave-functions are more
abstract since they exist in a multi-dimensional configur¬
ation space, but they are just as real because they determine
the probabilities for the particle-events' and these proba¬
bilities are unchanged from one event to ar.other for a given
110
experimental arrangement. As we have noted before, this
identification of objective reality with invariance leads to
111
a position of subjective idealism, ' though this was
certainly not Bora's intention. In fact, he intended it to
1 0
counteract charges of subjectivity in quantum mechanics.'"
Coma1 era entar ity: In contrast to the invariant properties of
waves and particles there are also relative attributes; like
position and momentum which are complementary to each, other,
111
according to Born." - These attributes are not inherent in
the object; they result from the relation between the object
and the experimental arrangement as a whole, and they are
only statistically determined by the wave-function and are
llbr
subjeet to the uncertainty principle. Born compares
them to the different projections of a solid onto perpendic¬
ular planes. The apparent shape of the solid changes while
the actual shape remains unchanged. We can only view one
projection at a time, but from a comparison of the different
projections' we can reconstruct the invariant shape and know
that the solid is objectively real (again equating invariance
•J *j
with reality). For elementary particles, of course, the
invariant features are not shape but rest mass, charge and
116
spin. * However, several difficulties arise with this
1^6
analogy of Bora's." (l) Ke uses the word "'complementarity"
to refer to position and momentum aiid also to the mutually
117
exclusive conditions under which they are measured.
This usage is closer to Pauli than to Bohr. Moreover, in
spite of Bohr's objections, Born states that complementary
appearances are due to the disturbing effect of the process
T2g
of observation." (2) Born is correct in saying that con¬
jugate properties are relational and not inherent, but he
wrongly suggests that they are not bona fide attributes of
the object. Certainly anger and love are properly regarded
as states of the mind even though they are relationally
defined. This difficulty goes back to Born's; identification
of invariance with reality.
(3) Finally, the analogy to the projections of a
solid is a hopeless muddle. As a model of complementarity
it violates the conditions of completeness, coexhaustiveness
(there are generally more than two projections), alternation,
coirxherence, exclusiveness, reciprocity, emergence and point¬
ing. We have seen that it is not just the apparent shape
of the phase-cell, but its actual shape which changes as: the
object alternates from one mode to the other (oscillating
phase-cell model).U'^ The invariant here should be the vol¬
ume rather than the shape, so the change is not just a change
of appearance; it is a change in the object itself. In
fact, the projections of a solid onto different planes never
change at all unless the object rotates, but such a "rotating
phase-cell model" would not satisfy the Heisenberg uncertainty
12.0
principle in all instances, ' so it would not preserve the
one invariant that does exist. In short, Born has replaced
complementarity with the idea of orthogonality or modality.
His "projections" are simply the orthogonal dimensions.of
an invariant reality and do not satisfy the conditions for
121
complementarity, as Bohr understood the term.
*+.6 Pascual Jordan:
Pascual Jordan must be one of the most prolific ana
imaginative scientists of our century. Besides being one
of the founders of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory
he has made contributions to cosmology, geophysics, biology,
122
psychology, and even religious questions. ' ' Strangely
3 21
enough, Jordan claims to be a thorough-going positivist; '
that is, he holds that the aim of science is to collect and
organize sense data and not to seek an underlying essence of
12b /
things." " He embarrassed many of his colleagues (espec¬
ially his mentor, Max Born) by claiming that all quantum
physicists, and especially complementarists, must be posit-
121
ivists, ' thus providing grist for the mills of many
critics. " He must have horrified Bohr with his- repeated
statements that all observations are an "intrusion"
1 27(Eingriff) into nature ' and that all phenomena appear under
the "coercion" (Zv/ang) of experimental arrangements so that
1 pQ
an objective description is impossible. However, he
partially redeemed himself by saying that the features of
complementarity and uncertainty are grounded in nature
itself and are not simply due to the limits of knowledge or
129
of measurement." Like so many physicists, he did not
really have a consistent philosophical outlook, and he
should not be judged on the basis of occasional unguarded
declarations.
In an important paper on the quantum theory of .meas¬
urement Jordan rejected the subjectivist interpretation of
von Neumann ^ and maintained that entropy (the measure of
randomness) is an objective property of systems which is
independent of the knowledge (or ignorance) of the observer
and hence is the same for all observers* He concluded, that
the thermodynamic description (in terms of temperature and
entropy) of sin atom is complementary to its space-time des¬
cription in a way that is independent of the existence of
111
wave-particle complementarity. J What Jordan has. in mind
here is not the same thermodynamic complementarity that we
discussed in chapter 3.1, but a thermodynamical interpretation
of von Neumann's concept of a "pure state" or "pure case",
i.e. the representation of the state of a system by a single
wave-function which evolves continuously and causally in
accordance with Schrb'dinger1 s equation. The act of measure¬
ment transforms a pure case into a. "mixed state" or "mixture"
of the Eigenfunctions of the mathematical operator represen¬
ts?
ting the measurement. J ' In an ensemble of atomic systems
all of these Eigenfunctions will be found but for a. single
atom only one can be realized at a time, and this selection
is purely statistical in contrast to the causal evolution of
111
the pure case, itself. So the transition from a pure
case to a mixture is sudden and acausal, like the quantum-
I lb-
jump of an atom." J Therefore, Jordan argued, there is a
relationship of complementarity between a pure case and a
mixture, or between evolution by Scb.rodinger!s equation and
quantum-jumps, or between causality and space-time des-
149
] if
cription.~° In fact, if one substitutes "wave-mode" for
"pure case" and "particle-mode" for "quantum-jump", .then
one has the relationship of complementarity as Bohr saw it.
The only difference is that "ton Neumann and Jordan use ab¬
stract, mathematical concepts, whereas Bohr uses concrete,
1 /
physical ones,
Jordan's principal applications of complementarity
have been in the fields of biology and psychology, and here,
he tells us, he owes his basic .insights to his correspondence
•j 07
and conversations with Niels Bohr. JordanS's principal
contribution to biology is his "amplifier theory of organ¬
isms" (Versta"rkertheorie dor Organlsmen), in which the
effects of microscopic fluctuations are amplified into the
characteristically unique features of living organisms-
Some examples are the role of mutations in heredity and the
1^9
sensitivity of the eye to individual photons. It is due
to this"sensitivity" (Empfindl1chke1t) of the organism that
it is impossible to determine the state of all the atoms in
the organism without destroying it, hence the feature of
lli 0
complementarity first suggested by Bohr. ' Of course, this"
"amplifier theory" is not in itself sufficient to guarantee
the irreducibility of life phenomena since only a very few
atoms would have to be sampled to determine the microstate
n ) j -|
of a relatively homogenous body. In the case of an. org¬
anism, however, there is strong inhomogeneity even at the
level of the chromosomes, so a mere sampling would not be
1)4-2
sufficient. ' Amplification and inhomogeneity, then, are
the two features which distinguish organisms- from mechanical
or thermodynamic systems and make a physico-chemical explan¬
ation of life impossible."5"^
In the area of psychology, Jordan also makes several
interesting applications of complementarity. He mentions
1bb
the impossibility of observing how one goes to sleep," thus
illustrating the general principle that A-experienced and A-
ib-k
analyzed are quite different from each other. He also
develops Pauli's suggestion that the relationship between
the conscious and unconscious minds is one of complementer™
lbs
ity. and specially points out Freud's idea that neurotic
symptoms can only exist as long as their real significance
1)4.7
is not consciously realized." In other words, repression
(Verdrangung) in psychoanalysis is the correlate of recip¬
rocity in quantum physics. In a "split-personality", for
instance, the dominance of one personality represses the
manifestation of the other just as in an electron the appear¬
ance of wave properties (well-defined momentum) "suppresses"
the appearance of particle properties (well-defined location)
lbS
In this sense, Jordan says that Freud's concept of
repression is the positive side of his idea of the unconsciou
just as the principle of complementarity is the positive side
] if.9
of the discovery of indeterminism in quantum physics.
The same difficulty arises with this "split'-person¬
ality" model as with Pauli's complementarity of the conscious
and unconscious minds. The usual conception of a dual-
personality is that both halves exist at the same time and
150
in mutual opposition. Either they are two different
personalities altogether, or else two coexisting projections
of a single multi-dimensional personality. If a complemen-
151
tarist model is to be used, then the two "halves" must be
seen as wholes, that is, alternate modes of existence for
the total personality. However, neither Jordan nor Pauli
has; worked out a fully complementarist model in this sense.
Waiter M.Elsassers
Elsasser has certainly gone more deeply into the
application of complementarity to thermodynamics and biology
than anyone else. Like Jordan, he claims to be a strict
positivist, and he also follows the operational!sm of Percy
151
Bridgman. In fact, he had Bridgman proofread his first
book on biology to make sure that all the concepts used could
192be operationally defined. '• The operational!st approach
is particularly evident in Elsasser's insistence on dealing
with ensembles or classes of equivalent systems and his
strict definition of probabilities in terms of statistical
15h
frequencies. J
Elsasser introduced what he calls the "generalized
principle of complementarity" in 1937* "If systems with many
degrees of freedom are involved, the possibility of giving
a unique quantum-mechanical representation of a system by a
pure state and the possibility of leaving it in approximately
the conditions under which it appears as a sample of a given
19k-
collection, will in general exclude each other." At
this point Elsasser was thinking primarily in terms of stat¬
istical thermodynamics; it was another twenty years before
he published his first work on biology. He was undoubtedly-
familiar with Bohr's efforts to apply the principle of
'| be*
complementarity to thermodynamics, but he apparently
152
wanted to replace Bohr's intuitive arguments, based on the
classical statistical mechanics of Maxwell, Boltzmann aud
Gibbs, by a more rigorous argument, based on the quantum
156
theory of measurement.
He argued that in order to treat a quantum-mechanical
system as a "pure case" it is necessary to determine its wave
function, i.e. to determine the location and shape of its
representative cell in phase space (subject to the limita¬
tions of the uncertainty principle)."*"^7 This can be done
(in principle) for a simple system consisting of a very few
atoms. But for systems with large numbers of atoms and
hence large numbers of degrees of freedom (dimensions in
phase space) the effort to determine simultaneously the app¬
roximate positions of all the atoms would fequire bombardment
with a large number of high-energy x-rays (wavelength about
one Angstrom unit), which would greatly increase the average
momentum of the atoms and cause the system to burst into many
parts. In this case the system could not be treated as a
member of a statistical ensemble of equivalent systems since
its behavior would be radically different from that of any
other system on which the same measurement had been performed.
Therefore a system of many atoms can be represented by a pure
state in quantum mechanics only by disrupting the system
itself and destroying its equivalence to other similarly
prepared systems.
The alternative, of course, is to isolate the system
from external influence and treat it as a bona fide member of
a statistical ensemble which is represented mathematically
by a statistical matrix of wave-functions. In this case the
153
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wave-function is only statistically determined) * and. the
system cannot be represented by a pure state. Elsasser's
conclusion is that "the use of an ensemble for describing
and especially for predicting the average behavior of a col¬
lection of systems as found in nature and the precise
knowledge of the state of the individual samples exclude
] 59
each other." Hence, there is a relationship of comple¬
mentarity between the quan turn-mechsn ical description bf a
system by means of a pure state and the s ta1.1 s t i cal -me c han. i c a1
description by means of a statistical matrix. This is
Elsasser's "generalized principle of complementarity".
By way of critique we should note that Elsasser has
concentrated on the possibilities of observation and measure¬
ment rather than those of definition, reflecting his general
operationalist philosophyGiven the framework of the
quantum theory of measurement he might just as well have re¬
garded the limitations he discusses as matters of definition.
This would certainly have made his arguments more consistent
with Bohr's approach and more acceptable to a non-operation-
alist audience, as well. It is significant, in this respect,
that Elsasser regards the necessity of using statistics in
thermodynamics to depend on the validity of quantum theory.
Hence his "generalized principle of complementarity" is
simply the wider application of quantum-mechanical comple¬
mentarity to systems with large numbers of atoms, whereas
Bohr regarded each application of complementarity to be a
separate issue.Elsasser insists that in classical ther¬
modynamics the use of statistics is only a labor-saving device
since the microstate of the system could always be determined
15'!+
Cin principle) by measurements which do not essentially dis-
turb the system."*" " Thus he sets: aside Bohr's arguments
based on the possibilities of definition in terms of the
classical theories"®"*^ an.d considers only the possibilities
of classical measurements. Ultimately, of course, the two
"i 6*h-
approaches should give the same results, " but philosophic-
] 6s)
ally there is a world of difference between them. " -
Elsasser's interest in biology was first aroused by
166
Bohr's paper on "Light and Life" published in 19335' ^ and
his work in this field, he states, is basically a logical
167
extension of Bohr's. Specifically, he attributes his
"generalised principle" to the insights of Bohr and regards
this as one of the three basic principles that lie at the
foundation of all biology. The other two principles are
the principle of finite classes: (or inhomogeneous classes)
and the principle of supra-mechanical "biotonic" stability
or the "non-storage of information"."*"^ We shall examine
each of these in turn.
(l) We have already reviewed Elsasser's application
of generalized complementarity to thermodynamic systems.
The application to biological systems is basically the same;
there are two alternate modes of existence which Elsasser
calls mechanical (physico-chemical or quantum-mechanical or
i AQ
molecular) and orsanismic or biotonic, and the scientist
can choose to study either one or the other, but the two are
1
mutually exclusive. Any attempt to determine the mechanical
microstate (i.e. the wave-function) would disrupt the bio¬
tonic regularities and kill the organism. Conversely, the
decision to study the biotonic regularities, themselves,
155
restricts the available information about the micro-variables
to statistical inferences based on the observed macro-
1 70
variables (e.g. weight, pulse-rate, etc.)."'' This, Elsasser
argues, is the essence of Bohr's considerations, but it does
not go far enough because (a) it applies equally well to
thermodynamic systems and so does not take into account the
distinctive qualities of living organisms themselves - this
171
leads to Elsasser's principle of biotonie stability - and.
(b) Bohr has considered only the study of individuals and
has not considered the possibilities available from the study
of ensembles or classes of individuals - this leads to the
172
principle of finite classes. '
(2) In thermodynamics, as we have seen, one can
statistically determine the microstate of a- complex system
by treating it as a member of an homogeneous class, i.e. a
large ensemble of systems which are identically prepared and
therefore all have the same macrostate. If it is impossible
to control the preparation of the systems one starts with a
naturally-occurring inhomogeneous class and selects a sub¬
class that is reasonably homogeneous. Obviously, the greater
the inhomogeneity of the natural class, the greater its size
must be in order for it to contain homogeneous subclasses.
In the extreme case of the radically inhomogeneous class of
living organisms, the size of the natural class must be imm¬
ense if the microstate of any given organism is to be stat-
i
istically determined. Elsasser then shows that the number
of organisms in the universe is not large enough to make
this possible. The argument proceeds as follows: clearly
the number of organisms must be much larger than the possible
156
number of macrostates in order to ensure the existence of a
substantial subclass of organisms with the same macrostate.
But even that is not enough: in order to have a good set of
statistics the number of organisms in this subclass must be
much larger than the number of equivalent microstates, i.e.
the number of micro states consistent with the given, macro-
state. Hence the number of naturally-occurring organisms
must be much, much larger than the number of microstates of
an homogenous subclass.. But a rough estimate shows that
even if the earth were literally covered with living cells
20
and there were 10 other planets In the universe covered
with living cells and every microsecond of each cell's- exist¬
ence were counted as a separate system-event and if life had
existed for thirty billion years (a generous estimate of the
age of the universe), the total number of system-events would
still be immensely smaller than the number of equivalent
microstates of a single cellI J Therefore, even if all the
cells in the universe were considered to have the same macro -
state for all their lives and hence to constitute an homo¬
geneous class, it would be impossible to make any statistical
inferences about the microstate of even a single cell. All
this is not to mention the practical difficulties involved
in obtaining and studying all these cells or the ethical
problems Involved in killing them all save one. Blsasser's
conclusion is that the irreducible essence of life is seen
in the relationship of the individual organism to the class
of all organisms. That class is finite and radically in-
momogeneous, therefore life cannot be reduced to the terms
1 7bof physics and chemistry. '
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Comments: (a) In spite of Elsasserfs claim to have developed
this idea himself, we should remember that Bohr also pointed
out the impossibility of defining the atomic state of an
organism due to its fundamental complexity and inhomogeneity«
3 75 (b) There is something rather arbitrary about basing
an argument concerning the nature of life on the number of
planets in the universe and the length of time that life has
existed on them. It is possible that a universe such as
ours could not conceivably exist in sizes large enough to
3 76
reverse Elsasser's inequality. Perhaps a universe of
such proportions would be too massive to allow sufficient
expansion (against gravitation) and cooling to provide con¬
ditions for life as we know it. But what about the age of
life in the universe? Perhaps this is only a few billion
177
years, ' but could the potential future of life be limited
simply because it cannot be explained in terms of physics'
-| ri O
and chemistry?" Or could it be that, if life is to con¬
tinue indefinitely, then it must become ever more complex so
that it never reaches the stage where it reverses Elsasser's
inequality and automatically becomes reducible to the laws
179
of quantum mechanics? I don't think Elsasser has thought
through the implications of his argument beyond the limited
considerations of the use of statistics. As far as he is
concerned the construction of an homogeneous class of organ¬
isms is impossible In practice, therefore it is meaningless
to speculate about the possible application of quantum-
mechanics to living beings.
(c) However, there is another possible objection
which Elsasser does consider: the same quantitative estimates
158
can be done for Inorganic systems like crystals, and the
resu.lt is the same inequality so nothing has been proved.
To answer this objection Elsasser drops the consideration
of classes and returns to the basic inhomogeneity of indivi¬
duals (which was Bohr's original point) and the importance
of feedback mechanisms. The maerostate of a crystal or a
dust particle is quite insensitive to its microstructure}
and the moderate inhomogeneity at the atomic level can be
1 8"*
averaged over without significant loss of information.
Even major inhoraogeneities are simply treated as "impurities"
182
and usually neglected without loss.' Just the opposite
is true for an organism, however, since it is strongly in-
homogeneous at the molecular level and very sensitive to even
the slightest changes at that level due to the presence of
feedback mechanisms or "ergodizers" (cf. Bohr and Jordan on
amplification effects)
Conclusion: Elsasser's principle of finite classes is faulty
in several respects, and when suitably modified it amounts
to little more than the principles of Bohr and Jordan based
on the complexity and inhomogeneity of organisms at the
atomic level and the importance of amplification effects.
Elsasser probably would not have placed so much emphasis on
a consideration of classes in the first place had it not been
for his commitment to operationalj.sm. In fact, there are
points where he drops his guard and speaks simply of the
uniqueness of individuals I No two sheep or blades of grass
•iftLi.
are exactly alike.' It may be that in the back of his
mind he is thinking of the qualitative individuality of org¬




(3) Elsasser's principle of supra-mechanical stab¬
ility is similar to his principle of finite classes except
that it applies to the individual itself, rather than the
relationship of the individual to a class. Since the total
number of system-events for the whole universe is immensely
smaller than the number of equivalent microstates for a
single cell, it follows that the total number of system-events
for any single organism must be immensely smaller than the
number of its equivalent mlcrostates. Therefore only an
immensely small percentage of the microstates corresponding
to any given macrostate will be realized during the organ¬
ism's lifetime, and all macrostates will be equally improb-
"I PC
able. This accounts for the variability and flexibility
of organisms, but it makes any quantum-mechanical explanation
of their remarkable stability completely impossible
The efficient storage of information by an organism is a
biotonic feature that cannot be explained in (quantum) meeh-
X88
anical terras. From the viewpoint of complementarity (in
Bohr's sense) this stability simply Illustrates the feature
of emergence like the emergence of stability in atoms which
cannot be explained in (classical) mechanical terms.
Elsasser does not include this feature in his definition of
"generalized complementarity" because he virtually equates
1 90
complementarity with the uncertainty principle." '
In conclusion, Elsasser's principles of generalize!
complementarity and biotonic stability are together equiv¬
alent to Bohr's principle of complementarity. Elsasser's
original contribution is the principle of finite classes,
160
but this is open to serious objections.
h»8 Philipp Franks
We turn now to two physicists who were directly
associated with the Vienna Circle and represent logical
positivism in its purest form. Their .interpretations of
complementarity are unique and serve to illuminate the diff-
"191
erences between Bohr's philosophy and positivism."
Philipp Frank considers the principal contribution
of Bohr's philosophy to be his attention to the conditions
192
for the application of everyday concepts." The signifi¬
cance of this attention is for Frank, however, the attainment
of a coherent logical syntax rather than unambiguous commun-
191
ication. J The significance of complementarity is that
the whole of everyday language is broken up into complemen¬
tary sublanguages suitable for different experimental
] 9k
situations. So as long as1 one restricts complementary
analysis to the use of language, Bohr's philosophy is consis¬
tent with positivism, but as soon as complementary modes are
attributed to objects one has drifted into metaphysics and
2 95
mysticism. In reality, there is neither wave nor particle,
but only measurable quantities like momentum and position
196
subject to the uncertainty principle. In spite of all
this, Frank claims that there is no difference between Bohr's
view and his own on the meaning of complementarity in physics;
but there is a real difference, he admits, with regard to
the application of complementarity to biology and psychology.
197
In fact, Frank virtually rejects these applications.
In biology, Frank argues, a com.pl emen tar 1st approach
161
is "possible", "certainly tenable", "perhaps even desirable",
but given the present state of biological knowledge it is
198
not a necessary, but only a convenient approach, The
parallel to atomic physics breaks down because in atomic
physics complementarity is demanded by the evidence (e.g.
the observed stability of atoms), and this evidence cannot
be explained in terms of the laws of classical physics.
So far, however, there is no empirical evidence for a contra¬
diction between the properties .of living organisms and the
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laws of quantum physics. One wonders whether Frank
would have accepted Elsasser's arguments here if they had
been available to him at the time. The only evidence for
complementarity that he cites is the impossibility of obser¬
ving the exact atomic configuration of an organism -without
causing death.The possibilities of definition, which
2.01
Bohr stressed, are completely Ignored. ' However, Frank
was never really open to Bohr's arguments in the first place.
He even states at one point that complementarity can never
serve as a scientific argument in favor of an organismic
conception of nature since it is purely negative and can only
lead to the replacement of one kind of physical description
20 ^
(e.g. classical mechanics) by another (quantum, mechanics).''" ^
Therefore, even if complementarity could be conclusively
demonstrated in biology it would only transform biology into
another branch of physics! Ultimately, nothing is beyond
the range of physics and chemistry because the only legiti-
PG1
mate data are physical data. This kind of reductionism
is completely opposed to the intent of Bohr's philosophy,
and It would have been better for Frank to say so openly
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rather than try to harmonize the two at Bohr's expense.
In the same reductionist vein, Frank tries to use
complementarity in psychology as an argument in favor of
behaviorism. Since one cannot experience an emotion and
analyze it at the same time5 a causal account of mental life
(the only kind acceptable to Frank) cannot be based on intro¬
spection as Comte pointed out over a century ago. Therefore,
a scientific account must be based exclusively on the be¬
havior of others with no appeal to one's self-understanding.
Once introspection is eliminated in this manner, psychology
becomes a branch of biology, and all complementarist consid-
20h
erations disappear1 Of course, our language still
contains statements about personal "freedom", and such state¬
ments will always be complementary to statements about causal
determination, but in this sense "freedom" means simply the
absence of compulsion ("liberty of spontaneity") and has
20 5
nothing to do with metaphysical "freedom of the will".
In fact, such a transition into metaphysics is ruled out,
according to Frank, by Bohr's own restriction to classical
language and logic. The terms; of a complementarity relation¬
ship must be taken from everyday life, not from metaphysics<,
?o6
Clearly he is wrong here for even the terminology of
physics is derived from ordinary language via metaphysics.20''
Therefore, metaphysical terms like "free-will" and "mind"
cannot be ruled out by positivist criteria.
Frank rejects an argument made by Sommerfeld that
mind must be complementary to body because it cannot be
208
localized within the body. - The same thing could be said,
209he argues, of the function of a machine. Of course,
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when Frank wrote this (1938) machines were still regarded
as being purely "mechanical"; the idea of function was
2*| Q
regarded to be an epiphenomenon like mental life itself.'""
In retrospect, however, we can see that Frank's analogy is
a good one and that machines (in fact all human artifacts)
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participate in the same complementarity as: their creators,
k-.9 Hans Reichenbach:
Reichenbach was less critical and more creative
than Frank with regards to Bohr's ideas. In fact, he offered
his own alternative to complementarity which he called the
212
"principle of anomaly". Briefly stated, it asserts that
no uniform causal account of "interphenomena" is possible on
213
the atomic scale. For instance, single-slit diffraction
can be understood solely in terms of a wave-picture only if
the wave is allowed to collapse instantaneously and acausally
when it impinges upon a screen. On the other hand, it is
possible to interpret this experiment solely in terms of the
scattering of classical particles by the slit- without such a
"causal anomaly". Just the opposite is true, however, for
double-slit diffraction (Young's experiment). Since a
particle can only pass through one slit at a time, there must
be some action at a distance of the second slit on the part¬
icle which makes the diffraction pattern different from that
of the single-slit experiment. In this case, the causal
anomaly can be avoided only if a modified wave-picture is
used. The point is that neither wave nor particle picture
Fill-
can account for both experiments without causal anomalies. '
Reichenbach discusses two possible solutions for
16}+
this dilemma, which he calls "restrictive interpretations"
because they avoid the anomalies by suitable restrictions
on the discussion of intorphenomena. The first is a- rest¬
riction of meaning. It simply rules out all statements
about interphenomena (e.g. about the path of the particle in
the double-slit experiment) as meaningless. Reichenbach
attributes this version to Bohr and Heisenberg but does not
support this allegation with any specific references to their
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writings. The second interpretation is a restriction of
assertability. Rather.-than ruling out statements about
interphenomena as meaningless., it introduces a three-valued
logic and treats them as potentially indeterminate.v Such
statements always occur in pairs, only one of which can be
determinate at a time. For instance, the particle approach¬
ing the double-slit has a determinate momentum and Indeter¬
minate position, but when it finally impinges upon the screen
it has a determinate position and indeterminate momentum.
In the idiom of complementarity, as we have studied it, the
"particle" exists first in the wave-mode and finally in the
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particle-mode. ' Hence Reichenbach1s "interpretation of
restrictive assertabillty" is practically equivalent to
Bohr's principle of complementarity. In fact, his "three-
valued logic" is identical to the multi-valued "logic of
21 7
complementarity" developed by von Weizsacker, 1
The main weakness in Reichenbach's principle of
anomaly is his separate treatment of phenomena and inter¬
phenomena. He admits that no sharp distinction can really
be drawn between the two since both involve inference and
interpretation on the part of the scientist, only in different
165
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degrees. Furthermore, Reichenbach recognizes that the
phenomena themselves appear to be either corpuscular (when
position is measured) or wave-like (when momentum or wave¬
length. is measured) even though these phenomena could be
interpreted in terms of either of the two pictures if necess-
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ary. Therefore, a more unified treatment could be
achieved by extending the principle of anomaly to include
both phenomena and interphenomena. The result would then be
entirely equivalent with Bohr's principle of complementarity.
5-.10 John A. Wheeler and Richard P. Feynmans
Two of the most imaginative physicists of the post¬
war period have been John Archibald Wheeler and. Richard
Phillips Feynman. Some of their ideas are rather speculative,,
but they ought to be studied as possible developments for the
principle of complementarity in the future. There are two
separate theories to be considered, the "direct particle
interaction" formulation of electrodynamics developed by
Wheeler and Feynman and the "relative-state" formulation of
quantum mechanics developed by Everett and Wheeler.
The "direct particle interaction" formulation of
electrodynamics was developed in the l^-O's as an alternative
to the usual conception of indirect transaction by means of
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electromagnetic waves. In the usual conception a source
is thought to radiate a wave which travels outward until it
happens to be absorbed by another particle. This trans -
action is one-way, from the source to the absorber, and the
initial process of radiation is entirely independent of the
166
(presence or absence of) the absorber. Hence transaction
by intermediary fields is a form of action by contact, as
Einstein called it, in contrast to the Newtonian action at
221
a distance. ~ The Wheeler-Feynman conception on the other
hand, is of a direct, two-way interaction between the source
and the absorber. The initial radiation by the source is
actually stimulated by the "advanced-potential" (travelling
backwards in time) of the absorber, which is1 in turn prod¬
uced by the "retarded potential" (travelling forewards in
\ 222
time; of the radiating source. The circular relationship
between source and absorber means that the source could not
possibly radiate unless there were another particle somewhere
in the universe to absorb its radiation. Hence, source and
22"}
absorber, past and future, are interdependent. °
Because the interaction is two-way and symmetry is
maintained between past and. future, Wheeler find Feynman
regard this "direct particle interaction" to be a modern
version of Newtonian action at a distance. Furthermore,
they regard their treatment, which emphasizes the interacting
particles, as being equivalent but complementary to the
22b
usual treatment, which emphasizes the intermediary fields.
The choice between the two treatments is strictly a matter
of convenience: when dealing with actual electromagnetic
radiation (real quanta) the field-picture is more suitable,
but when dealing with electromagnetic fields- (virtual quanta)
the direct particle interaction approach is more convenient
since it automatically avoids the infinite "self-energy" terms
226
that appear in the field theory. Still the two formula¬
tions must be equivalent because one can transform from a
167
picture involving the annihilation and subsequent recreation
of an antiparticle pair (involving the mediation of a real
photon) to a picture involving the direct interaction of a
pair of identical particles (involving the exchange of a
226
virtual photon) by a simple "crossing11 transformation."
In other words, Feynman and Wheeler have presented us with a
new form of supplemontarity, not complementarity in the
227
proper sense.
We turn now to the "relative-state" formulation of
Q OQ
Everett and Wheeler* This theory is essentially the log¬
ical development of von Neumann's quantum theory of measure-
229
ment. It is well-known that von Neumann's approach leads
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to an infinite regress: J A quantum-mechanical system cannot
have a unique state unless it is observed by an outside agent
(the pure state is then transformed into a mixtureK2-1
But the process of observation itself can be analyzed quantum-
mechanically (according to von Neumann) so the observer-
observed system as a whole still does not have a unique state
unless- it in turn is observed by a second agent, and so
222
forth. J The Everett-Wheeler theory simply defines the
state of the observer in relation to the state of the observed
222
object. ^ Since the object has no unique state, then
neither does the observer, and the act of measurement, rather
than transforming the object into a unique state, actually
transforms the observer into an infinite superposition of
states! The observer branches into an infinity of "obser¬
vers" each with a different state corresponding to the
22!f
possible states of the observed object. And the second
observer likewise branches into an infinite number of "obser¬
vers" with different states corresponding to the possible
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states: of the first observer and so on. The result is a
complete branching of the universe into an infinite number
of new "universes" and a complete rebranching again and again
as; these interactions go on. The beauty of it is that there
is no discontinuity or scansality since all possible devel-
opments are realized at once. J The statistical laws of
quantum mechanics- completely determine the numbers of univ¬
erses that follow any given course of events. Moreover,
there is no appeal to classical physics'-, and the correspondence
principle is entirely eliminated.2^ Of course, there can,
be no communication between the different branches so our
subjective feeling of uniqueness is not violated; in fact,
there is no way at all to either verify or falsify the exist-
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ence of other branches besides our own universe. ' This-
theory does not alter the laws of quantum mechanics in any
way; it simply reinterprets them so that they are conceptually
self-contained and hence logically simpler than in the ortho-
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dox representation. J Therefore, the "relative-state"
formulation can only be judged on basically aesthetic grounds.
Although the correspondence principle is. eliminated
in the "relative-state" formulation, the principle of comple¬
mentarity apparently is not. Wheeler is a staunch, supporter
of complementarity,2^ and in the note he appended to
Everett's first publication^^ he argued that complementarity
is maintained between the memory states for successive
2ni
measurements of conjugate variables-. If an electron is
measured first with respect to its position and then with
respect to its momentum and then again with respect to its
position, the observer's memories of the two position meas¬
urements will be correlated statistically in accordance with
the uncertainty principle. So the Everett-Wheeler formu¬
lation eliminates indeterminacy, but retains the features of
irreversibility and real becoming; it dispenses with the
correspondence principle, but retains the basic features of
complementarity. In Bohr's philosophy these ideas are all
interdependent; Everett and Wheeler have shown us that they
can be separated if one Iw willing to admit on infinite
plurality of universes.
b-.ll Adolf Meyer-Abich:
The only biologist so far to make use of complemen-
?!+?
tarity is Adolf Meyer-Abich. In a brilliant paper on
theoretical biology he discusses three distinct but related
applications of complementarity to his field of study.
First there is the relationship of form and function or of
homology and analogy, as represented by the studies of moruh-
ology and physiology, respectively. -J Meyer-Abieh points
out that whereas the characteristic feature of 1.8th and 19th
century biology was the attempt to subordinate one to the
other (the "problem of domination"), modern biolo.gy, with the
development of physiological anatomy and anatomical physiol¬
ogy, has come to regard the two as being complementary.
Morphology and physiology are logically independent and each
uses categories which embrace the whole field of biology
while at the same time excluding the categories of the other.
Yet neither can be reduced to the other, and both are necess¬
ary for a full understanding of biology.
Secondly, Meyer-Abich cites the relationship between
an "organismic subject" (e.g. cell, organ, organism) as part
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of its external world or biotic environment and the same
organi.sm.ic subject as the totality of its Internal world
/ \ phli.(IJmweIt -Innenwe11 BeziehungJ. '' When we treat an organism
in relation to its biotic environment, we regard it as- a
functional unit within that environment, and individual organs
are all. part of the internal world of the organism. How¬
ever, it is also possible to analyze the organism in terms
pL-H
of its individual organs, i.e. as a composite structure. '
In this case each organ is part of the external world or
environment of every other organ. Moreover, the two approa¬
ches are not just alternate viewpoints; they represent
alternate modes of the "organismic subject" itself. In fact,
there is no diredt connection between an internal organ and
the external environment of an organism. The environment
affects the organism as a whole, in its functional mode, and
the individual organs are only affected as the organism
reverts to its structural mode.
Note that Meyer-Abich regards the environment of an
organism as a higher level of unity because he refers; to the
biotic or ecological environment, not just the physical en¬
vironment. In our previous discussion we have only consid¬
ered external influences on an organism at the atomic level
2^-6
of sense impressions (e.g. light waves, sound waves;, etc.).
In these instances, the organism receives a stimulus at the
atomic level and translates it upwards to higher levels.
In Meyer-Abich1 s model, however, the organism is so well
Integrated into its biotic environment that it responds to
environmental changes as a whole and translates the influence
2*+7
downwards to lower levels. Clearly, both mechanisms are
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possible, and their occurrence simply depends on the degree
of integration or isolation between organsim and environment
in each case.
One important aspect of the Umwe11 -Innenwe11 Bezie-
hung, according to Meyer-Abich is the complementarity between
natural selection and ecological- adaption, or between the
phQ
corresponding sciences of genetics- and ecology. The old
debate over the inheritance of acquired characteristics can
only be resolved when it is recognized that these two sciences
are based on mutually exclusive postulates and are really
complementary in that both together are needed, to explain the
full range of hereditary and evolutionary phenomena. Modern
genetics works only with pure lines of descent for which
there is no real adaption, and the only possibility of evol¬
ution is through gene mutation and natural selection.
Ecological adaption, on the other hand, is directed by final
processes of reconstruction. Here Meyer-Abich suggests; that
ecological adaption may be responsible for the "macroevolut»
ion" of the thirty-or-so original "archetypes" of organisms
(e.g. vertebrates, arthropods, molluscs, etc.) and that gene
mutation and natural selection are largely responsible for
the evolution of the subsequent "paratypes". The two com¬
plementary mechanisms correspond to teleological or final
2*+9
causes and effective causes, respectively.
It is remarkable how well Meyer-Abich has grasped
the intent of Bohr's ideas, especially in view of the fact
that he was not trained in physics. The ease with which he
adapts the concept of complementarity to biology reminds; us
of the fact that Bohr's father was a biologist with, a keen
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interest in the vitalist-mechanist debate and Bohr's own
thinking was strongly influenced by these considerations.
If. 12 Paul Oppenheim et al;s
The most systematic attempt to define complementar¬
ity rigorously and apply it to psychology and religion has
25.1
been made by Paul Gppenheim and his associates. Their
basic definition is summed up in the statement: "Complemen-
252
tary phenomena have non-compatible interpretations.15
This means first of all that complementarity is a relationship
between "phenomena" or "phenomenon sentences", i.e. between
descriptions or statements about observable events such as
the click of a Geiger counter or the stretching of a spring
251
balance. ^ These "phenomena" are therefore macroscopic
events which can and must be described solely in terms of
classical physics. Their interpretations, on the other hand,
will involve statements ("interpretational sentences") about
unobservable quantum events in the microscopic world. These
events must be described in "quasi-classical" language, i.e.
classical language that is used analogically and so undergoes
a- semantical change when applied to the non-classical world
o 5h
of quantum events. For instance, the click of a Geiger
counter can be interpreted as the impact of a particle at
that precise instant of time, and the stretching of a spring
balance can be interpreted as the change in energy or
Doppler-shift of a wave.
Oppenheim et al. call these phenomena "complementary"
and their interpretations "non-compatible". By "complement¬
ary" they mean that the phenomena (a) occur under mutually
173
exclusive conditions (cf. our condition 8), (b) are caused
by the same atomic object (cf. our condition l), and (c)
together exhaust the possible types of phenomena caused by
p C? C?
that object (cf. our condition k). By "non-compatible"
they mean that the interpretations utilize concepts like wave
and particle which are incompatible but not co-referential
(i.e. not applicable to the same object) in classical physics
and. co-referential but not incompatible in quantum physics
since they apply only to complementary phenomena and are
25'A
therefore never applicable at the same time. All of this
is packed into the short definition: "Complementary phenomena
have non-compatible interpretations".'
The principal value of this formulation is the clear
statement about the semantical change that classical language
undergoes when applied to quantum events. As we saw in our •
discussion of the correspondence principle, this is one of
the most difficult and least understood points in Bohr's phil¬
osophy. However, Oppenheim's dual treatment of phenomena
and interpretations is unnecessary (except from a positivist
viewpoint) and unduly restrictive on the use of the word
237
"phenomenon". The three-point definition of complement¬
arity is perfectly correct as far as it goes, but it is
somewhat incomplete compared with the complex use of the term
in Bohr's writings.
Oppenheim et al. have recently applied their formu¬
lation of complementarity to the mind-body problem with
238
rather interesting results. y They divide the world of
discourse into statements about two groups of "entities"
(i.e. things, events, processes, etc.), mental and bodily.
l?h
The difference is that mental entities or "experiences"
permit privileged access (experience only by the person to
whom they are attributed) and are never experienced as having
a specific location within the body, whereas bodily entities
do not permit privileged access and do have a specific loc¬
ation in the body of the person to whom they are attributed.
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The authors then make a further distinction on the basis
of language usage: Some entities (entities-^, whether mental or
bodily) are theory-free in the sense that they are only ref¬
erred to in statements which are free of concepts taken from
a particular psychological theory. Others (entities2) are
referred to in statements which do use theoretical concepts
and so are theory-bound.
The authors then argue that mental entities^ and
bodily entities^ are incompatible like waves and particles
in classical physics, that is, they can never refer to the
9(' 1
same object and therefore cannot be complementary. ' The
example cited is that of fear, a mental entity-j , on the one
hand, and blushing, a bodily entity-^, on the other. Clearly
these two are incompatible for a person is not likely to
blush when he is afraid! But the example is pporly chosen
for one could just as easily take fear and trembling which
clearly are not incompatible; in fact, they are practically
262
synonomous. Here the authors1' analysis breaks down badly.
Turning to entities2 they then argue that mental entities2
and bodily entities2 are not incompatible but non-c'ompatible.
por instance, one particular theory correlates the
sensation of hunger with a concentration of glucose ih the
hypothalamus. Both of the terms here are theory-bound since
hunger is defined as a psychological state (e.g. by the "cog¬
nitive dissonance" theory) rather than as a personal experience.
Moreover, the two terms are non-compatible, like wave and
particle in quantum physics', because they are defined under
mutually exclusive experimental conditions. Hence, mental
entities2and bodily entitles2 are complementary.
The only weakness in the analysis of Oppenheim et
al., is the artificial distinction between theory-free
entities^ and theory-bound entities^ Apparently this was
introduced in order to provide the distinction between incom¬
patibility and non-compatibility and thereby establish a
parallel to the correspondence principle in physicss wave
and particle are incompatible in classical physics (entities^)
but non-compatible in quantum physics (entities^) due to the
semantical change in the meanings of the classical terms.
But as we explained before, the correspondence principle is
automatically fulfilled in a complementarist treatment of
the mind-body problem, so it does not have to be artificially
26U-
contrived. The "classical model" in this; case could be
Pf) *")
either psycho-physical parallelism (Bohr's choice) ' ' or
mind-body dualism. In both cases mental entities and physi¬
cal entities are clearly incompatible since they cannot be
co-referential, but in the complementarist model they wo\ild
be defined under mutually exclusive conditions and so would
become co-referential and non-compatible. The artificial
»
distinction between entitles-^ and entities^ is unnecessary
as a distinction between "theory-free" and "theory-bound."
entities, but it is taken care of by the correspondence
principle as a distinction between incompatible and non-
compatible entities.
176
If any general conclusion can be drawn from our
study of Bohr's "allies", it is surely that the idea of a
monolithic "Copenhagen interpretation" of quantum mechanics
is purely a fantasy, at least, with regards to complement-
266
arity. J Every physicist we have studied has an interpret¬
ation of his own, and each of these deserves to be studied,
appreciated and criticized in its own right. In the follow¬
ing chapter we shall be looking at complementarity from the
viewpoint of Bohr's critics. Since much of the criticism
is in fact directed at interpretations other than Bohr's own,
we: should keep these differences in mind.
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berg, "Quantum Theory and its Interpretation", pp.95-
108, P.A.Heelen, op. clt., pp. 35-36,5-8, and M. Jammer, The
Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, pp. 35-5-35-7.
5-2. Heisenberg's principal writings relevant to complement¬
arity are: The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory,
Chicago, I93O, Phi1osophical Problems of Nuclear Science.
New York, 1952, "The Development of the Interpretation,
of the Quantum Theory", in W.Pauli, ed., Niels Bohr and
the Development of Physics, London, 1955, pp.12-29, The
Physicist's Conception of Nature, London, 1958, Physics
and Philosophy, New York, 1958, "Die Plancksche Entdeck-
ung und die philosophischen Grundfragen der Atomlehre",
In Max Planck: Zum Gedanken, Berlin, 1959, pp.5-3-61, and
"Planck's Discovery and the Philosophical Problems of
Atomic Physics", in W.Heisenberg et al., On Modern Phys¬
ics , London, 19ol, pp°31~39»
5-3. See above, ch.2.10.
55-. Heisenberg stands more in the tradition of von Neumann
in this respect than in that of Bohr; cf. above, ch.2,
fn.69.
55« The Physical Principles, etc., p.63, Philosophical Prob¬
lems , etc., pp.15-16752, and Physics aid Philosophy, p.53*
Note: the wave-function in configuration space can also
be treated as a state-vector in Hilbert space, see J.von
Neumann, op.cit.
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of the Interpretation of Quantum Theory", pp. 2.6-27,
Physics and Philosophy, p.l80.
k7* "The Development of the Interpretation of Quantum Theory",
pp. 12, -13,27, Physics and Philosophy, pp.51, 53,l!+7-15-8,
160,180, "Die P'lancksche Entdeckung, etc.", p. 50, and
"Planck's Discovery, etc.", p»9»
W3. Philosophical Problems, etc., p.17, "The Development of
the Interpretation of Quantum Theory", p.27, The Physic¬
ist' s Conception of Nature, p. 15, Physics and Philosophy.,
pp.53-5?. Hence Heisenberg's famous statement that
science deals not with nature but with man's knowledge
of nature: "50 J'ahre Quanten theorie", p. 53, The Physic¬
ist' s Conception of Nature, pp. 15, 2k-, 25, 28-29, and
"Planck's Discovery, etc.", pp.12-13.
59. Philosophical Problems, etc., pp.l6,!+2, 55,82, 97, "The
Development of the Interpretation of Quantum Theory",
pp.22,26-27, The Physicist's Conception of Nature, p.29,
Physics and Philosophy, pp. 52, 5? "55; cf. Bohr's warning
against the use of such language, ch.l., fn.127, above.
50. Philosophical Problems, etc., pp.l5~l6, "The Development
of the Interpretation of Quantum Theory", pp.22,27, Phys¬
ics and Philosophy, pp.*+9~50; ef. F.R.Hanson, op.cit.,
pp.82-3^. A curious reversal occurs here. For Bohr,
the basic complementarity is between application and
analysis, hence the wave-mode represents the classical
description, i.e. the application of the classical, con¬
servation laws and the principle of causality which cannot
be analyzed in terms of space-time pictures of the const¬
ituent particles. But, for Heisenberg., the basic comple¬
mentarity is between a classical description in terms of
space-time events and a quantum-mechanical description in
terms of the wave-function and Schrodinger1s equation.
For Heisenberg, therefore, causality holds in the quantum-
mechanical description (wave-function), whereas for Bohr
it holds in the classical description (wave-mode). One
reason for this difference is that for Bohr a "wave" is
basically a physical model taken from classical physics,
whereas for Heisenberg a "wave" is an abstract, mathem¬
atical concept in the formalism of quantum mechanics.
Another reason is that Heisenberg may have misunderstood
Bohr's treatment of measuring instruments in which a
space-time description of an atomic object (particle-
mode) requires stationary instruments and hence a
classical space-time description of the instruments,
themselves (see ch.l, fn.l1+2 above). Of course, causal
description and space-time description are equally class¬
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depending on the nature and function of the system at
hand. For stationary measuring instruments a classical
space-time description is appropriate, but for stable
atoms a classical causal description is appropriate.
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pp.88-92, "Planck's Discovery, etc.", pp. 11-12., Physics
and Beyond, pp.117-122; cf. P.A.Heelen, op.clt., pp.
xiii -xiv,29,32,5-3,5'3 -55-, 15-0 -15-1,152-153 •
52. See above, ch.2.10.
53* See above, ch.l«5, esp.fn.128.
55-. See above, ch.l.3«
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to speak." (Church Dogmatics, II.1. ch.29, p.3^2).
56. See our discussion on "modellists" and "formalists"
above, p.17. Heisenberg is clearly a formalist; see
The Physical Principles, etc., p. 10, Physics and. Philos¬
ophy, pp.179-lBl, "Die Plancksche Entdeekung, etc.",
p J+6. In fact, he believed that all physics will some
day be derivable from a single universal equation?
Philosophical Problems, etc., pp.118-119, Physics and
Philosophy, pp.72~73. In. this respect he is closer to
Einstein than to Bohr; cf. Physics- and Beyond, pp.61}—68.
57« "Komplementaritat und Logik", Naturwls. 5-2, 1955, pp.
521-529,55-5-555 (reprinted in Zum WeItbiId der Physlk,
8th edn., Stuttgart, I960, pp.28I-329X On von Weizsack-
er's relationship with the others, see W.Heisenberg,
Physics and Beyond.
58. "Komplementaritat und Logik", p.521; cf. K.M.Meyer-Abich,
op.clt., pp.155-158.
59. "Komplementaritat und Logik", pp.522-523; cf. f'n. 29, above.
60. Note? the sense of the term "complementary" here is
quite different from the traditional sense in which x is
"complementary" to non-x and p is "complementary" to
non-p; see e.g. I.M.Copi, Introduction to Logic, Hew
York, 1968, p.136.
6l« loc.cit.; cf. above, ch.l, fn. 63.
62. See above, ch.2.5«
63. loc.cit., p.523. On the early development of quantum
field theory see G.Wentzel, "Quantum Theory of Fields




65'. cf. K.M.Meyer-Abich, op.cit., pp.185-186. Even then the
two are not quite the same. ' Von WeizsSeker uses the
term "circular11 because he believes that quantum theory
replaces the classical theories as the foundation of
physics, whereas: Bohr believed that the classical theories
would forever remain the foundation and that quantum
theory was a superstructure builb upon them; cf. ch.l,
fnc87 above.
66. loc.cit., pp.525~526.
67' "Bemerkung zum vorstehenden Aufsatz", in Zuta Weltbllcl
der Physik.. pp.329-331; cf. W.Heisenberg, The Physical
Principles of Quantum Theory, pp. 58,63--6H-.
68. cf. fn,. 51 above. On von Weizsacker1 s allegiance to Kant
see The World View, of Physics-, pp.92,115-135? "Komple-
mentaritSt und Logik*", p. 5'2 "5, and papers in T. Bast in, ed.,
Op, .Clt < , pp . 28 , 23^ .
69. "Komplementaritat und Logik", pp.52*+,526; for Bohr's
treatment of the relation between reason and experience
see cholA above.
70. See above, ch.l, fn.152.
71. See above, ch.3, fn.25»
72. cf. our discussion of Polanyi and Bohr, pp.2pf above.
73» cf. "Gestaltkreis und Komplementaritatin Zum Weltbild
der Physik, pp.332-366, esp. pp.3^6,3^7.
7^. See ch.3.3 above.
75. Compare Heisenberg's conception of complementarity: above,
p .136.
76. For von WeizsAcker's emphasis on the forms of perception,
see The World View of Physics, p.57«
77' The World View of Physics, p. 102, "Koraplementaritstt mid
Logikpp"527-529", ^5-555, "Die Einheit der Physik", in
F.Bopp, ed.,. op. cit., pp .hk-'+b, and "The Unity of Physics",
in T.Bastin, ed., on.cit., pp.236ff. See also G.Birkhoff
and J.von Neumann, "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics",
Annals of" Mathematics 37, 1936, pp.823-8^3j H.Reichenbach,
Phlloso-phic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. pp.l50-l60j
and P-. A.Heelen, "Quantum Logic and Classical Logic", Syn-
these 21, 1970, pp.2-33, and "Complementarity, Context
Dependence and Quantum Logic", Founci.atj.ons of Physics 1,
1970, pp.95-110.
78. "Komplementaritat und Logik". A good summary of this esot¬
eric subject is given by F.Waismann in R..T.Blin-Stoyle et
al., Turning Points in. Physics, Amsterdam, 1959, pp. 1^9-
153. The basic classical concepts are explained in any
textbook on logic, e.g. I.M.Copi, op,cit., pp.21^,239,25!?•
183
79- See L.Rosenfeld, "The Measuring Process in Quantum Mech¬
anics", p.223; cf. above, ch.l, fns.25,26.
80. "Incidentally it would seem that the recourse to three-
valued logic, sometimes proposed as a means for dealing
with;.the paradoxical features of quantum theory, is not
suited to give a clearer account of the situation, since
all well-defined experimental evidence, even if it
cannot be analyzed in terms of classical physics, must
be expressed in ordinary language making use of common
logic." "On the Notions of Causality and Complementar¬
ity", p.317; cf. C.F.von Weizsacker, loc.cit., p.927*
81. On the correspondence principle and incommensurability
see above, ch.l.5, esp. fn.87«
82. loc.cit.. po!f28.
83. So Bohr-; cf. eh.I.1!- above.
85. W.M.ELsasser, "Bemerkungen zur Quantenmechanik freier
Elektronon". Naturwis. 13, 1925, p.711.
85* See above, ehi.2, fn.101.
86. See above, ch.2, fn.109.
87• For a review of these events see M.Born, "Statistical
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics" (Nobel Prize address,
1955) Science 122, 1955, pp.675-679 (reprinted in Pbysics
.i?l My Generation, pp.177-188).
88. "The fact that I agree with Bohr's, fundamental ideas,
above all with his 'complementarity principle', is the
result of my own thinking, although I am quite aware that
mine was only an afterthought, stimulated by Bohr's fore¬
thought." Physics and Politics, p.19; cf. "Albert Eins¬
tein und das Lichtquantum", p.530, Physics in My Generation,
p.153, and The Born-Einstein Letters, pp.155,212.
89. Physics in My Generation, p.153, Physics and Politics.
p.21, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, pp.107-108,
232-233.
90. Physics in My Generation, p.105.
91. ibid, p.106, "Bemerkungen zur statistischen Deutung der
Quantenmechanik", p.118 fn., Natural Philosophy, etc.,
p .10 5.
92. The Restless Universe, London, 1935, p.157, Physics in
My Generation, pp. 106,129, "Bemerk'ungen, etc.", p. 113,
Physics and Politics, p.57 fn.
93« See the last two references in fn.91«
l8h
91+. Atom!c Physics, pp.98-99*
•.'95* See ch.2.1 above.
96. Physics.in My Generation, p.52, "Bemerkungen, etc.",
pp.rFf-115, and Atomic Physics, pp.96,103.
97• Born agreed with Einstein that the wave-function only
applies to ensembles of systems (The Born-Binstein
Letters, pp.186,188). This allowed him to avoid the
problem of the acausal collapse of the wave-function
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belief that quantum-mechanical description is not com¬
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98. Physics in My Generation, p.187, and Physics and Politics,
p.57 fn.» Note the difference between "coexistence" and
"coinh.eren.ee",
99" "Bemerkungen, etc.", p.118 fn., Physics and Politics,
p. 57 fn., and Natural Philosophy, etc.., p. 10 5™.
100. See above, eh.2, fn.128, and W.Roller, Gestalt Psychol¬
ogy., New York, 1929, esp. pp. 183-18'+. For Bom's
interest in Gestalt psychology see Physics in. My Gener¬
ation , pp. 1+9-50,l62, Physics and Politics, p.2.67 Note,
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101. See ch.2»3 above.
102. The Restless Universe, p.157, "Bemerkungen, etc.", pp.
112-113, Physics and Politics, p.57 fn., Atomic Physics,
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103. Atomic Physics, p.157•
10*+. "Bemerkungen, etc.", p.113.
I.05. See our discussion of "equivalence" above, ch.2«5«
106. M.Born and L.Infeld, "Foundations of the New Field
Theory", Proc.Roy.Soc.London, Series A, l'+^f, 193'+? PP*
i+25-1+5i.
107. In response to F.Bopp's unitary particle theory; see
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"Quantenmechanische Statistik und Korrelationsrechnung",
Zett.Natur. 20, 19^-7, pp.210,215,216, and. "The Principles
of the Statistical Equations of Motion la Quantum Mech¬
anics", in S.Korner, ed., Observation and Interpret¬
ation, London, 1957, pp.189-192.
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particles as being complementary; The Restless Universe,
p. 1625 Physics in My Generation., "Bemerkungen,
etc.", pp.lf+-1155 Atomic Physics , pp.99,103,153«
109. Physics in My Generation, pp.105,160, Physics and Pol¬
ities', p.30, Natural Phi1osophy, etc., p.lO^t.
110. Physics in My Generation, p.106, Natural Philosophy,
etc., pp.105-108.
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are not obvious." Natural Philosophy, etc,., p. 10*+ (con¬
trast The Born-Einstein Letters, p.lb5); cf. our dis¬
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16^,170,218, and "Albert Einstein, und das Lichtquantum",
p.^30.
11-3* Physics and Politics, pp.30,56-57, Natural Philosophy,
etc., pp. 10*+ -105•
lllf. Physics in My Generation, pp.l56,l60-l6l, and Atomic
Physics, p.153•
115• Physics in My Generation, pp.l60,l87, Physics and Polit¬
ics , pp.29-305 of. W.Heitler, "The Departure from
Classical Thought in Modern Physics", in P.A.Schilpp,
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comes from von Neumann's "projection postulate" according
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to the mathematical projection of the state-vector onto
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above.
11.6. See ch.2.2 above.
117. Physics- in My Generation, pp. 186-187, "Bemerkungen, etc.",
pp.liVl!5, Physics and Politics, pp.30,56-57> Natural
Philosophy, etc., p.105° Born also speaks of comple¬
mentarity between life processes and physico-chemical
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52~53,107, Physics and Politics, pp.57~ol.
118. Physics in My Generation, pp.l60-l6l, Atomic Physics,
p.99, Natural Phi1o sophy, etc., pp.100,108.
119. See pp.67-68 above.
120. Take one pair of conjugate coordinates, q and p, for
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a and h/a (where a» h/a) to satisfy the uncertainty
principle for the cases of a pure wave (Aq = a,. i%p = h/a)
and a pure particle (Aq - h/a, Ap = a). Then as the
phase cell rotates through an angle© the uncertainties-
become Aq = a cosQ and Ap = a sin© so that nq Ap = a
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minimum allowed by the uncertainty principle.
121. See ch.2.3 above.
122. e.g. Per Naturwissenschaft 1 ep vor der rellgosen Prage,
Oldenburg, i960.
123. e.g. Anschauliche .Quantentheorie, pp.vii-viii. However,
Jordan rejected the materialism of P.Frank; ibid, pp.
viii-ix,273.
129-. Physics of the Twentieth 'Century, New York, 199-*+-, pp.
1+6,115,123,I9:9.
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ivism" see Physics in My Generation., pp.9-8-9-9, Physics
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12.8. e.g. "Die Quantenmechanik und die Grundprobi erne der
Biologie und Psychologie", Naturwis. 9*5, 1932, p.8l8.
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129. "Quantenphysikalische Bemerkungen, etc.", p.233? Physics
of the Twentieth Century, pp.130,137-
130. "On the Process of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics",
Phil.Sci. 16, 199-9, pp.269-278; cf. ch.2, fn.69 above.
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P.Jordan, J.von Neumann, and E.Wigner, "On an Algebraic
Generalization of the Quantum Mechanical Formalism",
Annals of Mathematics 35? 1939-, pp.29-69-.
131. "On the Process of Measurement, etc.", p.2.76. .Note?
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temperature and entropy to be applicable to individual
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atoms.
132. See ch.2, fn.68 above.
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133- See ch.2, fns. 78 and 80 above.
135. This analogy had been previously suggested by Jordan
("fiber eine neue Begrtiridung der Quantenmeehanik",
Zeit.Phys. 50, 1927, pp.809-838) and developed by
von N eumann (.op. clt., p. 218, fn.125).
135- "On the Process of Measurement, etc.", p.277•
136. If our interpretation is correct, then Jordan's "ther¬
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137. "Die Quantenmechanik, etc.", p.8l9 fn. Note that this
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138. ibid, p.820, Die Physlk und das Gehelmnis des organ-
ischen Lebens , Braimschweig, 19VjT, PP«8 3 >> 86, Verdrangung
und Komp1ementaritat, p.55.
139. "Quantenphysikalische Bemerkungen, etc.", pp.236-238,
Physics of the Twentieth Century, p.152.
150. Die Physlk und das Gehelmnis, etc., p.125.
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152. ibid, p.821.
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Physlcal Foundation of Biology, p.viii; cf. Atom and
Organism, pp.v-vi.
152. The Physical Foundation of Biology, p. 5, esp.fn.
153. Atom and. Organism, pp.8-9,13,l8,2i+,29,3O,i+2,1+8,109>119,
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Biology, pp. 1^7-1^8,3.65,170-172, "Quanta and the Con¬
cept of Organismic Law", p. 3*+, Atom and Organism, p. 17,
and "The Mathematical Expression, etc.", pp.278,279,281.
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162. "On Quantum Mechanical Measurements, etc.", p.990.
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wavelength is not correlated with momentum in classical
physics.
l63« See pp.88f above.
16H-. contra A.Grtinbaum (loc.clt., pp .7-l'f—715) who claims that
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165. See ch.1.3 above.
166. "What is Theoretical Biology?" in M.Marois, ed., on.
cit., p.7*+ •
167. e.g. The Physical Foundation of Biology, pp.9,13, Atom
and Organism, pp.vii,21-22.
168. The Physical Foundation of Biology, pp.l1+9-l50,l60,2.13.
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171• The Physical Foundation of Biology, pp.1^9-150, Atom
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be increased by the immense factor whose logarithm is
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more than 10 Of course, a steady-state universe
would be infinite in size, but all the stars and planets
beyond a certain distance (about ten billion light years)
would be travelling away from us at speeds- greater than
that of light, hence they would be inaccessible to us in
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1970.
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Bohr's; Critics, on Complementarity
11 ...Some versions /of the 'Copenhagen Point of
View17 which are discussed at great length in
the literature are not even a real thing but an
arbitrary construction on the part of certain
philosophers and scientists who in their eager¬
ness to prove Bohr wrong have collected prima
facie absurd statements /of Bohr's/ wherever
they could find them, without regard for con¬
text, or for idiosyncrasy of expression."
P.K.Feyerabend, "On a Recent Critique of Comple¬
mentarity I", p.310.
We shall treat Bohr's critics; in three groups: (a)
founders of quantum theory (Planck, Einstein, SchrbMinger,
de Broglie), (b) contemporary physicists who challenge the
"Copenhagen interpretation" with interpretations or even new
theories, of their own (de Broglie, Bohm, Margenau, Lan.de),
and (c) philosophers of science who challenge Bohr primarily
on philosophical grounds (Popper, Bunge, Feyerabend).
5.1 Max Planck J
Max Planck is generally regarded as the founder of
modern physics due to his discovery of the quantum of action
(Planck's constant) at the turn of* the century,"'* but his
views on quantum theory and his philosophy in general have
been overshadowed by those of Einstein, Bo.hr and others.
He was an outspoken opponent of positivism long before such
opposition became fashionable, and he greatly influenced the
philosophical development of Einstein's thought in this res-
2
pect. * Planck's basic philosophy was similar to the
197
*Y
Aristotelian essentialism which the positivists opposed.-/"
but it was sometimes modified along Popperian "hypothetieo-
deductive" lines;, emphasizing the importance of "free
Uv
creation"' along with Einstein's* At times Planck even
spoke of causality as an a priori category in the Kantian
sense and based his arguments for determinism on the necess-
5
ity of presupposing strict causality in all science.
Planck never addressed himself" directly to the ideas
of Niels Bohr or to the principle of complementarity.^ He
was generally opposed to the "Copenhagen interpretation"
because of its failure to maintain strict determinism in the
"real world". There is an appearance of indeterminism, he
conceded, due to the tenuous connection between the metaphys¬
ical and phenomenological realms;, but the real, unobservable
wave-function obeys strictly causal laws (Schrodinger1s
equation) and hence is deterministic. In this respect
Planck's outlook is almost identical to that of Heisenberg1.^
How two physicists with such diverse philosophical presupp¬
ositions could arrive at such similar conclusions would make
an interesting study in itself. The only common denominator
seems to be their common interest in Kant and their desire
to preserve the form of causality even at the expense of
9
endless abstraction.
In spite of all this there are some striking parall¬
els in Planck's writings to Bohr's principle of complement¬
arity, particularly with regards to the problem of free will
and determinism. Almost every volume of Planck's essays
1 Q
contains some treatment of this problem.The basic idea
is simple; free-will and determinism are perfectly compatible
198
because they involve viewpoints which are mutually exclusive.
The viewpoint of determinism requires strict objectivity,
hence it can only be applied to the actions of others or else
to one's own past actions, but never to one's- present or
'i i
future decisions. The latter are "free" in this; sense. "
In Planck's wordsi "Observed from without, the will is cau.s-
1 ?
ally determined. Observed, from within, it is- free.." ~
The deterministic viewpoint of science, therefore, requires
the voluntaristic viewpoint of ethics- as its "complement"."*^
The same relation holds between a ph.vsioloR.ical event like a
pinprick and its- psychological correlate, the sensation of
pain,. Their analysis requires two different methods which
mutually preclude each other, and neither can be eliminated
or reduced to the other. ' In fact, Planck even treats the
wave-particle duality for electrons as an example of alternate
15'
viewpoints. ^ He never refers to these viewpoints: as comple¬
mentary, however; instead, he seems to have regarded them as
"1
being "Orthogonal" in our sense of the term." In other
words, for Planck, the two viewpoints are mutually exclusive
17
in experience, but not in reality. The contrast to Bohr's
position is clear, but the strong similarity Is also striking.
Planck's treatment is closer to Bohr's in many respects than
are the treatments of most of Bohr's supposed allies.'
5.2 Albert Einstein;
We have already compared Einstein's philosophy of
1 P
science as a whole to that of Niels- Bohr,"' 3 so now we should
concentrate on Einstein's attitude toward complementarity in.
particular. It appears that Einstein did not know what to
199
make of Bohr, perhaps; because their general approaches were
so radically different. Be greatly admired Bohr's physical
19
intuition and once said that, of all the "orthodox" quantum
theorists he knew, Bohr came the nearest to achieving a sat¬
isfactory treatment of the philosophical questions in quantum
20
physics. On the other hand, Einstein found Bohr's explan¬
ations of complementarity to be abstruse and unclear, and he
seems to have misunderstood Bohr as basing his arguments on
the limits of measurement rather than questions of principle.
21
Moreover, there were several presuppositions in Einstein's
outlook which ruled out complementarity from the start and
made it virtually impossible for hlrn to appreciate Bohr's
thinking, much less agree with it. The question of deter¬
minism, however, was not the primary issue. Determinism was
as much a by-product of Einstein's general field-theoretical
approach as indaterminism was of Bohr's pluralistic view of
22
correspondence and complementarity. "" The primary issues
were those of (a) continuity and (b) contiguity. (a)
Einstein believed that nature must be ultimately continuous
in space and time hence he was dissatisfied with the ideas
of "quantum-.jumps" and a wave-function which collapses dis-
continuously.Prom the viewpoint of complementarity these
discontinuities are associated with transitions from the
wave-mode to the particle-mode and their elimination would
require the elimination of the particle-mode, i.e. the
repudiation of complementarity itself. (b) A primary mot¬
ivation for Einstein's development of a relativist!c field
theory was his desire to eliminate all action at a distance
and replace it by a form of action by contact.^" Thus he
200
regarded the "principle of contiguity" as a necessary con-
25
dition for all scientific theories. From the viewpoint
of complementarity the elimination, of action at a distance
implies that the state of an. object can be defined indepen¬
dently of its- immediate environment, since the interaction
between object and environment can then be analyzed in terms
of some kind of force-field, and an object-in-itself can be
Q /*
abstracted.. Then the specification of the experimental
arrangement would no longer be essential, and the manifest¬
ation of modes like wave and particle would only be apparent.
27' It should be clear that the difference between Einstein
and Bohr was not a matter of physics- so much as: philosophy.
As we noted in our discussion of their general positions,
2*.3
they saw the world in completely different ways.
5.3 Erwin Schrodinger:
Like Einstein, Schroainger was a lifelong opponent
of the idea of discontinuity in quantum theory and particul-
29
arly of the "quantum-jump". In fact, it was partly the
desire to provide a continuous- description of atomic trans¬
itions that led him to develop wave mechanics- in the first
place.In September 1926 Bohr invited Schrodinger to
Copenhagen to discuss their differences, but no agreement
3.1
was ever reached. As in the Bohr-Einstein discussions
there was: simply too much of a divergence in outlook to allow
mutual understanding.
Schro'dinger never discussed Bohr's principle of
complementarity, at least not in print, However, one of his
expositors, W.T. Scott, has suggested that he developed a
201
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version of complementarity of his own. The idea Scott
refers to is Sehrodinger1s distinction between the longitud¬
inal and. transversal continuities of material waves.
Transverse continuity corresponds to the wave-fronts perpen¬
dicular to the direction of propagation and manifests itself
in diffraction patterns and other interference phenomena.,
Longitudinal continue by corresponds to the wave-normals
pointing in the direction of propagation and manifests itself
in the "particle-tracks" that are visible in cloud chambers
and photographic emulsions. Schrodinger pointed out that
both of these aspects are equally real and that they corres¬
pond to wave-like and particle-like behavior, respectively.
However the analogy to complementarity is only superficial?
a "particle-track" actually consists of a: long sequence of
point-like events which are connected by the conservation of
momentum between the events and appear like a continuous
track when magnified by amplification techniques. So Seb.ro-
dinger's "longitudinal continuity" is only an apparent
continuity which involves both wave and particle modes in
rapid alternation. The same is true for the "transversal
continuity" of diffraction experiments.^4 Sehrodinger, of
•35'
course, knew all this, but he insisted on a world-view in
which discontinuities are completely camouflaged. All
discreteness and plurality could only be an appearance for
him since ultimate reality is organic and non-plural.-^
Clearly, his viewpoint was incompatible with Bohr's from the
start.
t'.'f Louis de Broglie;
202
Certainly one of the most colorful and. imaginative
thinkers in modern physics has been Louis: de Brc-glie. An
entire thesis could be devoted to the course of his complex
development, but here we can at least distinguish the three
O
principal stages? (a) 1923-1927, as one of the founders
and principal interpreters of the quantum theory, (b) 1928-
1950, as a convert to the Copenhagen view, influenced by
Bohr, Heisenberg and Born, and (c) since 1951 > as an outspoken
critic of the Copenhagen school, influenced by D.Bohm and J.P.
Vigier.
(a) 1923-1927: It was de Broglie who first associated a
"matter-wave" with each material particle and so introduced.
the "wave-particle duality" into the theory of matter as well
39
as radiation. however, as de Broglie himself explained,
he had intended to unify the wave and particle aspects, not
1+0
to introduce a new dichotomy. This primary motivation
gives some coherence to his subsequent vagaries. During
1926-1927 he became dissatisfied with the Schrodinger repre¬
sentation of matter-waves by the wave function which was
then interpreted statistically by Born, and he developed a
"theory of the double-solution". Here one solution was
Schro'dinger1 s wave-function which determined the probabili¬
ties of particle-events, but the second solution contained
a point singularity representing the particle itself and so
determined the occurrence of particle-events in. a quasi-
hi
classical manner. " Due to the mathematical difficulty of
this theory de Broglie simplified it into a "pilot-wave"
theory in which the Schrodinger wave-function itself guided
the motion of the particle. However, this reintroduced
the dualism of wave and particle which he had hoped to avoid
so when the pressure of criticism rose he abandoned these
efforts and tried to live with the orthodox statistical inter
Lj-2
pretation for the. next thirty years.
(tO 1928-1950: It was during this period that de Broglie made
s?everal interesting contributions to the discussion about
complementarity. We shall not dwell on his occasional regur
gitations of half-digested ideas he had picked up from Bohr
et al. - de Broglie was; obviously uneasy about many aspects
lo
of the Copenhagen line. J But. he also made several attempts
to rethink complementarity along purely rational lines that
he could visualize and imderstand. De Broglie clearly rec¬
ognized his own difficulty in appreciating Bohr's approach
he later referred to Bohr as the "Rembrandt of contemporary
physics - and openly acknowledged his own "secret hanker in
L|.0
after Cartesian clarity". Complementarity, he finally
>.f6
decided, was; a. "mystery", and he never gave up the hope
that some new idea would be discovered which would provide a
>5.7
more lucid interpretation of the "wave-particle duality".
Yet, at the same time, the notion of complementarity
intrigued Mm and he spent a good deal of time trying to
make sense out of it.
His first, most ingenuous attempt was by analogy to
an optical instrument which could focus on either of two
objects (at different distances from the eye) but only on
one object at a time. The two objects represent position
(the particle-mode) and momentum (the wave-mode) only one
of which can be accurately determined at a. time according
to the imcertainty principle. Classical mechanics, de
20 !+
Broglie said, was' like a rather crude lens which seemed to
focus on both at the same time, but more refined, tools (quan¬
tum mechanics) show this- to be impossible. The problem with
this- analogy, of course, is that it leaves one with the
suspicion that both objects exist simultaneously even if they
cannot be perceived simultaneously, and hence it suggests
that complementarity is really subjective. Also, there is
a suggestion of dualism since two objects rather than one
are involved. Both of these difficulties could have been
avoided if de Broglie had chosen an audio rather than a
visual model. For instance, a radio might be able to tune
in to one of two nearby resonant frequencies, but only one
at a time. Then there would be a single audio output exist¬
ing in one of two modes.;. Ultra high frequency television
could also be used as an example combining both audio and
visual. However, all such, analogies- are somewhat artificial,
and they do not satisfy the conditions of alternation, emerg¬
ence and pointing.
De Broglie's favorite example of complementarity
was the relationship between individual particles and the
IlO
system which, they compose. If the particles do not inter¬
act strongly with each other (i.e. if the potential energy
is much less than the total rest-mass energy) then the system
can easily be analyzed into its; parts mid the total mass
energy can. be divided up among them.. But for strong inter¬
actions with relativistic potential energies such an analysis
can be performed only at the expense of destroying the unity
of the system. Hence the "system" can either function as
a whole or be analyzed into its parts, though not both at
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the same time. De Broglie called these the modes of "inter-
I"""-i
action'• and "individuality", respectively.■)L However, as
de Broglie saw it, both of these modes were really "abstract
idealizations" and the reality was always intermediate between
52
them. If this were true then complementarity would net
be an appropriate concept here, because complementary modes
are mutually exclusive and coexhaustive. However, it
appears that de Broglie may have been thinking of the degree
of interaction between the particles as. being intermediate
between the nonrelativistic and relativistic cases rather
then the system, itself being intermediate between the two
modes that emerge in the relativistic case. The former sort
of intermeaiacy is quite consistent with the logic of comple¬
mentarity; for example, the emergence of complementarity in
thermodynamics, depends on the number of molecules in a system
(compared with Avogad.ro' s number), ^ that in. biology depends
5b-
on the degree of inhomogeneity, and that in psychology may
depend on the weight and complexity of the brain. Even the
emergence of complementarity in atomic physics (i.e. the
emergence of atomic stability) depends on the temperature
55
and radiation pressure, of the environment. Hence we may
expect that the emergence of de Broglie's complementarity
will depend on the degree of interaction, but insofar as
this degree is large the system will exist in two mutually
exclusive modes which do not allow any intermediate repres¬
entations. With this one amendment, de Broglie's-. idea is
extremely plausible and could turn out to be important in
relativistic quantum mechanics. .Quel dommage that de




(c) Since 1951• As we have observed, de Broglie was never
really comfortable with the concept of complementarity.
In his- own words he "secretly hankered after Cartesian
clarity in the midst of the fog which seemed to envelop
67
quantum physics" . In the years 195-1 -1922 he received
58 59
communications from both Bohm and Vigier* which encouraged
him to take up his "theory of the double solution" once more.
This time he defied the mathematical complexity and began,
looking for solutions for non-linear equations in keeping
/ p
with a suggestion made by Einstein. The effect of non-
linearity would be to represent particles as localized
inhomogeneities rather than point singularities, thus avoid¬
ing the mathematical infinities that have plagued quantum
6i
electrodynamics. Then de Broglie "grafted" this non¬
linear solution representing the particle onto a linear
solution representing the wave, thus uniting the wave and
particle concepts as he had first intended.^ Finally, he
tried to account for the apparent randomness of particle-
events by including a "subquantic medium" which buffets the
particles just as invisible molecules buffet droplets of
liquid in Brownian motion. J One tends to wonder where all
this is leading, but de Broglie is confident that these
ideas can he "suitably developed and corrected" so as- to
provide a real alternative to the orthodox interpretation of
6>+
quantum mechanics and that the imported randomness can be
65
reduced to a hidden determinism. Only time will tell.
What is de Broglie's current opinion of complemen¬
tarity? He regards it as an artificial dichotomy between
extreme cases which never actually occur in nature.
20'/
Reality is always intermediate (not a very Cartesian idea),
therefore the ideas of wave and particle should be fused
together rather than set in opposition. De Broglie's revised
"double solution" provides just such an intermediate model:
the non-linear part gives localized particle-like events such
as; impacts on a screen, and the linear part gives non-localised
wave-like phenomena such as diffraction patterns. Since
both parts are always present, there is no need for the quan¬
tum gymnastics of collapse and reexpansion which a simple
wave-function like Schrodinger1s must go through. Instead
of an inherently dynamic reality which exists in alternate
modes of being, there is; a more invariant reality which mani¬
fests alternate parts of itself at different times:. Hence
de Broglie would say that an electron is both wave and
particle at the same time, or else that is is really neither
68
wave nor particle, but something in between the two.
In my opinion, this composite model of de Broglie's
represents one of the most serious challenges to orthodox
quantum theory today. However, it cannot be properly eval¬
uated until it is worked out in detail, and de Broglie may
have opened Pandora's box by appealing to a subquantic medium
so a complete formulation may be a long time coming.
5.5 David Bohm et al.:
More than any other contemporary physicist, David
Bohrn has carried on Bohr's emphasis on the priority of phys¬
ical insight over mathematical formalism. Bohm's work can
be divided into three periods: (a) before 1951, as an
advocate of complementarity, influenced by Bohr, (b) the
208
1950!s, developing various "hidden variable" theories,
influenced by Einstein and Vigier, and (c) the i960 *s to
present, as a natural philosopher, influenced again by Bohr
and Jeffrey Bub.
(a) before 1951t Rohm1s work up till 1951 is epitomized by
69
his classic Quantum Theory. In this treatise he presents
the orthodox interpretation in clear, physical terms with a
70
minimum of mathematics. His treatment of complementarity
is particularly good; it is much clearer than Bohr's though
not as sophisticated. He places great stress on the indi-
71
visibility of an atomic system and its environment, the
relational (i.e. non-intrinsic) quality of atomic properties
r7 r\
(e.g. position and momentum), the full equality of wave
71
and particle modes, - the alternation between modes in temp-
7b-
oral evolution, and the latency or potentiality of each
75
mode within the other. In an attempt to visualize these
points Bohm offers an analogy to the evolution (ontogenetic)
of a bacterium by alternation between the bacterial and
n ZT
spore stages. In both stages we have the same living
system, but two completely different organic structures.
However, as Bohm points out, the alternation simply involves
a rearrangement of the various parts of the bacterium and
its environment and is not intrinsic: to the nature of the
bacterium as it is for an electron alternating between wave
and particle modes. In other words, the laws of operation
for a bacterium and a spore are basically the same and there
is- no real "emergence" from one to the other.
There is one serious fault in Bohm's view of comple¬
mentarity. Towards the end of Quantum Theory he discusses
209
the relationship of classical and quantum concepts as an
example of complementarity even though this relation does
not satisfy the very criteria which he had stressed him-
77
self! / The problem is that he completely neglects Bohr's
principle of correspondence which is essential to a proper
understanding of complementarity, at least in a. unique
78
universe.
The most striking feature of Quantum. Theory is Bonn'
curious preoccupation with the problem of "hidden variables".
79
He suggests' an analogy between the possible reduction
of quantum mechanics to a hidden variable theory and the; 19th
century "reduction" of thermodynamics; to the statistics; of
8o
atoms and molecules. He concluded that there was' no point
in searching for hidden variables- until the current quantum
theory broke; down,^ but the analogy to thermodynamics must
have seemed too good to neglect for he soon changed his. mind.
Actually Bohm's analogy is; very similar to Bohr's analogy
between thermodynamics and quantum mechanics' except that for
Bohr the relationship between the two levels (thermodynamic
and mechanical, or wave and particle )83 was-, one of complemen¬
tarity rather than reduction. In other words, Bohm's view
of physics is; hierarchical like Bohr's, but it is more
8>f-
unified and reductionist.
(8) the 1950'ss We; cannot possibly go into all the hidden
variable theories that Bohm and his colleagues- have devel-
85
oped. Instead we shall concentrate on Bohm's criticisms
of complementarity during this period. The basic points
are that complementarity does not allow a complete, continuou
O (.
strictly causal description of atomic processes and that
210
8'/
the relationship between wave and particle lacks real unity. ''
Bohm even calls the transition from one mode to the other a
form of magic since "the precise details...are necessarily
88
forever beyond human comprehension"I ^ As for causalityJ
Bohm now claims that "the domain of causality defines the
domain of science itself" and goes on to argue that causality
can always be profitably assumed, whether it really exists
89
or not, in a manner reminiscent of Pascal's wager. But
the worst of it is that Bohm commits the "unforgivable sin"
of attributing the uncertainty principle to practical limit¬
ations of measurement rather than considerations of principle.
90 It may be., as he predicts, that the uncertainty principle
(and complementarity) will have to be modified in the nuclear
domain (10 cm#)?91 ^ut ^hat is no excuse for distorting
92
the arguments that led to it in the first place. I
frankly do not under stand why Bohm changed his mind about
complementarity: his pre-1951 arguments for it are far more-
cogent than his- post-1951 arguments: against it. Perhaps it
was, as he sometimes said, just to give the orthodox inter-
91
pretation some healthy competition.
(c) the 1960rs to present: Since about 1962 Bohm has divers¬
ified his interests into many areas of theoretical physics
and natural philosophy in general. The important point for
our consideration is his renewed interest in Niels Bohr.
Since his 1962 critique of Heisenberg's Physics- and Philos-
9b~
ophy, Bohm and his collaborator Jeffrey Bub have gone out
of their way to differentiate Bohr's approach from that of
Heisenberg and von Neumann and to claim an affinity between
qa
the hidden variable approach and the former. However,
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the only aspect of Bohr's; philosophy with which they can
agree is the indivisibility or wholeness- of the atomic system
96
and its environment. They completely reject the use of
90
classical concepts (the correspondence principle) ' and
98
ignore the principle of complementarity. So there is
really very little in common between them in spite of all the
claims to the contrary.
5.6 Ernst Cassirer and Henry Margen.au:
Many of the writers we have discussed have interpreted
complementarity in a Kantian manner, but none so consciously
and deliberately as Ernst Cassirer and Henry Margenau. In
1937 Cassirer published his Determinismus und Indeterrninismus
99
in der modemon Physlk in which he argued that causality
is a permanent feature of physics because every experimental
procedure must presuppose causality to begin with."1'^0 When
new fields; of physics: are discovered the causality principle
must always be reinterpreted in such a way that it retains
101
its. full validity. ' In fact, Cassirer equated causality
with objectivity since it is only by establishing causal
patterns that man can distinguish objective reality from sub-
102
jective experience." ' If it turns, out, as: it does in
quantum theory, that Incllvldual events do not obey strictly
causal laws (dynamical causality) but that patterns of events
do (statistical causality), then it is the patterns which
•mo
must be regarded as basic rather than the events themselves.
Therefore, Cassirer rejects Bohr's correspondence principle
- he called it "Ariadne's thread in the labyrinth of quantum
10lf
theory" - as a compromise between the old physics and the
new because it retains the classical notion of causality and
subjects it to severe restrictions (uncertainty and comple¬
mentarity) rather than completely redefining it so as. to
avoid these restrictions and maintain its full validity. y
The root of this difference between Cassirer end Bohr goes'
back to their different ideas of objectivity: for Cassirer
it is basically recurrence or invariance which can be recog¬
nized by the individual whereas for Bohr it is basically
unambiguous information which can be communicated to others.
Margenau picks up where Cassirer left off: just as
Cassirer identified patterns: of events' as the basic reality,
so Margenau regards the wave-function as more real than space-
time events because it obeys causa], laws whereas- the latter
] 07
do not. " The remoteness and abstractness of the wave-
function are no deterrent10^ since for Margenau physical
reality can. only be attributed to mental constructs which
satisfy certain metaphysical criteria: permanence, stability
] 09
and causality are among them, but concreteness is not."
Actually most physicists wouldn't even agree that the wave-
function is permanent and stable since it is generally thought
to collapse, aeausally during the measurement process in ace-
1] 0
ordance with von Neumann's' "projection postulate". " Of
course, Margenau rejects^ the projection postulate because it
113
destroys causality and objectivity," but then his whole
argument becomes circular, viz. the wave-function is real
because it obeys causality and it obeys causality because it
is objectively real. Perhaps the reason this circularity
does not disturb Margenau is that he regards permanence as
an attribute of constructs depending on individual taste
rather than a feature of reality (Margenau would not allow
this distinction between constructs and reality) to be dis-
l1 2
covered by communal effort.
Margenau1s treatment of complementarity is a natural
U ■>
consequence of" his idealistic metaphysic. ' In his
earlier writings (during the late forties and fifties) he
interpreted complementarity as- a relation "between physical
reality (valid constructs like the wave-function) and hist,or -
1.1
leal reality (sense- data like space-time events) ' as
115
Heis-enberg and Planck also did. " But whereas Heisenterg
and Planck regarded physical reality to be noumenal and unob-
3.
servable and hence independent of man, ' Margenau regards
11 7
it as a mental construction subject to human manipulation.'""
Based on this (mis-) interpretation of complementarity,
Margenau1 s criticism is that Bohr has asked science to resign,
itself to an "eternal dilemma", an "unbridgeable chasm" between
objective reality (the "physical" wave-function) and subjec¬
tive appearances; ("historical" space-time events)."'""'"^
Margenau1s solution, then is to "cut off one horn of the com¬
plementarity dilemma" by taking the wave-function as the only
119
valid description of physical reality.
In his later writings- (during the sixties) Margenau.
apparently realized that Bohr's complementarity was- really a
relationship between wave and particle modes, and he changed
his line of criticism accordingly. The idea of an alter¬
nation between two modes, he said, does violence to one's;
monistic intuition, and since permanence and stability are
metaphysical requirements- (at least for Margenau) complemen-
*1 pO
tarity must be. an anti-metaphysical, positivis.tic concept'. ~v
'n • i
Reality must be invariant hence an electron must ultimately
be neither a wave nor a particle (nor a "wavicle").J"'rJ" In.
fact, an individual instance of an electron is not physically
real at all; only the ensemble of electrons which obeys
122
statistical causality has- physical reality.' Bohr's con¬
cept of complementarity, Margenau concluded, could only
appeal to philosophers and theologians who go in for myths,
allegories and paradoxes!"*""^
However, the issue here is neither one of meta¬
physics and positivism nor one of metaphysics; and mythology,
but rather of two equally metaphysical positions: Margenau's
position is essentially Platonic or Parmenidean, as he
] 2U- 121
states, " whereas- Bohr's is basically Heraclitean. The
real issue is whether change is real or only apparent and
hence whether reality is invariant or inherently dynamic.
5 >7 Alfred Lande, Karl Popper and Mario Bunge:
Few people have misunderstood complementarity more
thoroughly and persistently than Alfred Lande, Karl Popper
and Mario Bunge. I group them together because, they share
a formalist position, with a strong preference for formal
axiomatic systems over the use of intuitive physical models,
12o
and a commitment to the complete reduction of matter-
127
wave phenomena to a purely corpuscular interpretation.
Lande was originally a faithful, adherent of the
Copenhagen interpretation, but during the early fifties he
became dissatisfied with the wave-particle "dualism", and
"i P3
he has: been its most relentless critic ever since.""" In
129
his earlier writings" he used the word "complementarity"
215
rather than "dualism", but the concept is the same: it is
not complementer!ty in Bohr's sense. It is similar to
110
Born's concept of "duality" and is what we have been call
1 T
ing equivalence or supolementarity. -J'" Somehow the confusi
between these concepts- must be clarified if there is to be
any progress in the debate about- complementarity
Karl Popper's criticisms of the Copenhagen school
have been largely directed against the views of Heisenberg,'"*'
but he has also commented briefly on Bohr. His principal
complaint against Bohr is the vagueness and difficulty of hi
l^q
explanations of complementarity.' J In fact, Popper was so
perplexed by Bohr's writings that he wasn't sure whether to
T •> f.
identify Bohr's interpretation with Heisenberg's or not.D
He was also disturbed by the "renunciation" of a unitary
1 16
picture inherent in complementarity, and he charged that
Bohr's principle was; sterile and that it had produced nothin
117
more than, pointless philosophical discussions. ~ In fact,
complementarity has not inspired much new research in
physics, largely because there has been so much confusion
about its true meaning, but it has been fruitful in the area
of biology.1^ Hopefully it will become fruitful in other
fields as well as its interpretation is; gradually clarified.
Mario Bunge published two important articles in the
years 1955-1956 which were strongly critical of the Cop en ~
] 19
hagen view and of complementarity, in particular, - and he
has- periodically renewed the attack ever since. He is one
of the few persons ever to have recognized Bohr's use of
~ )j c
classical concepts as a form of analogical thinking,"4 * and
ltd
he rejects it as such. Other than that, his criticisms
216
are mostly based on gross misunderstandingst for instance,
be criticizes Bohr for basing his arguments on the limits
lb-2
of measurement rather than definition; ~ he misinterprets
Bohr's rejection of the "thing-in-itselfu as a form of ideal-
lip
ism rather than a relational view of attributes (a view
. Xb-b-
incidentally which Bunge shares!; ; and he rejects the
idea of complementarity between thermodynamic macrostates
and atomic micro states because these represent different
Xb-5
levels of matter and hence are not completely symmetrical; '
In fact, Bunge has many of the qualities of a good comple-
mentarist. Only his refection of analogical thinking stands:
in his way.
5.8 Paul K. Feyerabend;
No one has struggled with Bohr's: ideas- more valiantly
lb-6
than Paul Feyerabend. He is virtually the only critic
who has really studied Bohr's writings and endeavoured to
improve his understanding of the philosophy he was evaluating.
His various papers from 1957 onwards show an ever-increasing
appreciation of Bohr's intentions, and they are the only
'writings I could recommend as: an introduction to Bohr's work.
Feyerabend's strong points are his clear distinction
lb-7
between Bohr and other members of the "Copenhagen school",'
his recognition that Bohr was concerned with physical prin-
lb-8
ciples more than mathematical formalisms, ' his appreciation
of Bohr's relational view of attributes,his gradual
realization that Bohr's position was basically realist and
150
objective, and his recognition of the incommensurability
191of classical and quantum-mechanical concepts. ' ' However,
217
Feyerabend still shows no signs of understanding the role of
classical concepts in Bohr's philosophy. His persistent-
efforts in this direction and the fantastic, explanations he
develops suggest that he is still not satisfied on this:
i d2
point,, but his cyclical view of the history of science
makes it unlikely that Bohr's position will ever really make
1 ^
sense to him. Moreover, Feyerabend ha,: confined his
interest to Bohr's, general philosophy and has not yet examined
the logic of complementarity itself or its; various applica™
v ] dk
tions outside the field of atomic physics. " Nonetheless,
he has performed an invaluable service in giving us the first
coherent exposition of Bohr's; ideas.
On this positive note we c^ose our discussion of
Bohr's critics. Hopefully, new and more searching criticisms
will emerge with time as the concept of complementarity itself
is clarified.
Footnotess Chapter 5<
1. "tlber das Gestez dor Energieverteilung ita Normalspektrum",
Ann. Phys. b, 1901, pp . 953"% 3«
2. See e.g. A.Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, pp.226-227.
3° Where Is Science Going?, London, 1933? PP-93""9'+, The Phil¬
osophy of Physics. London, 1936, p.77? The Universe in the
Light of Modern PhysicsLondon, 1937? pp.8-10,1^—15,
Scientific Antoblpgraphy and Other Papers. London, 1950,
pp.100-105» In all of these references Planck speaks of
a metaphysical "real world" which stands "behind" the
phenomenological world of sense data, but on pp.101-102
of the last reference he explains that "the word, behind,
must not be interpreted in an external or spatial sense.
"Instead of 'behind', we could just as well say, 'in' or
'within'. Metaphysical reality does not stand spatially
behind what is given in experience, but lies fully within
it." This is a helpful distinction, but unfortuneately
Planck does not maintain it consistently. A few pages
later (p.105) he speaks again of the unbridgeable chasm
between the world of phenomenology and the real world.
b. Where Is Science Going?, pp.86-87,92,9b-95? The Universe.
etc., pp.9-1.1$ cf. K.Popper, Con.]eciures and. Refutations.
ch.,3? arid above, ch.l, fn.93-
5* Where Is Science Going? . pp.6k, 100,lb0,l57-158, The Phil¬
osophy of Physics. pp.bl,53,76-77, The Universe, etc.. ,
pp AS, 58~59, Scientific Autobiography, etc., p.lb9. Con¬
trast Bohr's use of causality as a classical concept, eh.
1, fn.82 above.
6. In The Universe, etc., p.38, Planck mentions the "comple-
mentariness" between the uncertainties of position, and
momentum but does not develop the idea.
7• The Philosophy of Physics, pp.61-62, The Universe, etc.,
pp. 51—55, Scientific Autobiography, etc., pp. 130-131,
136-138. ~ " '
8. See above, ch.l-.3•
9• The Universe, etc., pp.5b-55*
10. A Survey of Physics, London, 1925, p.107? Where Is Science
Going?, pp.102-iolh,I63-I65, The Philosophy of Physics,
p.32, The Universe, etc., pp.85-109? Sc3 en11 f ic, Au.t-ob1og-
raphv, etc., pp.7 2 ~7 5«
11. The Universe, etc., p.105, Scientific Autobiography, etc..
pp.72-75.
12. Scientific Autob1o graphy, etc., p.75? of. The Philosophy
of Physics. p.32. This passage is quoted by C.A.Couisen
as an example of complementarity: Science and Christian
Belief, p.96; see below, ch.6.2.
219
13. Scientific Anto b1o gr aphy. etc., p.109.
!■+• Ibid, pp.67-69•
15. Ibid, p.59. N.B. The last two references come from an
essay written in 19*+6 ("Phantom Problems in Science",
In' Scientific Autobiography, etc.. pp. 52-79) and may
reflect an awareness of Bohr's writings. But the treat¬
ment of free will is much earlier and. may well hare
influenced Bohr in the first place.
16. "Therefore, it will do no harm to say that the physical
and the mental are in no way different from each other.
They are the selfsame processes, only viewed from two
diametrically opposite directions." Scientific Autobiog¬
raphy. etc., p.69; cf. ch.2.3 above. A recent article
by G.G.Globus ("Unexpected Symmetries in the 'World
Knot'", Science 180, 1973, pp.1129-1136) treats the mind-
body problem (the 'world knot') in exactly the same
manner. According to Globus, whether a psycho-physical
event is observed as a 'pure', mental event or a physical
change in the nervous system depends on whether it is ob¬
served from the 'proximal1 or the 'distal' side of the
'transformation boundary' between nervous system and phys¬
ical environment. Accordingly the two 'perspectives' are
mutually exclusive only for a given observer, but not in
absolute terms.
17. See above, eh.2.8.
18. See above, pp.l3ff.
19. See above, pp„7f»
20. "Of the 'orthodox' quantum theoreticians whose position
I know, Niels; Bohr's seems to me to come hearest to
doing justice to the problem." "Reply to Critics", in
P.A.Schilpp, ed., op.cit., p.681.
21. "From these meager remarks one will see that to me it
must seem a mistake to permit theoretical description to
be directly dependent upon, acts of empirical assertions,
as it seems, to me to be intended (for example) in Bohr's
principle of complementarity, the sharp formulation of
which, moreover, I have been unable to achieve despite
much effort, which I have expended on it. From ray point
of view (such) statements or measurements can occur only
as special instances, vis., parts, of physical descript¬
ion, to which I cannot ascribe any exceptional position
above the rest." ibid, p.67*+; cf. Einstein's letter to
Schrodinger (9 Aug. 1939) in K.Przibram, ed., Letters on
Wave Mechanics. New York, 1967, p.36.
22. Ideas and Opinions, p.33*+; cf. Pauli's letters to Born
7195*+) in which he characterizes Einstein's position as
"realistic" rather than "deterministic"; see The Born-
Einstein Letters, pp.218,221. On complementarity and.
indeterminism, see above, pp.6Rf.
220
23° Ideas and Opinions* pp.275,318, The Born -Einstein Letters.,
p.158.
23. The World As I See It, pp. 193"203-.
25° The Born.-Binstein Letters, p. 171.
26. ibid, pp.158,16^,170,218.
27« cf. ch.1,5 above.
28. See p.15 above.
29° "Are There Quantum Jumps?", B.J.P.S. 3? 1952, p.l205
"What Is Matter?", Sci.Am. lo9 (No.3)5 1953> P»56, My
View of the World. Cambridge, 1963, p.3-3. Concerning
Einstein's influence on Schrodinger see K.Przibram, ed.,
op.cit., p.26; E.Schrodinger, "Die genenwartige Situation
in der Quantenmechanik", Naturwis. 23, 1935, p.835; and.
V.V.Raman and P.Forman, "Why Was It Schrodinger Who Dev¬
eloped de Broglie's Ideas?", in R.McCorrnach, ed., Hist¬
orical Studies in the Physical Sciences, Vol.1, Philad¬
elphia, i9^97~pp* 291-31W"
30. "Quantisierung als Eigenwertproblem", Ann.Phys. 79, 1926,
p.375; "The Meaning of Wave Mechanics", in A.George, ed.,
op.cit.. p.18.
31. The conversation is recalled by W.Heisenberg in Physics
and Beyond, pp.73-76.
32. W.T.Scott, Erwin Schro'dinger; An Introduction to His
Writings, pp.83-87, esp. p.86.
33* Science and the Human Temperament, London, 1935, p. 153-,
"What Is Matter?", pp.53-.55, and Was 1st Ein Naturgesetz?,
Munich/Vienna, 1962, pp.101,112-113.
33. See ch.2.6 above for a description of one such experiment.
35* e.g. "What Is An Elementary Particle?", Endeavour 9, 1950,
pp.112,115-116, and "Are There Quantum Jumps?", p.23-0.
36. "If Heisenberg's assertion is correct, and it it appears
at first sight to make gaps in our picture of the world
which cannot-be filled, then the obvious thing to do is to
eliminate the regions which refuse to be filled with
thought; in other words to form, a view of the v/orld which
does not contain those regions at all." Science and. the
Human Temperament, pp.131-132; cf. Science and 'Humanism,
Cambridge, 1951, PP.30-31,39-50.
37* My View of the World, pp.18-22 ("The Vedantic Vision"), p.3-1.
38. de Broglie has frequently recounted these stages of dev¬
elopment; "L'Interpretation de la Mecunique Ondulatcire",
J .Phvs.Rad. 20, 1959, p. 963, Hon-Linear 'Wave Mechanics,
221
Amsterdam, I960, Preface and pp.89-93, F/aw Perspectives
in Physics, Preface and pp.83-96, The Current .Inter¬
pretation of Wave Mechanics* Amsterdam, 1964-, Preface.
When criticized for being fickle, he once replied with
a quotation from Voltaire, "L'homme stupids est celui qui
ne change pas". La Physique Quantique Restera-t-elle
Indeterrainiste?, Paris, 1953 , p.22.
39. See ch.2, fn.6'1 above.
4-Q. "La Mecanique Ondulatoire et la Structure Atomique de la
Matiere et du Rayonnement", J.Phys.Rad. , Series 6, 8,
1927, -p. 225, Won -Linear Wave Mechanics, pp, 3,89, and
"The Interpretation of Wave Mechanics!', Foundations of
Physics 1. 1970, p.5"
4-1. "La Mecanique Ondulatoire, etc.", pp.225-226, An Intro¬
duction to the Study of Wave Mechanics. London, 1930? p«
6. and The Current Interpretation of Wave Mechanics,
PP.9,37^1 " ~— ""
4-2. An Introduction to the Study of Wave Mechanics, pp.6-7,
120-121, "L1 Interpretation de la. Mecanique Ondulatoire
a 1'Aide d'Ondes a Regions Singulieres", in Scientific
Papers Presented to Max Born, Edinburgh, 1953, p.22, and
New Perspectives in Physics, pp.96,111,176.
43- See Matter and Light, pp.255,278, The Revolution in
Physics, London, 195'+, pp. 18 -19,217 ~218, and Physics and
Microphysics, London, 1955, pp. 112,138-139,23^>, 24-1.
44-. New Perspectives in Physics, p.98.
4-5. ibid, p.vi; cf. p.105.
4-6. The Current Interpretation of Wave Mechanics, p.68.
4-7 • An Introduction to the Study of Wave Mechanics, p. 1.4-5 •
^8. ibid, pp.8-9.
49. "Individualite et Interaction dans le Monde Physique",
pp.356-360, Matter and Light, p.279, "Sur la Complemen-
tarite des Idees d' Individu et de Systbme", Pi alectlea
2, "19^8, pp.325-329, The Revolution in Physics, p.281,
and Physics and Microphysics, p. 135; cf. ^P. Des touches-
Fevrier, "Relations d1Incertitude Liees a la Complemen-
tarite Corpuscules-Systeme de Louis de Broglie", Comptes
Rendus 226, 194-8, pp.468-470, and "Manifestations et
Sens de la Notion de Complementarite", Dialect!ca 2,
1948, pp.397-399.
50. Matter and Light, p,279, and Physics and Microphysics,
P.13 5•
51. "Individualite et Interaction, etc.", pp.357-358.
222
52. ibid, p.357? Matter and Light., pp.279-280, and "Sur la
Complementarity etc.", p.328.
53° See above, pp.132,I52.
5^. See above, pp<>9!+,l!+9jl57f-
55" See above, p.62.
56. de Broglie concludes his 19^8 paper on complementarity
with the words:, "A cet egard comme a Men. d'autres, la
profonde conception nouvelle introdulte par Bohr apparait
comme susceptibj.e de nombreuses applications." ("Sur la
Complementarite, etc.", p.329). Three years later he
changed his mind and rejected complementarity altogether.
Compare his previous enthusiasm with the following state¬
ment: "The idea of complementarity, although a bit
elusive is an interesting one. Attempts have been made
to apply it in various fields - a procedure that is not
always entirely safe." (Non-Linear Wave Mechanics, p.63).
57. 'New Perspectives in Physics, p.vi.
58. Bohm sent him a preprint of his first paper on "hidden
variables" ("A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum
Theory in Terms of 'Hidden1 Variables", Phys.Rev. 85,
1952, pp.166-193) esp. p.167) in the spring of 1951? see
New Perspectives in Physics, p.83.
59. Vigier pointed out the similarity between de Broglie's
"theory of the double solution" and Einstein's ideas
about particles as singularities in a universal field;
see J.P.Vigier, "Introduction Geometrique de I'Onde
Pilote en Theorie Unitaire Affine", Comptes Rendns 233?
195-1) pp.1010-1012; and L.de Broglie, "Remarque sur la
Note Precedente de M.Vigier", ibid, pp.1012-1013, and
"L'Interpretation de la Mecanique .Ondulatoire, etc.", p.32.
60. Non-Linear Wave Mechanics, pp.vi,95?291-292, New Perspec¬
tives in Physics, pp. 9? , 1^2-1^,14-8, The Current Inter -
pretation of Wave Mechanics, pp.36-37,^+3"W° For Einst¬
ein's views see e.g. "Autobiographical Notes", in P.A.
Schilpp, ed., op.,cit♦, pp.77?87,o9. Incidentally, Einst¬
ein was not impressed by the theories of either Bohm or
de Brogl1e; see The Bora-Einstein Letters, p.192.
61. N011-Linear Wave Mechanics, p.290.
62. ibid, pp.223-231, New Perspectives in Physics, pp. 11.6-120.
The linear solution is similar to Schrodinger1s wave-
function except that it is not normalized and it never
collapses; see Non-Linear Wave Mechanics, p.266, and The
Current Interpretation of Wave Mechanics« pp.V/'-^S,
63. "L1Interpretation de la Mecanique Ondulatoire", pp.965?
975-976, Non-Linear Wave Mechanics, p.287, The Carrent
Interpretation of "Wave Mechanics, pp.vi:ii,1+2^+3? "The"
oo^
Reinterpretation of Wave Mechanics", p.lk. This idea
was also inspired by the work of Bohm and Vigier ("Model
of the Causal Interpretation.of Quantum Theory in Terms
of a Fluid with Irregular Fluctuations", Phys.Rev,, 96,
195k, pp.208-216).
6k. "The Reinterpretation of Wave Mechanics", p.lk.
65. "L'Interpretation de la Mecanique Ondulatoire", p.965.
66c Non-Linear Wave Mechanics, p.62.
67« The Carrent Interpretation of Wave Mechanics, pp.7-8.
68. Non-Linear Wave Mechanicsp.63.








77. ibid, pp.62k-628; cf. von Weizsaclcer's concept of "circular
complementarity", ch.k.k above.




82. "A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms
of 'Hidden' Variables", Phys.Rev. 85> 1952, p.l68.
83. See p.91 above.
8k. Bohm's hierarchical treatment of physics is amplified in
Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, London* 1957,
pp.51,121,139,lk5-lk6,155)166. Here he allows each
level an autonomy and stability of its own in keeping
with Bohr's basic ideas.
85. See D.Bohm, "A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum
Theory in Terms of 'Hidden1 Variables", Phys,Rev. 8.5,
1952, pp.166-193? "Proof That Probability Density App¬
roaches /¥/a in Causal Interpretation of the Quantum
22k
Theory", Phys..Rev. 89, 1953? ppA58A66, "Comments on
an Article of Takabayasi Concerning the Formulation, of
Quantum Mechanics with Classical Pictures", Prog<Th.
Phys« 9, 1953? pp.273-287; B.Bohm and J.P.Vigier,
"Model of the Causal Interpretation of Quantum Theory
in Terms of a Fluid with Irregular Fluctuations", Phys.
Rev. 96, 195>+, pp. 208-2165 p.Bohm, "A Proposed Explan¬
ation of Quantum Theory in Terms of Hidden Variables at
a Sub-Quantum-Mechanical Level", in S.Korner, edM op.
Sit., pp.33-3-0; J.P.Vigier, "The Concept of Probability
"in the Frame of the Probabilistic and the Causal Inter¬
pretation of Quantum Mechanics", ibid, pp.71-77•
86. "A Suggested Interpretation, etc.", pp.166,168, "Proof,
etc.", ppA65>*+66, "Comments, etc.", p.282.
87. Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, pp.93?98,111-112,
117,138. " ~ ~~3
88. "Comments, etc.", p.282.
89. ibid, p.281H- ("Even if there really were no cause, no
error could come from the assumption that there was one.
All that would happen would be that our efforts to find
the cause would not be successful. But if, as is much
more likely, there really is a cause, and we assume there
is not, then we may be lead to overlook important new
factors that are needed in the theory".).
90. "A Suggested Interpretation, etc.", p,l80.
91• ibid; cf. "Comments, etc.", pp.275-276.
92. See above, pp.lOf. Even Heisenberg in his Physical Prin¬
ciples of the Quantum Theory (ch.2) based his argument's
on theory and only cited thought experiments as illust¬
rations .
93. "A Suggested Interpretation, etc.", "Comments, etc.",
p.279; and D.Bohm and J.Bub, "A Proposed Solution of the
Measurement Problem in Quantum Mechanics by a Hidden
Variable Theory", Rev.Mod.Phys. 38? 1966, ppA58,H69*
9li-. "Classical and Non-Classical Concepts in the Quantum
Theory: An Answer to Heisenberg1 s Physics and Philosophy.",
B.J.P.S. 12,. 1962, pp.265-280.
95* J«Bub, "Hidden Variables and the Copenhagen Interpretation
- A Reconciliation", B.J.P.S. 19, 1968, pp.185-210; and
D.Bohm, "On Bohr's Views Concerning the Quantum Theory",
in T.Bastin, sd., op.cit., pp.33AO, and "On the Role of
Hidden Variables in the Fundamental Structure of Physics",
ibid, pp.95-116. Note: since 1969 Bub has taken a com¬
pletely different tack; see his "Under the Spell of Bohr",
B.J.P.S. 2k, 1973, pp.78-90.
96. D.Bohm, "Classical and Non-Classical Concepts, etc.",
pp. 266,277; cf. eh.l, fri.122 above.
225'
97* D.Bohm, loc.cit. , pp. 273 "27 5? "On Bohr's Views, etc,.
p.hO; and J.Bub, "Hidden Variables, etc.". pu.186,190-
191,206.
98. D.Bohm, B.J.Kiley, and A.E.G.Stuart, "On a New Mode of
Description in Physics-", International Journal of Theor¬
etical Physics 1.. 1970, 'pp.172-173
99. E.T., Determinism and Indetermin.ism in Modern Physics,
New Haven, 1956» Margenau wrote the preface to the Eng¬
lish version,
100. ibid, pp.119,123•




105' "We certainly do not have a satisfactory situation when
definite concepts are accepted for the time being only
to be subsequently corrected through restrictions to
certain conditions: and thus; alone really justified and
certified in their application." ibid, pp.112-113•
106. See above, ch.1.3.
107. "Reality in Quantum Mechanics", p.300, The Nature of
Physical Reality, pp.1+l1+,i+l8-!+19, and "Preface" to E.
Cassirer, op..cit,, pp.xviii,xix.
108. "Reality in Quantum Mechanics", pp.300-301, and The Nature
of Physical Reality, p.R19»
109- The Nature of Physical Reality, pp.1-10,81,100,292.
110. See above, ch.*f, fn.115*
111. Margenau has written many papers: criticizing the projec¬
tion postulate. The most recent are: "Measurements- and
Quantum States", Phil.Sci. 30, 1963, pp.1-16,138-157,
and "Measurements in Quantum Mechanics", Annals of Physics
2-3, 1963, pp.^69-^-.
112. "When a tree is seen, the tree is the construct; the unit¬
ary experience of the tree is summed up in that way. The
tree is permanent exactly to the extent which permanence
has; been invested as. a rational element in the construct.
There is not a tree and my construct of it, nor a wave¬
length and ray construct of it." "Reality in Quantum
Mechanics", pp. 293-2.9^; of. The Nature of Physical Real -
itv, p.70.
113. Margenau sometimes speaks of his position as idealist and
226
sometimes claims to reject both realism and idealism;
see "Reality in Quantum Mechanics", p. 237-, The .Nature
of Physical Reality, pp.3,71,98.
111. "Reality in Quantum Mechanics", p.299, The Nature of
Physical Reality, p.U-21, "Advantages and Disadvantages
of Various interpretations of the Quantum Theory", p. 9,
and "Preface" to E.Cassirer, op.clt., p.xx; cf. eh.2.2
above.
115. See above, chs-.lf.3 and 5«1«-
116, Planck, for instance, distinguishes between the real
world, the world of the senses and the world of physics
(The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics, pp.9-11),
whereas; Margenau identifies the first and third of
these. In Margenau1s terminology, physical reality is
on man's side of the P (perception)-plane for Margenau
and it is on the other (noumenal) side for Planck and
Heisenberg.
117« "...I am perfectly willing to admit that reality does
change as discovery proceeds. I can see nothing basic¬
ally wrong with a real world which undergoes modifica¬
tions with the flux of experience." 'The Nature of
Physical Reality, p.2.95°
118. ibid, pp.l+22,Li-26, "Advantages and Disadvantages, etc.",
p.9. As we have seen there is no such dichotomy in
Bohr's philosophy; see eh.1.5 above.
119• "Advantages and Disadvantages, etc.", p.10.
120. "Admittedly, this; view does violence to one's monistic
intuition, but in an age of positivism one may have to
assuage one's metaphysical conscience by relying on
facts and logic alone, yielding the natural desire for
unity of explanation, the philosophic instinct which
abhors a fundamental ambiguity in the realm of nature's
ultimate constituents." Open Vistasp.156.
121. The Nature of Physical Reality, p.321, Open Vistas, p.
161", "The Philosophical Legacy of Contemporary Quantum
Theory", in R.G.Golodny, ed., Mind and Cosmos., Pitts¬
burgh, 1966, p.351.
122. The Nature of Physical Reality, pp.375,^18, Open Vistas.
p.lhV.
123. "The appeal /cf complementarity/ is to the deeper concerns
of our being, somewhat reminiscent of at modern trend that
the knowledge of divinity is possible only through myths,
allegories, and paradoxes." Open Vistas, p. 1.62; cf. "The
Philosophical Legacy, etc.", p.3^-9«
12J+. "Like Parmenides and Plato we feel dissatisfied with the
messages delivered to us by external perceptions, for
22?
these messages are peculiarly incoherent, full of sur¬
prises, and cryptic in their meaning. The mind, prefers
to behold conditions that expose themselves to leis¬
urely and careful view; to it the changeable external
world is a perpetual offense. Thus arises the sugg¬
estion that; the sensory world may, after all, not be
wholly real, for it violates the cherished postulate of
permanence." The Nature of Physical Reality, p.3,
3.25- See above, pp.65-66.
126. See above, pp.17-18 and A.Lande, Quantum Mechanics, pp.
7-8, "New'Foundations for Quantum Physics", Physics
Today 20 (No.2), 1967, pp.55-58; K.Popper, "Quantum
Mechanics without 'The Observer'", in M.Bunge, ed.,
Quantum Theory and Reality, Berlin, 1967? p.Id; and M.
Bunge, Intuition and Science, p.107, and "Analogy in
Quantum Theory: From Insight to Nonsense", pp.280-282.
127. A.Lande, Foundations of Quantum Theory, New Haven, 1955,
pp.75-76, From Dualism, to Unity in Quantum Physics, Cam¬
bridge, I960, pp.97,100, and New Foundations of Quantum
Mechanics, pp.x,5,7,8,20,107,109■-110,113,II7,118,l50;
K.Popper, "The Propensity Interpretation of the Calculus-
of Probability", in S.Korner, ed., op.cit., p.68, and
"Quantum Mechanics without 'The Observer'", pp. 21,39-50;
and M.Bunge, Foundations of Physics, Berlin, 1967, p.
235, and "Analogy in Quantum Theory, etc.", p.268.
128. Foundations of Quantum Theory (New Haven, 1955) is the
first publication in which Land£ clearly criticized
"duality". For a summary of Lande's views see the "Intro¬
duction" to W.Yourgran and A.van der Merwe, eds., Per¬
spectives in Quantum Theory; Essays in Honor of Alfred
Lande, Cambridge, Mass., 1971 *
129. Principles of Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge, 1937, and
"Quantum Mechanics. London, 1951.
130. See above, pp.l53-l55«
131* See above, cli.2.5, esp. fn.60.
132. It is most, discouraging to see that Lande's most recent
diatribe against "duality" is based on the same misunder¬
standing: "The Decline and Fall of Quantum Dualism",
Phil.Sclv 38, 1971? pp.221-223.
133* The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp.221,232-23*+, 552-553•
131+. "Discussion" in S.Korner, ed., op.cit., p.89, The Logic
of Scientific Discovery, pp.555,556, and "The Argument
of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen", in W.Yourgrau and A.
van der Merwe, eds., op.cit., p.185=
135. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp.553,555,556.
t'\ t-y Q22o
136«• ibid, p3+5'+, and Conjectures and. Refutations, p.100.
137• Con.iectares arid Refutations, p. 101.
138. Especially in. the work of P.Jordan, W.M.Elsasser, and
M.Dslbruck.
139. "Strife About Complementarity", B.J.P.S. 6, 19 55, pp.
1-12,3>1-15R, and "Survey of the Interpretations of
Quantum Mechanics", Am.J.Phys. 2d, 1956, pp.272-286
('both, reprinted in Metasclentific Queries, Springfield,
Illinois, 1959).
lh0. "Analogy in Quantum Theory", p.2735 see above, pp.16-18.
1*+1. See ch.l, fn.ll!+.
ibZ. "Strife About Complementarity", pp,3,1^-8-1^-9, "Survey
of the Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics", p.28.1.
lh-3. "Strife About Complementarity", p.6.
lhk. "This /fact that there are no isolated systems in quan¬
tum mechanics/, far from meaning that an observer must
always: be taken for granted, only means that other
material systems, macroscopic ones, are always in inter¬
action with the microscopic system under consideration."
"Survey of the Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics",
p.275; cf. p.281, ana. "Analogy in Quantum Theory, etc.",
p. 273- See above, pp. 2>+f, 136f.
Ilf5« "Strife About Complementarity", p.1^8. See above, c.hs«
2.10 and 3<1 •
lM-6. See above, ch.l, fns.5>^95 50,7^,85,86,87.
IV7. "Complementarity I", p.80, "Problems of Microphysics"
pp.201, 221, 237, 250,259,271,273-275-, and "On a Recent
Critique of Complementarity II", pp.9^"97-
lt-8. "Complementarity I", p.96, and "On a Recent Critique of
Complementarity II", pp.82-88.
l!+9« "Niels Bohr's Interpretation of the Quantum Theory", p.
372, "Problems of Microphysics", pp.217,219, ana "On
a Recent Critique of Complementarity I", p.311; cf.
Hooker's criticism of Feyerabend's interpretation of
Bohr: C.A.Hooker, loc.cit., pp.150-152.
150. "Problems of Microphysics", pp. 2.02,220, 259, and "On a
Recent Critique of Complementarity I", p.322 and "II",
pp.96-97.
151. "On a Recent Critique of Complementarity I", pp.315-320.
152. "An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience",
pp.152-1535 "Complementarity I", pp,8h~88, "Niels Bohr's
229
Interpretation of the Quantum Theory", pp.387-389,
"Problems of Microphysics", pp.228,231.
153• See ch.l, fns.35,86.
l5'i. Feyerabend rejects these "generalizations" of complemen¬
tarity as- "very weak and mostly invalid", but he doesn't
really consider them seriously.
Part II
The Logic of Complementarity in Theology
Chapter 6
Possible Theological Uses of Complementarity
"The appropriate answer to 'Are theological paradoxes
like the wave-particle duality?* is not 'yes* or 'no'
but a full account of the ways in which they are like
and unlike." W.H.Austin, Waves. Particles, and Para¬
doxes , p.97.
Niels Bohr once recommended that theologians make
1
more use of the principle of complementarity in their work,
and we intend to follow him up on this suggestion. First
we should review the efforts of other theologians in this
direction and get some idea of the possible applications to
be considered. Bohr himself suggested applications to (a)
creaturely freedom and divine sovereignty,.and (b) the imman-
2
ence and transcendence of God with respect to time. These
will come up again in this chapter, and there will be other
suggested applications as well.
6.1 Gunter Howe:
One of the regular participants in the "Gottingen
circle" of scientists and theologians was Gunter Howe.
Howe was trained as a physicist himself, but he also studied
Barth's Kirkllche Do gin atile and contributed an article to the
Festschrift dedicated to Barth on his seventieth birthday
in which he drew parallels between Berth's theology and
modern physics
There are two important points with respect to our
thesis which Howe brings out in his writings. First, he
stresses that modern (quantum) physics leads beyond the
classical antithesis of materialism (mechanism) and ideal-
L|_ t ^
ism. Citing Heisenberg and von Weizsacker on the "break¬
down of objectivity" in modern physics, he wisely avoids
using the term "subjectivity" (Subjectivisiinis) and refers
instead to "non-objectiflability" (Nlchtob.i ectlvlerbarkeit),
q
i.e. a transcendence of both objectivity and subjectivity.
The use of a term like "non-objectiflability" (cf. Athanas-
6
lus's dianola in contrast to the eninola of the Avians)
would help to prevent confusion since the dependence of the
atomic object on the observing "subject" in the act of measure
ment is no different from its dependence on its macroscopic
environment in any other situation. As Bohr himself stressed
it is the complete specification of the experimental condit¬
ions that is important, not the presence or absence of a
conscious "subject". Howe has helped to clarify this point.
Secondly, Howe follows von Weizsacker in interpreting
Bohr's principle of complementarity in a "circular" rather
g
than "parallel" fashion. He does this in order to streng¬
then the analogy to Barth's idea of the veiling and unveiling
of God which involves a "circle of knowledge" rather than a
strict parallelism. As we have pointed out before, this
approach confuses the "pointing relation" of complementarity
with the cyclical relation of correspondence.^ The relation¬
ship between God-revealed and God-concealed is one of
dependence and pointing beyond, not of epistemoiogical cir¬
cularity. We shall return to this issue in chapter nine.
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6.2 C.A.Coulson and D.MTMackay:
The two men primarily responsible for popularising
the idea of complementarity in Christian thought have been
Charles A. Coulson and Donald M. Mackay. Both are trained
in mathematics and physics and have a keen interest in the
issues of modern philosophy. Coulson1 s writings' are a good
example of the theological difficulties one can get into by
using the concept of complementarity carelessly. His "com¬
plementarity" is roughly what we have called orthogonality
or modality - complementary aspects are different views or
projections of an invariant reality."*'0 Hence wave and par¬
ticle are simply two alternate interpretations of electrons'
or of lightj they do not reflect any change in the object
11
itself. "" Similarly, final and effective causes represent
1 2
alternate viewpoints in both physics and biology. Coulson
also follows Planck in regarding mind and matter or free will
and determinism as the same reality viewed from within and
without."*"3 Finally, he sees science as a'whole and religion
as different ways of viewing the same reality whether it is
1 b-
called. Nature of God. Without qualification he quotes
Alexander Pope's famous lines:
All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.
and speaks freely of the sacramentality of Nature as the body
15
of Christ. These misleading (though not entirely false1.)
ideas are avoided when complementarity is treated qs a
relation between distinct modes of being rather than aspects
of an invariant object. We take this up again in chapter
eight.
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Mackay has repeatedly insisted that complementarity
should be treated as a logical rather than a physical rel¬
ation,^ By this he means that complementarity arises
whenever an object of many logical dimensions is described
in terms of concepts that have fewer dimensions than the
1 7
object itself,"" Again, this is not complementarity m
Bohr's sense but what we have called orthogonality, ' However,
Mackay, unlike Coulson, allows for complementarity between
conceptual or ontological levels as well as logical dimen-
18
sions. " Here he has in mind relationships such as that
between mental and physical or between sign and thing-
19
signified. This comes very close to Bohr's concept of
complementarity (e.g. between elementary particles and stable
atoms) although Mackay denies this repeatedly. It certainly
makes his treatment of the complementarity between the events
of nature and the activity of God more suitable than Coul-
20
son's; however, neither Mackay nor Coulson really examines
the theological issues to see whether the concept of comple¬
mentarity is entirely valid in this regard.
6.3 Ian G.Barbour;
I11 his classic text on science and religion, Ian
Barbour has given us four helpful cautions about applying
complementarity to fields outside atomic physics and to the
pi
field of theology in particular." (l) He points out that
such applications are necessarily analogical and not infer¬
ential. , that .is, the use of complementarity cannot automat¬
ically be transferred from one field to another; there must
be independent grounds for its application in each field.
In other words, the appeal to complementarity must always
Op
be based on a prior knowledge of the issue at hand. (2)
Complementarity applies to different ways of analyzing a
single entity under varying conditions, not to distinct ent¬
ities. Hence it is improper to refer to science and
religion as complementary in the strict sense unless one is
willing to accept pantheism and deny the distinctness of God
and nature. As Barbour puts it; "God and the world are
different modes of being, not different modes of knowing a
2°
single being." ^ Evidently he is reacting to Coulson's
defective use of complementarity here, but he has not noticed
that Coulson's definition of complementarity is also defective
and that if the definition is revised in keeping with Bohr's
intention then the application can be made properly. If,
as Barbour says, God and the world are different "modes of
being", then they may be complementary provided that (a) an
invariant, monistic being is not assumed and (b) God's own
existence is recognized as being modal, so that he may parti¬
cipate in complementarity with creation as its immanent
creator and sustainer and also transcend creation as the one
who dwells in eternity. More on this in chapter eight.
Finally Barbour warns us that (3) the acceptance of
complementarity should not be taken as a veto against the
search for a more unified description and (k) one ought not
to abandon a critical realism just because the more naive
form has finally broken down. All of this is good advice
and is perfectly consistent with the philosophy of Bohr as
we have "understood it.
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6.Li- William H. Austins
The most thorough work to date on the theological
uses of complementarity is ¥.11. Austin's Waves, Particles.
2b
and Paradoxes. Austin first tries to define complemerit-
arity, and then he examines possible applications to the
"Christological paradox", i.e. the dual nature of Christ, and
the love and justice of God. The principal difficulty with
his definition is that he compromises the strict exclusive-
ness of complementary models in order to allow them to be
25
intermixed." He also ignores Bohr's analogical use of
classical concepts in the correspondence principle. When
he examines the Christological paradox these omissions lead
him to trouble: he begins by considering the models of Christ
as God and Christ as man, but concludes that complementarity
won't work with these two models because (a) the ideas of
God and man cannot be "mixed": in Christian theology and (b)
they are revised and improved through our understanding of
the Incarnation while there is (according to Austin) no sig¬
nificant change in the (classical) concepts of wave and
27
particle in quantum physics. Therefore, he discards the
models of 'God' and 'man' and chooses instead to work with
the models of 'Logos' and 'Messiah' which are supposed to
represent the Alexandrian and Antiochene strands of Christol-
ogy, respectively. However, the relation between these
alleged strands in the history of religion is one of coexis¬
tence and interaction, not one of complementarity in Bohr's
sense. Therefore, further consideration should be given to
Austin's first suggestion of complementarity between the
human and divine natures of Christ, and we shall take this
up in chapter- ten.
For the "paradox11 of the love and justice of God
Austin suggests the models of 'merciful Father1 and 'just-
Judge' . However, he recognizes that these concepts cannot
be strictly separated, that they are not opposed in Scrip¬
ture, and that any apparent antithesis applies only to
religious experience and cannot be maintained in systematic
28
theology. c Clearly, there is no point in pursuing this
possibility any further.
6,5 Complementarity as the Ontological Correlate of Revelation
Thus far we have three possible applications of com¬
plementarity to consider in the field of theology; (a) the
relationship between the (immanent) Creator and his creation,
(b) the transcendence and immanence of God (with respect to
time), and (c) the divinity and humanity of Christ. We shall
examine each of these possibilities in turn, but first we
ought to consider their group characteris11cs in order to
decide whether there are other possible applications belonging
pQ
to the same group (the problem of homology).' Secondly,
we should also investigate the possibility that the members
of this group are related to each other hierarchically as
are the members of the complementarity group in science.^
Finally, we should examine the progressive adaptation of eom-
11
plementarity from one end of this hierarchy to the other.
The many ramifications of these problems will occupy our
attention throughout the remainder of this thesis. At this
point we need only sketch an impressionistic outline and
give a preliminary, heuristic consideration to the underlying
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principles. Therefore, we shall make use of the more intu¬
itive concept of complementarity developed in chapter one
and leave the detailed points of definition of chapter two
for later verification.
The most striking feature of the three suggested appli¬
cations of complementarity is their common "revelational"
32
structure. ' In each case there are two terms which might
be called modes or poles: they are (polar) modes in that
they cannot be separated or treated independently, and they
are (modal) poles in that they cannot fused or reduced to a
common third term. The relationship between these polar
modes ( or modal poles) is twofold: the first gives rise to
the second chrono1.ogleally or is prior to the second onto-
loglcally (e.g. "God created the heavens and the earth"), and
the second always depends on the first and points back to the
first as its proper source or ground (e.g. "the heavens
declare the glory of God").
Now there are at least three other relations in theology
which share the revelational, structure of the three we have
considered: (a) First, within the triune nature of God,
there are the relations of Father to Son (generation and
glorification), of Father to Holy Spirit ("spiration" and
glorification), and possibly (depending on the filioque) of
Son to Spirit. (b) Secondly, there is a universal relation¬
ship between "heaven" and "earth" as the respective abodes
of God and man (e.g. "heaven is thy throne and earth is thy
footstool"). It is generally understood (Russian astronauts
notwithstanding) that heaven is not another place in the uni¬
verse, but rather another pole or mode of the universe to
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33which earthly events may direct our attention. Hence,
the somewhat unpopular topics of theophany and the doctrine
of angels would come under this heading. (e) Finally,
there is a more particular relationship between heaven and
earth or between God and man in the doctrines of the church
(the body of Christ), the word (the word of God and the word
of man.), and the sacraments (act of God and act of man).
All of these relationships are inherently revelational and
hence they should be considered together with the first
three.
The principal question, therefore, is how this dual
relationship of giving rise and pointing back is related to
Bohr1s concept of complementarity. Bohr's basic insight was
that em object (e.g. the universe as a whole) may exist in
one of two modes depending on whether it is analyzed in terms
of its structure or applied and allowred to function in accor¬
dance with its design or purpose. At the level of theology,
of course, this purpose would be revelational. Thus, crea¬
tion as a whole is designed to reveal the glory of God, yet
this glory cannot be seen in the structure of creation itself
but only when creation is allowed to function as a revelation
of that glory. Beyond or "behind" all creation is the
creating and sustaining activity of God, but this activity is
hidden so long as creation itself is specifiably known.
In other words, "creation" has two complementary modes:
creation as analyzed or specifiably known, i.e. "the heavens
and the earth", and creation as applied or tacitly known,
i.e. "the glory of God". The same considerations apply to
the other examples cited.
It is worth noting that this comp3.ementar.ist app¬
roach provides an alternative to the model of revelation
proposed by John Mclntyre (A reveals B to C) in that revealer
and revelation are two modes or poles of the same entity (A-
applied and A--analyzed) rather than two separate entities
. . -jlj.
(B and A). Hence, revealer and revelation are related
modally rather than in s tmmental ly.
There is, however, one Important difference between
these examples of complementarity in theology and the type of
complementarity we have studied in science. In science, the
specifiable mode is always the (chronologically and ontolog-
ically) prior mode from which the tacit mode evolves (e.g.
atoms-*-organism), hence the directions of evolution and poin¬
ting are the same. Things are built from the ground up so
to speak. However, in theology things are built from the
top down. Hence the tacitly-known mode is usually prior to
the specifiably-known mode (e.g. Creator-*creation) so that
the directions of "evolution" and pointing are opposed.
Note that the reversal of the direction of evolution and dep¬
endence occurs at the level of man •- levels below man evolve
upwards and those above man "evolve" downwards (the hierarch¬
ical relation). Hence this reversal simply reflects man's
unique position in creations he is the summit of natural
evolution .from the viewpoint of science and a "little lower
than the angels" from the viewpoint of theology. It is an
ontological reversal rather than a merely epistemological one
based on an anthropocentric outlook. Once this curious rev¬
ersal of dependence is understood the continuity and
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discontinuity between science and theology ceases to be a
barrier> and the way is open to applying a concept like
complementarity to theological issues (the problem of prog¬
ressive adaptation).
The reversal of the direction of dependence mani¬
fests itself in several ways. For one thing the initiative
in the knowing relations of science always lies with man -
he is the questioning and knowing subject. But in theology
the initiative lies entirely with God - man here is a quest¬
ioned and to.'.own subject. Hence we speak of God's self-
IS'
revelation rather than man's own. discovery of God. Another
related point- is that entities above or beyond man (e.g.
creation as a whole or God in one of his modes) need not and
cannot always be defined in terms of an environment or experi¬
mental arrangement since they have no "boundary conditions"
in the absence of a. human subject. Hence the relational
view of attributes derived from atomic physics is no longer
applicable, and the possibilities of definition (presupposing
in
a particular theological model) may entail a subject.-object
boundary in the absence of a subject, even in Bohr's general
lO
sense of the term (i.e. experimental arrangement). In
other words, since we have no instruments for observing God
(or for that matter the universe as a whole), we can only
confront him directly and the modal character that we observe
must be independent not only of the presence of a human sub¬
ject (as in the sciences )39 but of any kind of subject or
environment. Then we must conclude that this modal existence
is intrinsic tip the entity in question. It is not simply a
1+0
response to changes in the environment as in the sciences,
2kl
When we come to experience these modal transformations (cf.
the transfiguration of Jesus) we experience them as being
spontaneous rather than merely responsive. Hence we eon-
elude that our own modes of knowing (specifiable and tacit)
are modelled on the modal structure of reality (structure
and function) and we recognize the priority of God's self-
revelation (the divine complementarity) to our knowing of it.
2k2
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The Doctrine of the Trinity
"When we confess that God is One we deny that He
is single; for the Son is the complement of the
Father /Farrem consummat Fillns7, and to the
Father the Son's existence' is due." Hilary, On
the Trinity 7.31 (P.132).
7•1 Introduction s
The doctrine of the Trinity is the ideal starting
point for our study of complementarity in theology since it
epitomizes the struggle of the early church as it experienced
new depths to the reality of God and attempted to develop an
adequate formalism to express its findings. The situation
was remarkably similar to that of the physicists' first ex¬
ploration of the quantum domain: there was the same break¬
down of classical, formulas, the straining of ordinary
language, the emergence of numerous "paradoxes", and countless
"heretical" oversimplifications. In both cases an "ortho¬
doxy" emerged which attempted to do justice to all aspects
of the reality concerned even at the expense of "common
sense" and ordinary logic. The respective "orthodoxies"
have had their adherents and their critics in every gener¬
ation, and it seems almost as though a permanent stalemate
has been reached in the respective sciences. However, a new
possibility emerges with the recognition of the parallel
between the two cases. Once the various issues and the con¬
trasting positions can be identified in a variety of different
sciences (including theology) they can be generalized and
treated as a class rather than simply as isolated instances.
2b6
Once the various themes and fallacies can be abstracted from
their particular contexts there is an immense gain in per¬
spective, and a kind of metascience emerges,, One may never
be able to decide between (say) monist, dualist and eoraple-
mentarist models in a final way, but one can use the lessons
learned in one area of application to test one's conclusions
in another area.
Hence there is considerable benefit to be derived
from the establishment of a plausible parallel between a
theological problem like the doctrine of the Trinity and the
principle of complementarity. But establishing such a par¬
allel is not a simple task at allI Besides the vast chasm
between scientific and theological discourse, there is the
problem of defining the doctrine of the Trinity in. the first
place. Then there is the difficulty of pinning down the
logic of that doctrine (so as to compare it with the eleven
points of complementarity) when, in fact, it operates as an
organic whole and stoutly resists any such analysis. Finally
there is the question of how to evaluate the results of the
comparison. (
In this chapter I shall begin with a general dis¬
cussion of various possible models of the Trinity with the
intent of choosing those models which are most susceptible
to a complementarist analysis. Then I shall treat the
Father-Son relation in detail as a parallel to the eleven-
point relation of complementarity and try to show how various
heretical positions arise from the neglect of one point or
another. Finally I shall evaluate these results on the
basis of their comprehensiveness and logical fertility.
7.2 Models of the Trinity;
The first point to make clear is that we shall dist¬
inguish the transcendence-immanence (or essence-energies)
relation which is directed towards creation (processio ad
extra) from the intratr.initar.ian relations which are trans¬
verse to the former (processio ad intra)» In other words,
we shall assume with Irenaeus, Origeri and later Fathers '
that the generation of the Word and the procession of the
Spirit are eternal acts in themselves and not merely prepar-
2
atory or relative to the creation of the world. In so
doing vie reject what seems to be the current trend in Western
theology and side with the more traditional view of the
k
East.
Secondly, we must decide whether to apply complemen¬
tarity to the relations between the persons themselves (as
suggested .in chapter 6.5) or else to the relation between the
essence (ousia) and the persons as a group (hypostasels)
i.e. between the "oneness" and the "threeness" of the "tri-
unity". In support of the latter application one might cite
numerous statements by the Fathers to the effect that the
k
persons are three in one respect and one in another. How¬
ever, complementarity is not applicable to the relation of
viewpoints or dimensions, and mere "tr.iun.ity" can be under¬
stood in terms of a much simpler model like the ordered pair,
x - 3> Y - 1 (from the vertical direction it appears to be
three and from the horizontal direction it appears to be one).
Moreover, the relation of complementarity in this instance
would require an extreme essentialism on one hand (the mode
of pure oneness) and complete tritheism on the other (the
, Qr.."rO
mode of pure threeness). In fact, the pure essence of God
(without (distinction of persons) is never known in the econ¬
omic trinity and is generally thought to he a misconception
6
when applied to the immanent trinity, and, conversely, the
individual persons are never known in strict isolation without
7
the coinherence of the others. "Social" or "organic"
models of the Trinity have recently become popular due to
their ability to combine threeness with oneness,** but accord¬
ing to our analysis these models could only account for one
mode of the complementarity relation (i.e the holistic mode
of "oneness") as in the case of social relations among men
9
and the supra-individualistic nature of mind. Moreover,
such models (cf. universals and particulars), though freq¬
uently used by the Fathers, were never taken literally as
they tended to compromise the singleness of God's being in
10
the direction of tritheism. In fact, they seem to do
justice neither to the distinctiveness of the persons nor to
the unity of the essence. However, both of these conditions
are satisfied a fortiori once we apply complementarity to
the relationship between the persons themselves since both
singleness of. being and exclusiven.ess of modes are postulated
from the start. Moreover, as we have seen the Father-Son
and Spirator-Spirit relations embody the same giving rise and
pointing back that one would expect of a complementarity
11
relation. Furthermore, the later Fathers frequently corn-
pared the Father-Son relation to the relation of thought and
~L? \ 1 J
word ~ or of soul (mind) and body.Since complementarity
lk
can be applied effectively zo these latter relations' we may
reasonably expect that, the Father-Son relation will be a
fruitful area of application as well.
Finally, we must distinguish between hierarchical,
linear, and triangular models of the Trinity and deal with
the problem of the fllioque. An hierarchical model would
correspond to a procession of the Spirit from the Father and
the Son equally. Here one would attribute to the gener¬
ation of the Son a certain priority over the procession of
the Spirit and so construct the Father-Son relation first in
the model. Then from the Father-Son dyad as a unit one
would derive the procession of the Spirit within a larger




Reversing this procedure one could start with the essence of
God (the triad) and then distinguish the persons by means of
the traditional relations of opposition; procession would
distinguish the Spirit from the Father and Son (the dyad)
and generation would then distinguish the Son from the
Father, Clearly this model corresponds to the traditional
1£)
Western concept of the Trinity.' The characteristic feat¬
ures are the hypostatizing of the relations themselves and
3 r
hence of the Father-Son dyad which operates like a unit"0and
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the consequent subordination of the Holy Spirit.
A linear model of the Trinity would correspond to
a procession of the Spirit from the Father through the Son
and would treat the Son as a kind of middle term or inter¬
mediate case between the Father and the Spirit: e.g. the
Father gives, the Spirit receives, and the Son both gives and
17
receives like a channel between the dther 'two - Clearly
this model is not susceptible to a complementarist analysis
since either the coexhaustiveness or else the mutual exclus-
iveness of the two poles (Father and Spirit) would be
, 18impairecu
The triangular model corresponds to a procession of
the Spirit from the Father alone and hence maintains complete
10
symmetry and simultaneity ' between the relations of gener¬
ation and procession. Here there are two relations of
complementarity? one between Father and Son and another bet¬
ween Father (Spirator) and Spirit. Complementarity between
Son and Spirit is ruled out by their mutual reciprocity with
the Father: the strict definition of the personal properties
of the Father (fatherhood, unbegottenness) exclude the strict
definition of the conjugate personal properties of the Son
and Spirit (sonship, procession), and, conversely, the absence
of the strict definition of the former requires the strict
definition of both of the latter. Hence the triune God
exists in three modes of subsistence but two of these (Son
and Spirit) are synchronous. A diagram of these relations








Here are two complementarity relations operating in unison
and forming a kind of tetrahedrons! structure which has the
ronal) models can then be interpreted in terras of complem¬
entarity, hence, to first order, complementarity is neutral
with respect to the question of the filioque. When it comes
to relating the doctrine of the Trinity to the immanence and
transcendence of God, however, there is a decided advantage
to the triangular model in that it can easily be mirrored or
inverted to produce the economic trinity whereas the hterar-
21
chical. model cannot. "
However, it would perhaps be unwise to reach a decision on
such a complex issue as the filioque on the basis of such a
formal consideration. Therefore, we shall leave the question
of the filioque entirely open, and, having shown how to
20
more familiar triangular pattern as its base.






relate the Spirit to the Father and Son with or without a
fllioque, we shall concentrate on the Father-Son relation
alone to decide whether complementarity is a suitable categ¬
ory in the first place. Fortunately, the Father-Son relation
is also the most discussed, aspect of the Trinity in the pat¬
ristic literature so there is no lack of data, on which to base
such a decision.
7.3 The Father-Son Relationship:
The purpose of this section is to compare the Father-
Son relation point by point with the complementarity relation
and evaluate the .'Latter as an antidote to some common heresies.,
(l) Unity: For instance, the heresy of tritheism, as we have
already noted, is automatically avoided by the postulate of
unity - Father and Son (and Spirit) are one and the same God.
But there is an apparent difference here, at least in empha¬
sis, between the logic of the Trinity and the logic of comple¬
mentarity. The Fathers generally argue for the unity of
the divine persons on the basis of (a) their common properties
22
(e.g. same nature, power and operation)," (b) their coinher-
enee,^ and (c) their relations of origin (i.e. the monarchy
oLl
of the Father), ' whereas in chapter 2 we accepted unity as
a postulate, independent of the existence of common properties
and then (using the idea of alternation) reasoned to the
idea of "coinherence". Therefore, even apart from the
meaning of these terms (which we shall consider below) there
is the question of their logical relation to the postulate
of unity itself.
(a) In fact, the fallacy of arguing for unity from
the existence of common properties occurred to some of the
Fathers as well, especially after the Council cf Nicea and
the canonizing of the term homoousIon. Sometimes it was
argued that Father and Son are both God in the same sense as
Adam and Eve or Peter and Paul are both ,:manu« However,
the limitations of this reasoning were also appreciated and
the unity of Father and Son was recognized as a presuppos¬
ition. rather than a conclusion of the existence of common
23
properties. As John of Damascus puts it, men do not dwell
within each other as Father and Son do, so their properties
are only similar whereas those of Father and Son are actually
on
identical. (b) This brings us to the argument for unity
from coinherence or interpenetration usually based on an in¬
terpretation of John I'+^ff. The point to recognize here is
that the first Christians had a long tradition of experience
with God (the Father) behind them so that when confronted
with the person of Christ they had first to recognize the
presence of divinity in the Son (coinherence) and then to
infer the unity of Father and Son. In atomic physic,s the
situation was quite the reverse: the particle-mode of matter
was known first and. the wave-mode was postulated for theor¬
etical reasons, even before wave-phenomena were actually
23
observed. ~ Hence the unity (in some sense) of wave and
particle was a foregone conclusion, and the idea of coiriher-
29
ence was largely an inference from this. Hence this
difference in emphasis between complementarity and the doct¬
rine of the Trinity simply reflects the different historical
developments of the two concepts and does not affect their
intrinsic logic.^ (c) The third argument for the unity of
2/-;-
Father and Son is based on the monarchy of the Father, that
is, the derivation of the Son from the Father by generation.
However, like the argument from common properties, this
tended to lead to tritheism (or else subordinationism) since
11
a father and his son are in general two distinct beings.
We may conclude, therefore, that the unity of persons (or
modes of being) in the Trinity is logically a. postulate in
theology as it is in physics; it is closely related to the
idea of coinherence yet the two are not strictly equivalent.
(2) Common Properties: The doctrine of the Trinity
is unique in theology in that the extent of the properties
common to the individual modes is maximal: all of the attri-
12
butes of deity, the complete substance of deity, and all
of the opera ad extra are said to be shared by Father and
Son. In short, all properties except for the relations of
origin (opera ad intra) are held in common*^ In the ter¬
minology of complementarity, all properties are common except
for those that are conjugate to each other (e.g. fatherhood
and sonship, see below). Regardless of the degree of
symmetry or asymmetry between the modes the general form is
still the same.
It is also said of the Trinity, however, that "those
/common/ properties which are in the Father are the source
lb.
of those wherewith the Son is endowed".^ This point is
quite distinct from that of the monarchy of tne Father because
it pertains to the nature of the persons (which is common)
rather than the persons themselves (which are distinct).
As we shall see when we come to our discussion of Christology
(chapter 10) it is analogous (within the format of complement
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tarity at least) to the doctrine of the enhypostasia.J
However, no analogous point has yet been recognized in the
logic of complementarity. The equivalent would be to say
that the coramon properties of two modes have their source in
the prior mode (e.g. particle) and exist in the emergent mode
only derivatively. In atomic physics, in fact, the proper¬
ties of rest mass, charge and spin are regarded in the first
instance as particle properties and are attributed to waves
only because they are not subject to commutation rules.
Hence, our understanding of complementarity may be enriched
by the insights of theology as it is applied to various
doctrines.
(3) Individual Gomjoletenesa: As the condition of
individual completeness distinguishes complementarity from
modality or orthogonality-* so it guards the doctrine of the
Trinity against modalism and Sabellianism. In both cases
the entity in question is fully present in each of its modes
and does not merely offer one aspect or dimension to our
37
view. In contrast, Simon Magus taught that Father and
•3 O
Son were merely successive roles that God assumed, and Sab-
ellius held that they were merely Wo names for the same
19
person. Recently, the importance of this completeness or
"radical self-manifestation" in the persons of the Trinity
1+0 l+l
has been reemphasized by Karl Barth and Karl Rahner.
(b) Coexhaustlveness; The modes of Father snd Son
(and Spirit) completely exhaust not only our knowledge of
God, but the being of God as He is' in Himself. This means
that there is no "essence" prior to or outside of the persons
.1+0
(i.e. no "quaternity") and that the Father-Son relation is
exhausted by the persons of the Father and Son (i.e. there
% L|.q
is no "grandfather" or "grandson"). Hence the Son com-
pletes or "complements" the Father as Hilary says.
However, the doctrine of the Trinity is even stronger at
this point - there is one and only one Son, not a whole group
of Sons as there are particles in an atom or atoms in an
I4.5
organism. x Is this purely coincidental? Definitely not,!
Since Father and Son are modes of God and uniqueness is one
of God's attributes, both Father and Son must be unique just
as both the mind and the body of man must be "human". More¬
over, it may be possible to view this absolute uniqueness as
the limit or extrapolation of the emergent uniqueness and
individuality we noted earlier with regards to living organ~
Llx
isms and men in particular. This point will be taken up
again when we discuss the subject of Christology in chapter
10.
(5) Equal Necessity; The point here is not merely
that Father and Son are equal in honor and divinity (a point
.Lj.y
frequently made by the Fathers) but that neither one can
be eliminated or reduced to a limiting ease of the other.
Both are necessary for an understanding of God. The Fathers
come closest to expressing this point by pointing to the very
names, "Father" and "Son"; there cannot be one without the
other hence neither one can be excluded in favor of the other
|,Q
as if they were equivalent names for the same thing.
(6) Alternation: In the logic of complementarity
an entity evolves by alternation between its two modes.
The question we must ask here is whether the generation of
the Son (or procession of the Spirit) can bo understood in
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terms of such an "alternation". In the patristic literature
the doctrine of the Trinity is frequently expressed in essen-
LlO
tially dynamic terms. However, the idea of a merely
temporal alternation of an eternal being is explicitly ruled
to
out as Sabellian." Therefore, the dynamic of the Trinity
51
is said not to be temporal but supra-temporal: it is a
52 51
matter of a causal sequence^ or logical ordering J which is
5k
timeless and eternal. The problem, of course, is that our
language is permeated with temporal concepts: even when we
discuss logical relations we inevitably use temporal termin¬
ology (e.g. "it follows that..."). Therefore, it must be
recognized that such language is used analogically, that is,
we recognize that there is a realm which transcends time and
yet embodies relations that are formally analogous to our
familiar temporal relations. There is, of course, a prob¬
lem here as- to the very nature of time which goes far beyond
the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that the postu¬
late of supra-temporal relations is allied with the philos¬
ophical view that time is essentially a kind of ordering and
that the notion of ordering or sequence is prior to that of
56 57
time both logically and psychologically. So our conclu¬
sion is not that the generation of the Son is like the
collapse of a wave into a particle, but that the generation
of the Son stands in the same relation to the eternal consub-
stantial union as the wave-particle alternation does in
relation to the temporal evolution of atomic objects. The
analogy between the various features of the doctrine of the
Trinity and the eleven points of complementarity is one of
proportionality and not one of direct proportion.
r\ r^Q255
Aside from the problem of the status of supra-
temporal relations there is the question of the propriety
of the particular relation suggested by the term "alter¬
nation". In the sense in which this term was used in our
discussion of complementarity it would imply that the per¬
sonal properties of the Father (fatherhood, unbegcttenness)
are "alternately" (in the supra-temporal sense) explicit
(well-defined) and implicit (ill-defined) as the intra-
58
trinitarian life "proceeds". Conversely, the personal
properties of the Son are "alternately" implicit and explicit.
Moreover, there should be some real "development" or "evol¬
ution11 of the Godhead as this alternation proceeds. Indeed,
the generation of the Son would represent just such a devel¬
opment, and it would presumably be accompanied by a progress¬
ive definition of the characteristic properties of "sonship".
But is it accompanied by a reciprocal diffusing of the char¬
acteristic properties of "fatherhood"? If not, then we must
have either two Gods or else a contradiction of terms; accor¬
ding to the logic of complementarity. Moreover, does; the
Son "regenerate"1 the Father so as to complete the cycle as
suggested by the term "alternation"? Certainly the Fathers
forbid xis to think in terms of a reciprocal decanting and
filling up as in the case of empty vessels as if the Father
59
and Son were not individually full and perfect, but this
condition is adequately met by our insistence on the indivi¬
dual completeness of the modes which holds whenever the
conditions necessary for the definition of their respective
properties are satisfied. Moreover, the concept of perich-
oresis popularized by the later Fathers embodies the notion
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of reciprocation or revolution or alternation as well as
coinherence or interpenetration (choreo = 'to go' as well as
'to contain') although it is never explicitly used in this
/ o
sense in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. So the
alternation of generation and "regeneration" is a distinct
possibility. However, it is also possible that the order¬
ing of "ecernxty" is not an. endless sequence as we imagine
our time to be. We cannot place any a priori restrictions
on this ordering at all, and it may be as simple (and as
profound) as the sequence, one-two. In other words, there
could conceivably be just two moments in the supra-temporal
ordering of eternity, one corresponding to the Father and the
other to the Son (and the Spirit?). In this connection it
is worth noting that Brouwer- regarded the intuition of "bare
two-oneness" to be the foundation of all mathematics.
Rather than interpret the generation of the Son as a recurring
alternation like those with which we are familiar in time,
it might be possible to use the more familiar notion of the
generation as an irreversible once-for-all "event" to define
the character of the supra-temporal ordering itself. Ob¬
viously, we can do no more than raise these possibilities here,
but one of the main reasons for using a concept like comple¬
mentarity is simply to suggest new ideas like this one.
(7) Coinherence? Closely associated with the idea
1
of alternation In the logic of complementarity is the "coin¬
herence" of the two modes; i.e. each mode exists as a
potentiality ~ within the other. Applied to the generation
of the Son by the Father this would mean that the Son first
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exists as a "potentiality" within the Father and then the
Father exists as a potentiality within the Son he has gener¬
ated. hence the "interpenetration" and "Interparticipation"
of the two modes. Aside from the problem, of using temporal
language analogically, which we have already noted, this
notion is very similar to the idea of coinherence used by the
Fathers. For instance, the generation of the Son is said to
be due to the nature of the Father rather than his will.^
Hence the Son must be present even in the primordial nature
of the Father, and since this nature is anterior (logically,
not temporally) to the generation of the Son, the Son may be
said to exist as a potentiality within the Father even prior
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to his own generation. Conversely, the Father is in the
Son as the sun is in its radiance or the fountain is in its
stream," 7 i.e. by virtue of the generation (and the possibil¬
ity of "regeneration"?). Hence, Father and Son are said to
envelop and contain each other,^ so that the two are inter-
wreathed and mutually permeative - not like' two physical
objects (say the roots of two trees) but like a man and his
portrait^ or an object and its mirror image.^ In short,
when one mode is present the other inheres within it, and
when one does something (ad intra as well as ad extra) the
other participates in that action. As wTe have seen the same
69
might be said of the wave and particle modes of an electron.
The fact that the Father is present in the Son as
a potentiality rather than an actuality (as say an actor in
a disguise) guards the concept of coinherence-against the
70
error of Patripassianism. The Father may .be said to par¬
ticipate in the suffering and death of his Son, but he is not
the actual subject of that suffering.
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(8/9) Mutual Kxclusiveness and Reciprocityt In con™
ni
trast to the Sabellian identification of Father and Son''
the Fathers saw that the two persons could not be equated
7?
since they are diametrically opposed .like day and night.
The very names Father and Son indicate this for noone can be
his own father or his own son. Nor can the two be reduced
to a common denominator like matter and energy or (to some
extent) sp.ace and time. In complementarist language, the
two are mutually exclusive in thought, experience and reality.
Accompanying this exclusiveness is a reciprocity or oppos™
71
ition between their personal properties. ^ As Basil says,
these properties (unbegottenness and begottenness) cannot
7^
possibly coexist in the same subject. Hence, in contrast
75
to the common properties, they are incommunicable. In
the language of complementarity we would say that only one
of a pair of conjugate properties can be explicitly defined
in a given instance (e.g. begottenness in the Son); the
other may be present by virtue of the coinheren.ee, but only
implicitly.
(10/11) Emergence and Pointing: Again t,he idea of
emergence could be inferred simply from the use of the names
Father and Son. While there is no actual subordination of
the Son, it is recognized that the Son owes his being to the
Father and hence the Father is "greater" than the Son (John
76lh.28). Further, the Son acknowledges his source and
77
points back to it like a faithful image or portrait. As
Irenaeus puts it, the Father is the invisible of the Son and
7 8
the Son is the visible of the Father. The point to stress
here is that this "pointing" relation is not limited to hist-
79
orical revelation; it is "from the beginning of time"' and.
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founded upon the eternal generation of the Son.
Evaluation of the Comparison:
In favor of the use of complementarity as a model
for the Trinity we could cite (a) the clear specification of
alternate models with or without a fllloque, (b) the compre¬
hensive coverage c? the logic of the Father-Son relation,
(c) the built-in safeguards against tritheism, rnodalisni and
subordinaticnism, and (d) the fruitfulness of the model in
providing new insights into an ancient topic (e.g. the logi¬
cal relation of unity, common properties and coinherence or
the possible nature of supra-temporal ordering suggested by
the idea of alternation). Conversely, the logic of the
Trinity has contributed something to our understanding of
complementarity, namely the location of the source of all
common properties in the ontologically prior mode. However,
there is still considerable uncertainty as to the propriety
of a concept like alternation and also as to the strict equi¬
valence of the theological and complementarist notions of
coinherence. Moreover, the application of complementarity
is limited to those models of the Trinity that relate the
three persons in dyadic pairs (Father-Son, Spirator-Spir.lt).
If a linear model (Father-Son-Spirit) is preferred, then com¬
plementarity will not work at all. The fact that the
assumption of dyadic pairs has allowed us to treat the Father-
Son relation without any reference to the Holy Spirit under¬
scores the artificiality of this approach. The most that can
be said is that complementarity provides a possible model of
the interpersonal relations of the Trinity and that this model
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has some very attractive features♦ This attractiveness
would be greatly enhanced i-f the same basic format could be
used in a variety of other theological topics for then not
only would the many parallels stand out but the distinctive
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Chapter 8
C-od and the World; Transcendence and Immanence
"In this vise does God, from within and from with¬
out, control and correspond to the universe; being
infinite He is present in ail things, in Him Who
is infinite all are included." Hilary, On the
Trinity 1.6 (p J+l).
8.1 Introduction;
The relation between God and the world is one of the
most complex subjects in all theology, and, in contrast to
the doctrine of the Trinity, there is no general agreement
as to its precise nature, or even its epistemological status.
Is this relation to be viewed as; an analogy of being,"®" or an
2
analogy of operations? Or are both of these notions essen-
tial? Moreover, is it proper to treat this relation
independently of or prior to Christology? Does Christology
depend upon the doctrine of creation for its theological
a
formulation, or does creation itself presuppose Christology?^
Or is the relation between the two a circular one?^
These issues must be considered in. due course, but
they are not crucial at the outset. The fact that there is
7
an analogy between creator and creature and the general
structure of this analogy are the relevant points. In a
later chapter we shall inquire whether the structure of
O
Christology is similar to that of the analogy at hand, but
the question of dependence is really a matter of the ordo
decreti and here we are concerned primarily with the relation¬
ship between orders (e.g. the ordo decreti and the ordo
2?0
salutis). Our approach is admittedly structural and "syn¬
chronic'" and is not suited for the analysis of the "diach-
9
ronic" dimension itself.
Our task, then, is immensely simplifieds we have
just two terms, God and the world, and we want to discuss
the relation between them.. Moreover, the plausibility of
a complementarist relation gains immediate support from the
long-standing tradition of analogies with the mind-body prob¬
lem.^ However, whereas in the case of the Trinity we could
appeal to a large body of material for verification in view
of the underlying unity of understanding controlled by creeds
and confessions, here we must be more cautious. Terms like
'transcendence'and 'freedom' have vastly different meanings
for different writers and correlations between them are often
misleading. Therefore, it is advisable to work with a
single author even though this will make it more difficult
to achieve comprehensiveness. Fortunately, we have an
extremely thorough treatment of the doctrine of providence
in Earth's Dogmatics III.3, and we can use this material as
the basis of our investigation.
It is significant, however, that Earth avoids using
the mind-body analogy In his discussion of providence.
Whereas the relation between mind and body is largely revers¬
ible (in complementarist terminology the two alternate and
interpenetrate in spite of the ontological dependence of one
1
on the other), that between God and the world is not. God
is immanent in all occurrence, but all occurrence is not
immanent in God. God "concurs" with the creature, but
the creature does not "concur" with God."^ In traditional
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terras God is "transcendent" as well as immanent, not just in
a relative way, as mind "transcends" body (emergence and
\ p
pointing), but absolutely in the sense that God has his
own (necessary) existence quite separate from and unrelated
to creation as well as a relative and contingent existence
which, in itself may function as a "mind" to the "body" of
. ] 1+
creation (toturn inker omnia et toturn extra). " In short,
we have two relations to consider, not just one. There is
the obvious relation between (the immanent) God and the
world and also the more abstract relation between the two
15
modes of God, transcendent and immanent, or absolute and
16 2.7
relative, or essence (ousla) and energies (dunamels),
In order to avoid the implication that the God-world relation
is reversible or purely symmetrical we shall treat the tran¬
scendence-immanence relation first, and since Barth has very
1 ^
little to say on this subject we need to supplement his
thinking with the work of another writer. The best treat¬
ment I have found is that of Vladimir Lossky in The Mystical
19
Theology of the Eastern Church' whichiis based on the
thought of St. Gregory Palamas. In view of the current
Western tendency to equate the generation of the Son with
God's movement towards creation (logos prophorikos)., it is
not surprising that we are forced to turn to the Eastern
tradition to find an adequate treatment of the transcendence
20(essence) and immanence (energies) of God.4"
To restate the matter; if there were only two terms
(or modes) to consider, it would be impossible to avoid the
reversibility or symmetry between God and the world which
Barth warned against, whereas in a three-term model the res-
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trictlon against reversibility is incorporated into the onto-
logical structure of the God-world relation. However, we
must rule out the idea of a demiurge or intermediary between
God and the world so two of the terms (transcendence and
immanence or essence and energies) must belong to God himself.
This, in turn, requires a "natural procession" within the
being of God which is distinct from and orthogonal to the "per¬
sonal processions" of generation and spiration. Hence, while
their theological traditions are worlds apart, Barth and
Lossky supplement each other quite nicely in this regard.
In the next two sections we shall discuss the two rel¬
ations among the three terms separately, and in the final
section we shall look at the connection between them.
8.2 Lossky's Concept of the "Uncreated Energies":
Lossky's treatment of the "uncreated energies" is highly
condensed, and the main points are found in a few concise
statements like the following:
God is thus at the same time totally inaccessible
and really communicable to created beings; neither
of the terms of this antinomy /pan be/ excluded or
minimized in any way. (p.68),
Wholly unknowable in His essence, God wholly reveals
Himself in His energies, which yet in no way divide
His nature into two parts - knowable and unknowable -
but signify two different modes of the divine exist¬
ence. (p.86).
In these two passages alone one can find most of the charac¬
teristic points of complementarity: the single divine being
and undivided (common) nature, the individual completeness
("totally inaccessible", "really communicable"), coexhaust-
iveness ("two"-ness), and equal importance of the modes
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("neither...excluded or minimized in any way"), their mutual
excTusiveness ("antinomy") and reciprocity ("inaccessible.,.
communicable"), emergence ("in the essence and outside of
21
the essence"), " and pointing ("God wholly reveals himself
in His energies"). In fact, Lossky's basic dialectic of
knowable and (known as) unku.ovia.ble or analyzable and unanal¬
ysable is virtually identical to the complementarity of
specifiable and tacit knowledge or of analysis and applic-
2?
ation.
We are left then with the problems of alternation
and coinherence. Note that Lossky speaks of the energies
of God as a "natural procession", a "processio ad extra", an
23"eternal manifestation", and a "natural outpouring".
From these verbal images we may conclude that the relation
between essence and energies is thoroughly dynamic, albeit
supra-temporal. Hence, we are confronted with the same
issues' that emerged in our treatment of the doctrine of the
Trinity. Can the interplay between essence and energies be
understood as an ongoing sequence like that between wave and
particle, or is the apparent "one-twoness" of the procession
ad extra to be taken as definitive in our understanding of
this supra-temporal ordering? In either case, the natural
procession ad extra, must be allotted a dimension of its very
own; it must not be confused with the personal processions
ad intra. Both are supra-temporal; both may even be des¬
cribed as "eternal", but they constitute two different
orders of eternity; One is directed towards creation in a
kind of tandem relation (transcendence-immanence-world) while
2b
the other is entirely transverse.
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However, there is an important difference here
between Lossky5s conception of essence and energies and the
logic of complementarity. In complementarity the single
entity (God) evolves by an. alternation of modes. This means
that the "events" of this supra-temporal ordering, i.e. the
eternal decrees, must involve both, essence and energies,
both transcendence and immanence, whereas Lossky wishes' to
restrict the decrees to the energies so as to preserve the
pd
"absolute repose" of the essence. In other words, for
Lossky, essence is static and energies are dynamic, so the
decrees must be confined to the energies, whereas in comple¬
mentarity the two are dynamically related so that no such
restriction is required. If we accept the complementarity
model here, we can say that the supra-temporal ordering of
"the processio ad extra is correlated with the or do deeretl.
provided, of course, that we assume the decrees to be eternal
and not just a temporal "concurrence". Then the procession
ad extra is not just "once-for-all" but a sequence of pro¬
cessions which continues as long as necessary to produce the
total number of decrees-, whatever that might be.' The
relation between this order of eternity and time, or between
the ordo decreti and the ordo salutis. will be discussed in
section •+ below.
Coinherence of essence and energies is nowhere ex¬
plicitly stated by Lossky, but it is readily inferred from
his use of such expressions as "the being and action of God",
and his reference to the energies as the "rays of His divin¬
ity", or the "expansive energy proper to God", cr even the
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"glory of God". The essence inheres in the energies as
being in action, or the sun in its rays, and vice versa.
So it seems that a doctrine ol" ccinherence could be developed
for the natural procession along lines very similar to those
of the personal processions themselves♦ Moreover, the
image of "being and action" is comparable to that of poten¬
tiality and actuality which we used in our discussion of
07
eoinherence in atomic physics. ' In both cases, one mode is
contrasted to the other and yet present as a potentiality
within the other. The difference is that in atomic physics
either mode can be actual while the other is potential
whereas the polarity of being and action (for Lossky) is not
reversible in this sense. Of course, this "irreversibility"
is simply a result of the apparent "one-twoness" or "once-
for-allness" of the natural procession and can be corrected
once the notion of "absolute repose" is reinterpreted. So
one can argue for a correlation with complementarity without
too much difficulty even though the evidence is extremely
thin, to say the least.
8.3 Barth's Doctrine of Providence;
Barth's style is far more expansive than Lossky's
so we must treat him topically in spite of the greater tedium
this involves. Virtually all of the distinctive points of
complementarity can be documented from his Dogmatics III.3,
but the principal area of difficulty turns out to be the
first point, the nature of the unity between God and the world.
(1) There is no doubt in Barth's mind that such
unity or solidarity exists; it is for him a primary expression
28
of God's love and grace. Nor is there anything especially
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problematic about the fact that God freely accepts this soli¬
darity ~ it is not imposed on him from within or without -
for while the world is distinct from God and so may Id© chosen
or rejected by him, it is in no way independent and would
cease to exist i-f it were ultimately rejected. Hence there
is an ontological dependence upwards here just as within the
created sphere itself there is an ontological dependence
29
downwards. The only difference is that we may attribute
free volition to God, but not to atoms.
The problem arises with respect to the character of
this union. For Barth it is purely a unity of action, not
one of being; the activity of God and that of the creature
10
are one single action.- From the perspective of complemen¬
tarity, Barth1s apparent denial of any unity of being raises
a difficult question; does the emphasis on action, as opposed
to being, imply that God's solidarity with creation is only
dynamical and not ontological? If this were the case, then
complementarity would not be an appropriate category for the
relation of God and the world for it could not be said that
(the energies of) God and the world are complementary modes
of one and the same (temporal) being. However, there are
several factors that prevent us from reaching this negative
conclusion:
(a) In Dogmatics II.I Barth stresses the full pres¬
ence of God's being in his revelational (i.e. covenant)
11
activity, in general, and in the Incarnation, in particular.
(b) In Dogmatics III.l Barth maintains that the covenant is
the internal form of creation and, conversely, that creation
12
is the external form of the covenant. One is compelled
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to conclude that God is fully present in his providential
as well as in his revelational activity, and, therefore,
that his solidarity with creation is ontological and not just
dynami'cal or operational. J Otherwise, one would be forced
to say that God's presence in Christ is only dynamical, as
well. (c) On the other hand, Barth's distinction between
act and being may be related to Athanasius's distinction
between the eternal essence of God, from which the Son is gen¬
erated, and the dynamic energies of God, by which the world
lh
is created. If this is the case, then Barth's denial of
a unity of being between God and the world means that the
world is created ex nihilo by God's immanent energies and is
not eternally generated from God's essence as the Son is.
But the distinction between essence and energies is itself
15
an ontologieal one so the solidarity between God and the
world must also be ontological; that is, it pertains to (tem¬
poral) being as well as to activity.^
It should be stressed that this solidarity of being
is meaningful only within the context of creation and provi¬
dence and that it only pertains to the immanent 'energies'
of God, not to his transcendent 'essence1. God (i.e. the
energies of God) and the world are one, but God (essence and
energies) is also one by himself, so there are ultimately
two realities, one temporal and one eternal, and the energies
of God participate in them both.
(2) Barth cites three properties or qualities of
being that are common to both creator and creature: glory,
17
wisdom or reason, and power. The creature does not poss¬
ess these in itself, however, but only insofar as it
participates in the glory, wisdom and power of (the immanent)
God.-^ As the (common) properties which are in the Father
are the source of those with which the Son is endowed, so
the (common) properties which are in the immanent Godhead
•30
are the source of those with which creation is endowed.
(3) Barth clearly indicates the individual complete¬
ness of God and the worlds the events of history are caused
wholly by the creator and wholly by the creature, not just
1+0
partly by one and partly by the other. Hence, there are
Lpi
no gaps in God's providence, no limit to his sovereignty,
and yet everything is left for the nature, activity, freedom
1+2
and responsibility of creation. This means that creator
and creature do not share freedom and responsibility as if
it were divided up between them, but it also means that the
two are not merely orthogonal dimensions of some higher-
1+0
order complex. God is not the fourth or fifth dimension
of the world'. Nor is he a four or five dimensional being
1+1+
who includes our space and time as a kind of subspace.
0+/5) In the operation of providence, itself, there
are two and only two terms. The existence of creation com¬
plements the immanence of God as partner, servant, instrument,
»+5
theatre and mirror. This means that there can be no third
term between the immanent God and the world, on one hand, and
also that both of these terms are equally necessary and
equally important within the context of time and history.
Hence, the sovereignty of God does not render the activity
of the creature superfluous. " The world is not absorbed
1+7
or assimilated into the Godhead as in pantheism, for while
it is completely dependent on the operation of God's grace
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1+8
it is also the conditio, sine .qua non of that same operation.
(6) In general terms, the idea of an alternation
or dialectic between creator and creature is embodied in the
classical scheme praecurr11-concurr11-succurrj.t which Barth
follows in ch.U-9.2. The basic point is that the activity
l+Q
of God is always prior to that of the creature, but this
priority may bo taken in two different senses. First there
is: a -priority of order which is eternal and terminates on
creation as a whole, and then there is also a priority in
time which is continual and terminates on each event Individ-
ually. In the following section we shall discuss the
first of these priorities in relation to the problem of time
and eternity, but here we are concerned with the God-world
relation in time. Barth discusses this priority at some
length in connection with the problem of causality. Here
the divine accompanying implies that the created order of
cause and effect can never become a closed system in itself
since it is open to the divine activity at every point in its
51
history. At every point God gives it form, even in the
5?
slightest movement of a leaf in the wind. Hence God plays
the role of a middleman between cause and effect or between
effort and result. Our efforts are naturally directed
toward particular goals, but it is always God who arranges
5l
the results, not just fate or chance or natural law.
For the man who knows God as Father this is a great source
of assurance and hope; it also entails the imperative that
he keep his eye fixed on God rather than just the goal itself.
We may conclude, therefore, that time and history
progress by a continual alternation or dialectic between God
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and the world. From a theological viewpoint, in fact,
it is precisely this alternation that produces history, that
makes time flow. Time .is the continual interplay between
creator and creature. Hence there is an absolute order and
directivity to events even though the existence of such
order and direction may not be apparent from an examination
of the creature itself, especially on the microscopic level.
In other words, the irreversibility of modal processes, which
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is only statistical at the atomic level and relatively
reliable at the organismic and human levels, is absolute bet¬
ween God and the world as a whole. God does not repent or
change his mind like a man, and the unidirectionality of time
which we experience bears witness to the fact. In a sense
this feature of time, this puzzle of both physics and philos¬
ophy, can be taken as a sign of God's covenant faithfulness
to his creation and to man in particular (Genesis 6 and 9).
(7) The coinherence of God and the world Is under¬
stood from the fact that the presence, activity and glory of
56
the creator exist in, with and under those of the creature,
and the creature in turn participates and cooperates in the
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existence, action, glory and power of the creator. The
two are not just parallel to each other but positively inter -
connected and coordinated.' Of course, there is an
asymmetry here as well dtie to the fact that God transcends
creation with his "essence" at the same time that he inter¬
penetrates it with his "energies". The coinherence is
complete only from the perspective of God's immanence, and
the inherence of creation as a potentiality within God must
be understood in this context. The world does not inhere
in God's essence since it is a product of his will - a
creation - not a product of his nature as the Son is of the
en
Father. The same must be said with regard to the inher-
ence of God as a potentiality ^ within his creation! We may
take this to refer to the immanent glory, wisdom and power
of God, but not to his transcendent essence. Again, there
is a parallel here between creation and covenants creation
is summed up in man, man in Israel, and Israel in Mary.
How then can Mary be theotokos if creation itself is not also
the bearer of God's presence?
(8/9) The mutual exclusiveness and reciprocity of
God and the world are relatively straightforward. God is
not a creature, and the creature is not Godi^' Nor is there
any common denominator between the two; they are absolutely
antithetical and utterly unlike, ^ each belonging to a dist-
met order of its own J and having its own peculiar proper-
61*
ties. One is causa pure cansans and causa, divina or
creatrix, while the other is causa causata et cansans and
69
caixs a 11on divina or creata. One is self-existent while
the other is totally dependent,^ and so forth. In the ter¬
minology of complementarity, these are all conjugate proper¬
ties and their definitions must be reciprocal, that is, the
better defined one is, the J.ess well-defined the other, so
that they may coexist in the single being of (immanent) God-
and-the-world without contradiction. As the divine and
creaturely modes alternate between actuality and potential¬
ity, their characteristic properties alternate between being
explicit and implicit, and so the course of events develops.
The difficulty here concerns the question of correl¬
ation between the states of alternate modes. We have
observed that the degree of correlation, increases from the
level of atoms (wave and particle) to the level of man (mind
and body) along with the degree of individuality and irrev¬
ersibility. 3 ^ At the supreme level of providence it would
seem that the correlation is absolute and complete like the
others. God withdraws his spirit and the creature perishes;
he returns with his spirit and the creature revives (Psalm
10h.29f). However, the character of God's providential act¬
ivity will naturally vary from one level of creation to
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another, due to the gradual emergence of normative behavior
at the higher levels. At lower levels which lack any real
correlation, God's control may be rather mechanical as
69
Hodgson has suggested? at each point of time the laws of
nature specify a certain range of possible occurrences and
70
God selects among these. At the human level, however,
the element of propriety is quite strong to begin with, so
God's providence will naturally take the form of guidance
and grace. Of course, we must resist the tendency to reduce
these distinctly human qualities to the procrustean bed of
mechanical categories.
(10/11) Finally we must recognize that there is a
definite asymmetry between creator and creature even within
the limited context of time. Even in his immanence God is
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not just a companion but the Lord of creation. His order
or level of existence is the superior one; that of creation
70
is subordinate. ' At the same time the world is the mirror
and likeness of his glory and a witness to his wisdom and
7°
reason. Hence the "emergence" of divinity is accompanied
by a "pointing" relation from creature to creator.
8ok- Time and Eternity:
At this stage the two halves of this thesis, the
approaches of science and theology, have come into contact,
and the basic outline of a complementarist worldview is
nearing completion. From the si.de of science we have built
up a hierarchy to the level of man, and from the side of
theology we have worked our way downward from God to creation.
At each stage we have been faced with the problem of the
natiire of time or of the supra-temporal ordering involved,
and certain conditions have emerged which must be fulfilled
if the complementarist view is to be made viable. It would
not be putting the matter too strongly to state that comple¬
mentarity stands or falls with the peculiar view of time and
eternity which it entails. Hence, our findings on this
matter should be summarized and restated under a heading of
their own.
We have shown that reality is hierarchically struc¬
tured, that is, it has; many different levels or domains, and
these are connected in various ways: some are transverse
mid folded into each other (e.g. Father-Son and transcendence-
immanence), some are related in tandem (transcendence-imm¬
anence and immanent creator-creature), and some are nested
within higher domains (e.g. atom-organism within body-mind).
Each of these domains involves two distinct modes, and the
domain in question evolves by an alternation between these
modes. Hence there is a sequence of' mode-events, and this
sequence defines a distinct ordering. There are as many
kinds of ordering as there are domains, but due to the various
connections between these domains the orderings may be
28m-
divided into three groups; First, there are the eternal
orders of Father-Son and Spirator-Spirit, which may be
nested (with fllioque) or else synchronized (without filio-
. ulj.
que). ■ Secondly, there is the or do decreti which is also
eternal in the sense of being supra-temporal, but not
eternal in the same sense as the ordo trlnitatis. Finally,
there is a large group of temporal orderings which are
nested within each other in a hierarchy presided over by the
God-world relation of providence * This latter group con¬
stitutes time and history as we know it. Its ordering must
be related, to the ordo decreti, but the two are not necess¬
arily the same. For instance, the decree of creation may
be a single supra-temporal act connected via providence to
7C>
a long series of historical events. x Furthermore, the
decree of election or salvation may precede that of creation,
as the supralapsarians held, in spite of the fact that the
historical fulfillment of these decrees generally occurs in
the reverse order with respect to a given individual.
Hence we cannot say that time and eternity (in this sense)
are exactly parallel, but, on the other hand, they are not
strictly orthogonal either since there is a positive rel¬
ation between them. Both are irreversible and have the same
directionality in spite of the fact that their orderings are
not identical.
From this particular perspective the complementarity
principle becomes quite plausible, indeed, almost to the
point of appearing trivial. The intuitive content of the
principle, i.e. the contrast of analysis and application,
has been a common theme in the history of philosophy.
Moreover, many of the distinctive features, like unity,
individual completeness, mutual exclusiveness, and emergence,
could have been written down a priori simply from a careful
consideration of the conditions that must be fulfilled in
any satisfactory treatment of issues like the relation of
mind and body or of God and the world. Other features,like
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alternation, coinhorence, and reciprocity, could almost
be guessed at in an attempt to work out a solution which is
consistent as well as comprehensive. Finally, although
some of these points seem to r\m counter to our common sense
view of time and continuity, they appear quite natural within
a broader framework which defines time in terms of alter¬
nation rather than the other way around.
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For the angels are part of the universe, in
the sense that they do not constitute a uni¬
verse on their own, but are combined with the
physical creation to form one total world.
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae la.61*3 (Vol.9,
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What exists and takes place in our sphere exists
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9.1 Time, History and Iheophany:
The outline of a complementarist worldview has
nearly reached completion with the doctrine of providence,
but not quite. This may be seen from a consideration of
cosmology: God created the heavens and the earth, hence
the domain of man is not the whole of creation and the possi¬
bility of higher created levels must be considered. But we
have also reached the point (in our imaginary descent from
God) where cosmology folds out into history, and creation
leads to covenant and its fulfilment in Christ. V/e cannot
proceed from providence to Christology without considering
the intervening history, the long period of preparation with
its many revelations and redemptions (both with a small 'r').
There are always the twin dangers of placing too much
emphasis on the subject of theophany and then absorbing the
incarnation into it as a special case, and going to the
opposite extreme and treating the incarnation as being so
utterly unique that all continuity vanishes. We have a
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very simple model for this relation in the correspondence
principle: theophany and incarnation are related by the
logic of analogy involving both correspondence and incommen¬
surability."'" That is, the concepts used in describing the
incarnation (e.g. Son, Lord, Savior) are taken over from the
Old Testament background and cannot be understood properly
apart from that background, yet they are so transformed by
their new application that they take on radically new dimen¬
sions of meaning. Their connection is analogical and they
cannot be reduced upward to Christology or (any longer)
downward to mere theophany. The best policy for us is to
treat the topic of theophany separately (rernoto Chris to),
if only briefly, and because we have begun with the side of
creation and providence we should treat theophany next in
order so as to maintain the relative continuity of historical
ordering.
In fact, history, as distinct from mere time, is
very much bound up with the occurrence of theophany. The
activity of God in providence gua.ran.tees an irreversibility
of cosmic evolution (there may be cycles but not repetition
or recurrence in the strict sense) including the evolution
of man. But evolution is not history. In evolution a past
may he "preserved" in some kind of fossil record, but this
past has no direct influence on the present. In fact, there
is no past; there is only the present existence of a fossil
record which is also subject to decomposition and evolution.
Hence the present "swallows up" the past. Then there is no
real present either'. There is only a succession of moments
with an absolute order, a "B-series" of before and after,
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but no "A-series" of past, present and future. There is
no transience to time because all moments stand on an equal
footing and there is no evolving past, no history, only a
succession of events without any cumulative effect.
The appearance of man alone does not greatly alter
the situation. Men are born and die just as stars do.
The fact that man. has evolved on this planet does make the
birth of our solar system unique and so distinguishes that
prehistoric event from a mere moment of time, but only
because we attach lasting significance to the emergence of
man, itself. After all, there may well be intelligent life
elsewhere in the universe and the mere fact of evolution
does not. guarantee the lasting significance of even the
human experiment,.. Quite the reverse! From the standpoint
of modern science, man's days are numbered, indeed! Beyond
the obvious threat of self-annihilation there is an unending
succession of ever greater catastrophes awaiting us: geo¬
magnetic reversals, the death of the sun, to say nothing of
the chance encounter with black holes or anti-matter, and
ultimately the death of our universe, whether a slow "heat
death" through unending expansion or a return to the state
of the "primeval fireball". Therefore, the emergence of
man is neither unique nor irreversible per se. And if man
comes to naught there is no real significance to his evol¬
ution, or the events that led up to it, and hence no history.
All that general providence ensures is that time goes on,
so that the death of the universe is different from its
birth. Providence guarantees order and direction but not
lasting significance.
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Nor does the fact that man keeps historical records
and remembers the past tell us anything other than that man
has a mind and a culture and these evolve with him. Histor¬
ical records and memory states can be absorbed into the
present just like fossil records. We know the difference
between present and past not because we have historical rec¬
ords but because wo have a history, not because we have
memories but because we have a past. The past and history
are real for us, as real as the present and nature, but why?
Because the past can change in the same way nature can. It
is not just "over and done"5 it lives and evolves along with
us and our memories and records. It has a reality and an
•5
evolution of its own." For example, the Russian Revolution
"occurred." in 1917? but it wasn't a revolution in .1917; it
might have "turned out to bo" just a rebellion. So the
character of an historical event changes with time. It has
Ll
a history of its own. But still we are building castles
in the air; the Russian Revolution may fail yet I In that
case it might still be called a revolution, but the word
'revolution' would then tie dead as it is; (more or less) in
'French Revolution', and the death of the word would only ref¬
lect the death of the reality behind it. It might then
take on new significance in relation to some other movement
of history, but if all such movements are futile in the long
run. there is ultimately no significance at all, and no history.
It seems to rae that the archimedoan point for a
theology of history is to be found in the "event" of Good
Friday and its subsequent history. In itself, the event was-
crucifixion, humiliation and defeat of the worst kind.
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More than that it was pointless, needless cruelty and stupid¬
ity.. Good Friday was not good on Friday; it became good on
Easter Sunday*. It became victory, glorification, and res¬
urrection. More than that it became necessary, meaningful,
providential. It is for this reason that Good Friday (tog-
6
ether with Easter Sunday) stands at the "center" of history.
As long as vie can say 'Good Fridayand mean it vie have an
absolute sense of history. As long as the word 'good' is
alive there is a past that evolves and influences the present.
What, then, is the special quality of Good Friday
that makes it an archimedean point in this way? Here, of
• course, the Christian knows more than he can possibly say.
But the sheer intensity of the reversal from defeat to victory
ia most significant. The widest gap was bridged, not in
billions of years, but in a matter of days! Never have men
witnessed such a dramatic, reversal, and there is good reason
to believe that the effects can never be undone. No counter¬
revolution of evil can ever reverse this reversal because
the height and depth of evil were already displayed in the
crucifixion itself. In other words, it vias God'-s: act of
Revelation and Redemption, par excellence, and it is irrev-
7
ersible in the ultimate sense.
Then hovi are vie to understand the "background of Old
Testament revelations and redemptions? Certainly these lack
the intensity and irreversibility of the resurrection, but,
on the other hand, we could not apprehend the intensity and
irreversibility of the resurrection if they did not have a
relative intensity and irreversibility of their own. There¬
fore, we may see the origin and basis of history (not just
our notion of history!) in the progressive theophany of the
Old Testament.
Curiously enough, the general religious category of
theophany is anything but historical in this sense. A "man
ifestation"1 of the 'sacred' or the 'holy' is invariably an
escape from history through participation in the unchanging
or eternal. It is both reversible and repeatable. Hence
there is time but not history in the proper sense. The
annual dying of the cosmic God is necessary and proper from
the start, so it does not evolve and is not an objective
reality with a history of its own. It is only within the
Hebrew tradition that the quality of irreversibility emerges
and hierophany becomes theophany in the historical sense.^
Rather than man's escape from history, the Old Testament
emphasizes God's intervention within history; the former is
9
reversible and repeatable, the latter is definitely not.
Hence we are at the border line between providence and the¬
ophany, between nature (human in this case) and history."*0
Nonetheless, the Old Testament, itself, has a back¬
ground. Its affirmations about Yahweh are to be understood
in comparison and contrast with those of the religions of
neighboring traditions. The concepts, motifs and literary
conventions are all taken from the common fund of ancient
near-eastern lore, another example of correspondence and in¬
commensurability. For this reason it would be worthwhile
looking at the general category of hierophany and comparing
it with the concept of complementarity. Since there is
nothing intrinsically historical about complementarity we
might expect to find its basic structure repeated in hieroph
any and historical theophany alike.
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9*2 Theophany In the Phenomenology of Religion:
The distinction between "numinous" and "natural"
moments of consciousness was first elevated to the status
I ]
of dialectic by Rudolf Otto. He realized that sacred ob¬
jects were not essentially different from others in outward
appearance so that the apprehension of the sacred dimension
1 2
was a matter of intuition or "divination".'" Moreover, the
"eternal" is apprehended within the temporal, penetrating
it so-to-speak, and there is something puzzling about the
sacred object even' on the empirical plane which calls atten-
II
tion to its higher modality. Clearly, a case for comple¬
mentarity could be made here, but what would be the ontological
status of this particular complementarity? Is the sacred
discovered by man in the object itself, or is it merely in¬
vented as an Idea while the object is transformed into a
Ir¬
religious artifact? Otto is not entirely clear on this:
point, but Ms Kantian outlook makes-' one suspect that he
would not accept the distinction between discovery and in-
] ^
vention. ' Hence, his "ides, of the holy" may well be a
manifestation of man's creativity (important as it is in its
own right) rather than a manftestation of an objective
reality.
More recently attempts have been made to approach
the realm of the transcendent via linguistic philosophy and
the sociology of religion. The late I.T.Ramsey emphasized
the empirical foundation of religious language in life-
situations that are experienced to be "strange" or "odd",
] £
for example, miracles. ' He spoke of "disclosure", "rel¬
igious discernment", and even "revelation", but these terms
are equally applicable (as he used them) to the use of nick¬
names or the cracking of jokes, -so are left in the domain
of man and have yet to discover anything beyond. Peter
Berger, it seems to me, has made a real breakthrough by ad¬
mitting the historical relativity of all religious experience
and yet allowing for real discoveries within the human sphere
17
which'he calls "signals of transcendence", "phenomena that
are to be found within the domain of our 'natural' reality
18
but that appear to point beyond that reality.""' He cites
man's propensity for order, his experience of hope and out-
19
rage, and his invention of play and humor as examples.
Whatever our opinion of these particular "signals", there is'
no doubt that Berger regards them as God's messengers and
20
not just human contrivances. ' Could it be that we have
been entertaining angels all this time without realizing it?
But the most thorough study of the phenomenon of
hierophany has been done by Mircea Elia.de, and it is in his
work that we find the greatest similarity, and also the
greatest clash, with complementarity. Working within the
no-man's-land of phenomenology Elia.de maintains complete
neutrality between subjectivist. and objectivist interpret¬
ations of religious experience. He appreciates the
imperialistic role of man in all sacralizlng activity and
at the same time recognizes the increasing freedom of God to
manifest himself under a variety of forms, culminating in
21
the incarnation. The significant point is that Eliade
finds the same basic features in all manifestations of the
sacred, a structure which he calls the "dialectic" or "para¬
dox" of the sacred: the sacred always manifests itself in
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an object or event which is not sacred in itself- hence it
limits itself and ceases to be absolute; it is concealed at
22
the same time that it is revealed. " There is a coexistence
of contradictory essences, a paradoxical coming-together of
sacred and profane, absolute and relative, being and non-
being, with a consequent breakthrough of on a into the other.
The sacred is embodied within the profane and the profane
participates in the dimension of the sacred.'"0 Eliade makes
all this sound very mysterious, yet the overall pattern is
very similar to complementarity and so could be rationalized
if a clear decision could be reached as to the ontological
status of the dialectic. There is one serious obstacle,
however. As the term "non-being" suggests, the level of
the profane lacks reality and efficiency; in fact, it is
pl+
only an illusion and is cancelled out by the sacred. As
Eliade affirms, the archaic worldview has a Platonic struc¬
ture in which objects are reduced to the status of ep.iph.en-
25
omena in relation to their archetypes. From the
complementarist viewpoint this is a clear violation of the
conditions of individual completeness and equal importance,
and it is precisely at these points that a Christian doctrine
of theophany should differ from the archaic view. This is
most clearly seen in the case of the incarnation where
belief in the full reality of Christ's humanity is an impor¬
tant criterion of orthodoxy. But it is no less true in the
case of Old Testament revelations and redemptions which are
essentially historical, almost to the point of being prosaic.
Hence there is a clear discontinuity between the
archaic and biblical notions of theophany. The archaic
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view lacks the mundarieriess, the historicity and irreversi¬
bility of the latter. Nonetheless, it provided a suitable
point of departure for the biblical witness, a kind of
proto-'complementarity, which suitably adapted and corrected
would provide the model for the Hebrew understanding of
revelation and redemption.
9.3 Theophany in Christian Theology:
In a sense the entire creation may be regarded as
a manifestation of God ("the heavens declare the glory of
God"), yet it is only a manifestation as presence and power,
p/
not as event or person. Theophanies, on the other hand,
generally take the form of a voice from heaven, thunder and
lightning, or else a visible form like a pillar of fire.
God also appears in human form, either in dreams or in the
07
visible form of angels. In most of these cases the per¬
ceptible form is temporary, even ephemeral; it. is created
?8
de novo. as it were, for the immediate purpose at hand. "
Hence it lacks the extensive permanence of providence, on
one hand, and the intensive permanence of the incarnation
on the other. Moreover, as the cited examples indicate,
the manifestation may be at any level of creation from the
29
purely physical to the purely mental. Then there are
also the angels. Angels seem to be a special class of
beings which are created and subject to providence, but only
appear in the special service of God. They are perraan-
30
ently available instruments of theophany, and, in this
sense, they prefigure the incarnation more accurately than
other forms of theophany although their appearances lack
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the novelty (i.e. departure from general providence) and
irreversibility of the other forms„But the existence of
angels introduces an entirely new sphere into our wor.ldview,
the sphere of heaven as the permanent abode (or mode of
existence) of the angels. In fact., there could be many such
heavens corresponding to various ranks of angels, but, for
our purposes, one will do* "In the beginning God created
the heaven(s) and the earth". Finally, once the existence
of heaven is recognized, there,arises the possibility of
God's manifestation at that level and his coming to earth
from that level. In short, we have two relations to con¬
sider, not just one: there is the relationship of theophany
between God and his creature at all levels (heavenly and
earthly), and there is the relationship between heaven and
earth, the heavenly theophany and the earthly theophany, and
their respective modes of time (aevum and tempus). ' We
shall deal with each of these relations in turn.
One of the most thorough discussions of theophany
33
in Christian literature is given us by St. Augustine.
In De Civitate Dei he begins by drawing a parallel between
theophany and speech: God's substance is to his perceptible
manifestation, as a thought is to the uttered sound in which
31+
it finds expression, a parallel which was also used in
the patristic period to describe the relation between Father
35
and Son. Hence the relation of theophany is not one of
identity; God and his perceptible form are mutually exclusive
- one is invisible and immaterial while the other is both
material and visible - yet one is seen and heard (tacitly)
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in and with the other. There are unmistakable(?) signs in
the manifestation which point to the hidden presence of the
V~>
substance itself.
In his De Trinitate Augustine develops this basic
theme into a lengthy discussion of the theophanies of Old
and New Testaments. At the baptism of Jesus and at Pente¬
cost the Holy Spirit was manifest as a dove, as a mighty,
rushing wind and as tongues of fire. These changing forms
point to the hidden, unchanging presence of God's Spirit in
the same way that the vulnerable flesh of Christ points to
the presence and power of God's Word. The only difference
is that the Spirit was only manifest in flesh, not actually
made flesh, i.e. the creaturely forms were not joined in him
O
permanently.- Here Augustine introduces the most apt for¬
mula for true theophany, the creature serving the creator:
"All these things, then, were wrought through the creature
serving the Creator, and were presented in a suitable economy
39
to human senses." This service is of a specific nature,
over and above general providence, for the creature is trans-
Lf-0
formed or even created de novo for the purpose at hand.
An example would be the class of events known as miracles,
events in which God's ubiquitous power suddenly breaks
through and becomes apparent to all by means of dramatic
signs like the thunder and lightning on Mt. Sinai or the con-
)+l
version of water into wine at the wedding in Cana.
Another example is the phenomenon of prophecy in which God
imposes himself on the prophet in such a way that he bears
the very person of God (cf. theophoros) in the actions and
words of his prophesy. ~ However, the most remarkable
example of the creature serving the creator for Augustine
is the appearance and activity of angels. Sometimes angels
constitute a theophany in themselves; God is figuratively
signified by them, and, in the case of the giving of the law,
Christ himself was present in the angels so that Israel's
rejection of Christ was prefigured in its failure to keep
the law as well as its persecution of the prophets (Acts 7.
' s. l)V
!?1~53)' But even when the angels are not visibly present,
they are instrumental in the effecting of other appearances,
hb
signs and miracles. In fact, there may be considerable
difficulty in any given case deciding whether the angels con¬
stitute the theophany or merely accompany it behind the
scenes.
Finally, Augustine tells us something of the mode
of God's apparition to the angels in heaven based on Mt.18.10
b6
and 1 Cor.13 .12. Actually there are two distinct possi¬
bilities here, but Augustine does not make himself clear.
)±n
Either (a) God's "face" (or else his "energies") is directly
intuited by the angels simply on the basis of creation and
providence (God upholds heaven as well as earth), or else
(b) God condescends to a finite manifestation which is in
heaven. In the latter case, heaven would be the terminus
ad quern of the theophany proper, and the mission of the angels
to earth would be a matter of providence so that the overall
1+8
process would be twofold and indirect. But, in the case
of direct, intuition, the angels themselves would constitute
the theophany and God would appear in them on earth rather
than just to them in heaven. On a lower, more familiar,
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level the same options are open in the case of prophecy;
God might appear to the prophet in a dream and the prophet
nr'Q
would then translate the dream into his own words, or else
5.1
God might speak directly through the prophet. The former
case is a truncated theophany; the latter is complete, and
it is on the latter that the incarnation is modelled (Heb.l.
i).52
I have treated Augustine's ideas exeget.ical.ly
rather than topically, but I think the basic points of com¬
plementarity are evident enough. Of the eleven points,
only unity, individual completeness, and equal importance
are left in question. Augustine's concern to stress the
disparity'between God's substance and his creaturely mani¬
festation sometimes leaves the impression that the creature
50
itself is only an appearance, a kind of maya./J He also
suggests (cf. option 'b' above) that the divine pole of the
dialectic Is eternal and unchanging so that the angels are
needed as mediators between this blissful state and the
world of time and change as if they were so many bodhisatt-
vas. In these instances, Augustine is perhaps closer to
the archaic outlook than to the biblical view, although our
analysis would Indicate that correction at these points would
leave the main body of his thought perfectly intact.
The gaps in Augustine's treatment are more than
compensated for in Berth's discussion of God's "ambassadors"
in Dogmatics III.3 (ch.51.3). To begin with, Barth stresses
that within the context of theophany, God and the angel con¬
front man together, in alternation, but as one and the same
subject. They share the same power, but God is the source
30 5
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of this power, and the angel is his plenipotentiary. The
angels have no existence or activity of their own; they have
these only insofar as God is rich in relation to them, i.e.
57
by participation in God's existence and activity. More¬
over, the angelic activity (and existence?) is wholly divine
68
and wholly creaturely at the same time.' Ilence, while
angels are completely subordinate, they are nonetheless real
Ko
in this subordination. They share in God's speech and
action on earth; when an angel is present, God is present;
when an angel speaks and acts-, God speaks and acts, and vice
versa.Yet there is an infinite qualitative difference
between the two; one is created, and the other is its crea-
61
tor; one is servant, and the other is-' Lord. " Finally, the
angels are God's most perfect witnesses-, consistently point¬
ing away from themselves so that God Is seen in them sicut
, 62m speeulo•
Here Earth gives us a classic statement of the epis-
temological correlate of complementarity, the dialectic of
tacit and specifiable knowledge, or, as he puts: it, "a state
of increased and sharpened attention which has to be divided
between the divine theophany as such on the one side and the
cosmic or heavenly form in which it is both concealed and
revealed on the other, between God in His mystery on the one
side and God in His mystery on the other." Hence, the
witness of the angels provides the paradigm for all human
witness. Prophets and apostles rarely achieve this perfec¬
tion, and insofar as they do they actually take on the
6>+
character of angels. At this point, I think Barth has
brilliantly succeeded in rescuing the doctrine of angels
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from the sphere of the occult and harnessed it to the central
theme of biblical theology, the dynamic of witness- and reve¬
lation.
9.h Heaven and Earth;
Needless- to say, we are not concerned here with two
portions of space but with two modes of creation: heaven is
the mode of the invisible, tacitly known, and earth is the
mode of the (relatively) visible, specifiably known. Some¬
times they are called "spiritual" and "material" or "physi¬
cal", but when this terminology is used it should be remembered
that the "material" earth includes man who is both mind and
body and hence, in his own way, "spiritual" and "material".
The terms are relative and are used in accordance with an
analogy of proportionality within a. hierarchical arrangement:
God is to. the world as heaven is to earth (man) as mind is
6 6
to body, etc. y
body mind
; 66
This is the basic hierarchical structure of theology accor¬
ding to which man is "a little lower than the angels". As
such it is the straightforward extension of the hierarchy of
the sciences (shown on page 102) within which man appears as
307
the summit of evolution. But, for the moment, we are con¬
cerned only with the relationship of heaven to earth.
Again Augustine gives us a good start. The angels,
he says, alternate between the heavenly mode, which is
eternal, invisible and spiritual, and the earthly mode, which
67
is temporal, visible and material. In so doing they
assume a. physical body (and mind?) which is .just as real as
the spiritual one they enjoy in heaven, albeit more change-
,, 68able.
69
According to Aquinas; the angel is united to a
70
physical body as the mover to the moved. This union is
similar to that of mind and body except that an angel is not
71
limited to a single, fixed body as a human mind is. The
body thus represents or images the spiritual attributes and
activities of the angel in heaven (e.g. an angel appearing
n
to eat food is an image of spiritual nutrition!).' Hence,
there is a kind of parallel or analogy between the sensible
and intelligible (viz. spiritual) realms.Moreover, there
is a kind of interpenetration between the two: the angel
itself may be said to be located at the place of the body to
7k
which his power is applied. Hence the angelic realm and
the physical realm constitute one single universe, not two
76
separate worlds on their own. ^ While the angels are "in
76
heaven" they are not "on earth", and vice versa, so they
must alternate between the two modes as they "evolve".
From the perspective of complementarity Augustine
and Aquinas nicely supplement each other. Augustine stresses
the equal reality of the physical and spiritual modes but
neglects the unity of the two whereas Aquinas stresses the
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•unity but leaves the impression that the physical manifes¬
tations of angels are merely symbolic and not as real somehow
77
as the activities of the human beings they imitate. The
reason he gives is that if angels assumed real human bodies
they would draw attention to their humanity rather than their
n Q
spiritual actions and attributes (to say nothing of Godl).
In other words, Aquinas wishes to preserve the feature of
"pointing" by sacrificing the "completeness" of the manifes¬
tation and its consequent concealment of the spiritual.
From our viewpoint this misjudgement reveals Aquinas' s depen¬
dence on discursive reason and his neglect of the possibility
of tacit knowledge.
Again we may turn to Barth for a more balanced treat¬
ment of the problem (ch.5l«2). Heaven and earth, he says',
are counterparts of each other within the one cosmos; creation
consists not so much of heaven and earth as of heaven in and
79with earth. Heaven complements earth as its partner and
go
alter ego. Hence, the two are equally real, each in its
8l
own peculiar way. ' Heaven has:- a certain precedence (above,
earlier, more) because God comes to us from heaven, but this
precedence lies entirely within the radical equality of
82
common creaturehood. Hence earth1s being "below" does
not disqualify it in any way; its glory is not less but merely
O -)
of a different kind. Moreover, the intracosmic movement
of God takes place from heaven to earth (and back to heaven)
so that the relation is one of genuine intercourse or dial-
S1)-
ogue. Nevertheless, the two modes are mutually exclusive;
they may not be interchanged or confused. In fact, they
85
stand over against each other as; opposite poles. Heaven.
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is- Invisible, incomprehensible and inaccessible whereas
earth is just the reverse, ^ yet in such a way that the exe¬
cution of God1s will on earth is accompanied by a revelation
87
of heaven. In other words, the dimension of heaven is
no8 unknowable so much as it is tacitly knowable (i.e. not
specifiahly kncwable) as the "other side" of events here on
earth. All of this coincides exactly with the logic of com¬
plementarity, but the most remarkable feature of Barth's
treatment here is his use of analogies with (a) the intra-
88
trinitarian dynamic of generation and spiration," (b) the
O Q
relation of God and the world, and (c) the relation of God
90
and man in Christ. Although Barth does not work this out
in detail, he effectively summarizes the entire logic of
complementarity in theology within the space of these few
pages. And his support here is: all the more auspicious for
91
its lack of deliberation and self-consciousness.
9.5 Aeviternity and Time;
Finally we should say a few words about the problem
GO
of the aeyum or angelic time (ternpus angelorum). Most of
the speculation on this topic has been controlled by the
understanding that heaven and the angels stand in a closer
relation to God than earth and man do. Since God is eternal
and man is temporal, the reasoning goes, the mode of the
angels must be intermediate. Hence Augustine concludes that,
while not eternal in itself, heaven partakes in eternity by
means of an unwavering contemplation of God which restrains
91
its natural tendency to mutability. Similarly, Aquinas
maintains that angels and glorified saints share in God's
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eternity and thus rise above the mere succession of temporal
CLl
moments through a vision of the divine Word* Hence, "the
aeon is neither time nor eternity but lies somewhere between
the two". Angels are eternal in the sense that they never
cease to exist, but they are also able to move about, make
decisions and think thoughts, all of which involve a kind of
96
successiveness. In short, their actions are accompanied
by time, measured by the aeon, and participate in eternity.
In another, rather more difficult passage Aquinas explains
that the angels are above time as the measure of physical
motion, but not above time as the measure of the succession
from non-being to being or of the succession that occurs with-
97
in their own heavenly activities. In other words, they
are created beings, not eternal, and they require their own
proper time (aevum) as the measure of their peculiar evolution.
From the complementarist viewpoint, however, evol¬
ution does not take place within a given mode (e.g. heaven)
but by alternation between that mode and its complement (in
this case earth). Therefore, the successive moments of
heavenly and earthly time are closely correlated and coordin-
98
ated to form a higher order of time. Moreover, this time
of creation (heaven and earth) is in turn correlated and
coordinated with the time of the .immanent creator to form a
single, all-inclusive time over against eternity of God
(transcendent and immanent), alone.^ Hence, the basic
idea (put forward by Augustine et al.) that the respective
times of man, the angels and God are h1erarchical1y related
can be appreciated as a profound insight. However, it would
have to be rid of its Eleatic obsession with changelessness
1 00
before it could become serviceable.
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Chapter 10
The Humanity and Divinity of Christ
"His body was for Him not a limitation> but an.
instrument Zlit. 'He mastered it'.7, so that He
was both in it and in all things, and outside all
things, resting in the Father alone." Athanasius,
On the Incarnation 17 (pA?).
10.1 Introduction - The Two Viewpoints;
Jesus is both the center of history"'" and the media-
2
tor between God and man, but these two descriptions require
two very different points of view. The first is diachronic
and historical while the other is synchronic and ontological.
The first is particularly suited to the study of Jesus' rel¬
ation to us, bo mankind past, present and future, while the
other is best suited to the study of Jesus' relation to God.^
The first is also suited to the study of Jesus' own history,
his birth, growth, death and resurrection, .and their signifi¬
cance, while the other is best suited to the study of the
continual dynamic between God and man in Christ which provided
the driving force for that; history. Hence the former con¬
cerns the event of the unitio personalis while the latter
concerns the state of the unio personalis. Here we are
primarily concerned with the latter, the ongoing dialectic
between God and man within the concrete history of Jesus
Christ, i.e. with the incarnation as a state rather than the
Incarnation as an event. In the same manner we were con¬
cerned in chapter 8 with creation as the ongoing relation
between God and the world rather than with cosmogony (or
eschatology) as such.
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Then where do we stand in relation to Pannenberg's
Christology? Certainly Fannenberg would agree with our
distinction between the historical and the (purely) ontolog-
ical, but he would reverse the relationship between the
two. In his view, ontology, or the essence of things, is
only manifest eschatologlcally and therefore is determined
retroactively by history itself.^ History generates ontol¬
ogy rather than the other way around. Hence the .importance
of Jesus' resurrection J by recognizing the qualitative
presence of the eschaton in the resurrection of Jesus we come
7
to know Jesus as God as; well as man. More than that, the
fact that Jesus was both God and man in his lifetime is dec¬
ided retroactively by the resurrection because it truly
8
anticipates the end of all things. If this is so then
ontology has indeed been reduced to history and the tradit-
9
ional two-nature approach is both unnecessary and misleading.'
What are we to make of this?
I accept Pannenberg's general view of history. His
emphasis on the holistic nature of history and the 'retro¬
active force' (ruckwirkende Kraftof significant events
coincides almost exactly with the cumulative view of history
and theophany set forth, in the previous chapter. The only
difference is that Pannenberg holds that historical events
are inherently ambiguous and that they only acquire signifi¬
cance through the subsequent development of .history"''"'"
t
whereas, in our view, all events have objective significance
from the start although that significance may change with
the course of subsequent history. Pannenberg places so much
importance on the future that he makes history (as it _is) a
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mere appearance to be dissolved and displaced by the esch-
aton. Hence, rather than eliminating docetism he merely
12
transfers it from a vertical emphasis on transcendence to
J
a horizontal emphasis on eschatology. °
However, that aside, I do not think Pannenberg's
(or any) view of history explains the relation between the
human and divine in Christ even if it does show how this:
relation was established. Either God was in Christ (the
historical Jesus, that is) or he wasn't, regardless of the
resurrection. What the resurrection tells us is not that
"God was in Christ" but that he was "reconciling the world
to himself" (2 Cor.5«19)' On the basis of the resurrect¬
ion we know that God's commitment to us in Christ (in
contrast to the O.T. theophanies) is final and irreversible;
we know that our humanity has been joined to him forever
and that not even death can separate us from the love of God.
On the basis of the resurrection we know that Jesus' birth
was the Incarnation and that his life and death were the
final Atonement. But the ongoing dialectic of God and man
within this framework is a distinct (though not separate)
issue. It leaves open the question of what God was doing
in the history of Jesus, but it cannot be reduced to or elim¬
inated by any treatment of the historical question, however
adequate. Therefore, even if we were to accept Pannenberg's
view of history without qualification we would still be
left with the question, "What Is the ontological connection
between the Logos and the human existence of Jesus of Nazar-
15etb?". In particular, we must ask whether complementarity
provides a suitable model for this connection.
10.2 Christology in Perspective:
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In the next section we shall examine the complemen¬
tarity model point by point, but first we must locate the
problem of the "two natures" in relation to the other theo¬
logical problems we have studied.
(l) Christology and the Doctrine of the Trinity? Recently
both Earth and Rahner have stressed the fact that it was the
Son or Word of God that became incarnate, not just God-as-
1
such. This point is clearly consistent with the complemen¬
tarity scheme we have been using in which an entity only
exists and operates in and through its particular modes of
being so that the actual modality must be specified in any
17
given case. So when we speak of God in Christ we under¬
stand this to mean God in his actual mode as Son or Word and
to include the Father and Spirit only by virtue of the mutual
perichoresis.
(2) Christology, Transcendence and Immanence: In the
same way that we must specify God as the Son we must also
specify the Son as either transcendent or immanent, or, in
Lossky's terminology, as either essence or energies, in
10
Christ. Inasmuch as the incarnation is an historical
event/state it pertains to the immanent Logos as; the actual
mode and to the transcendent Logos only by virtue of their
perichoresis. Thus, Lossky argues that the incarnation does
not alter the essence of God because it is a (historical)
manifestation of love and so pertains to the energies of God.
19
Aside from the difficulty raised by Lossky's view of
love (= amor dei ad extra?), we may take his essence-energies
scheme to be normative here as we already have in chapter 8.
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(3) Christology arid Providence; What, is the rel¬
ationship between the God-world relation of providence and
the God-man relation in Christ, and what is the difference
between the two? Perhaps the best answer to these questions
'
has been given by Athanasiuss the two relations the imman¬
ent Logos has with creation, providence and incarnation are
radically different but they do not in any way exclude each
other. The Word has alway filled creation as a whole, ord¬
ering and ruling it as its Lord, and he did not abandon this
20
role when he became incarnate. However, he entered the
21
world in an entirely new way " in that he became uniquely
related to a single part of creation (the humanity of Jesus)
and he assumed the likeness of men rather than remaining just
22
an unseen power. In other words, the manifestation of God
in Christ differs from that in creation-as-a-whole both in
its intensity and in its personality, though not in its per-
23
manence.
(h) Christology and Theophany: But the many theoph-
anies of Old and New Testaments are also more intense and
more personal than God's relation to the world in providence.
How, then, does his activity in Christ differ from mere in¬
spiration or appearance? Is the difference simply one of
2lf
degree as Paul of Samosata held? Is Christ to be regarded
25
simply as the "supreme theophany"? Again Athanasius seems
to have the best answer. He frequently does refer to
Christ's humanity as an instrument (organon) for the revel-
ation of divine majesty. However, he also points out that,
if this had been the sole purpose of the Incarnation, other
27
and better ways could have been devised to accomplish it.
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The Word could even have defeated death in other ways, but
the benefits of his victory would not have applied to our
humanity if lie had not assumed a human body and experienced
pO
death himself. Thus, whereas in the O.T. the Word came
to individual men to hallow them and display himself in
them, in the Incarnation he became man with a body of his
very own so that all the properties and especially the weak-
29
nesses of the flesh also became his. So the Incarnation
involves an irreversibility and a permanence, a humiliation
10
and a scandal that is absent from the O.T. theophanies.
Moreover, it entails God's final commitment to and redemption
of man.'s history although this is only evident and only
11
decided from the perspective of the resurrection. "
To summarize: from the synchronic viewpoint, empha¬
sizing revelation and cosmology, there is a strong parallel
between God's O.T. manifestations and his activity in Christ,
Since complementarity is basically a synchronic model it may
well be applicable to both. But from the diachronic view¬
point, emphasizing redemptive history, the two are very
different, and this fact justifies our treating the two as
separate problems.
(5) Christology, Heaven and Earth: "Who for us men
and because of our salvation came down from heaven...and
IP
became human"; so reads the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed.
"He.,s;rose on the third day...and ascended to heaven, and
sits on the right hand of the Father, and will come again..."
What is the meaning of all this coming and going with respect
to heaven? There are two possible interpretations depending
on whether the "heaven" involved is taken to mean the created
heaven or the uncreated abode of God. In the first case
Christ's preexistence in "heaven" would have the character
of a theophany in its own right and the incarnation would
involve the transferal of this theophany from heaven to
earth.^ Such a "descent from heaven" would not be without
oLj.
parallels in the history of religions,-J but it would find
very little support among Christian divines., themselves.
The Creed itself suggests that the "heaven" from which Christ
"descended" is simply the "right hand" (i.e. the presence)
of the Father, and there is a strong theological tradition
from Hilary through Calvin which equates Christ's preexist¬
ance "in heaven" with his eternal Sonship or deity and
therefore insists that he did not "leave heaven" (i.e. aban¬
don his deity) when he "descended to earth".Hence the
'extra Calvlnisticum'. However, this view makes it diffi¬
cult to appreciate the full significance of the ascension
and session. How can we account for the importance of these
events in N.T. theology if we assume Christ to have been at
the right hand of the Father all along? It may be that the
only way to do justice to both the inalienable deity of
Christ and the historicity of the descent and ascent is to
think in terms of a heavenly court such as we find in the
vision of John in the book of Revelation. This would not
eliminate the 'extra Calvlnist1cum'; it would only distin¬
guish it from the issue of Christ's preexistence in heaven.
Christ abandoned his place in heaven when he became man, but
he did not abandon his deity.
(6) Christology, Body and Soul: It goes without
saying (since the First Council of Constantinople condemned
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Apollinarius in 381) that Christ assumed both the body and
the soul -of man; this point really comes under section 3(3)
below. The issue to be considered here is the extent r.o
which a parallel can be drawn between the unity of body and
soul in man and the hypostatic union in Christ. This is
really a preliminary skirmish in testing the relevance of
complementarity to Christology: since the mind(soul)-body
problem is itself a candidate for complementarity and, more¬
over, since the body-soul relation has been used as a
37
parallel in several of the other doctrines we have studied,
a parallel must also exist in Christology (in the synchronic
sense) if overall consistency is to be maintained. In fact,
•j g
such a parallel has considerable support from the Fathers,-'
including both Antiochenes^ and Alexandrians 0 (though with
differing emphases!). In recent times the analogy has been
L_1
criticized by Earth ' and received a thoroughly cautious
assessment from H.A.Wolfson who lists three basic objections?
1+2 , v
(1) Whereas the Logos completely dominates his humanity,
the soul does not always dominate the body and there is some¬
times severe conflict between the two; and (2/3) whereas the
union of body and soul constitutes a new nature (i.e. human
nature) which is present .in the entire species of man, the
hypostatic union is entirely unique and there is no Christie
species. To answer these objections we must appeal to three
of the principles developed in earlier chapters all of which
1+-j
come under the general heading of progressive adaptation. -J
First we recognize that there is a complete reversal in. the
direction of ontological dependence at the level of man in
the overall hierarchy of complementarity; whereas lower levels
evolve upwards and depend downwards, higher levels (inelud-
ing Christology) "evolve" downwards and depend upwards.
Secondly, there is the progressive emergence of correlation
between alternate modes of an entity as one ascends to higher
levels. We have already seen that this correlation
*+6
becomes complete at the level of providence, and since
Christology involves the same terms and the same levels
(synchronically speaking) as providence the same perfection
may be expected to apply to the relation between the humanity
1+7
and divinity of Christ. Together these two points answer
Wolfson's first objection. Finally, there is the progres¬
sive emergence of individuality and uniqueness which we first
1+8
noted in the nature of man himself and later found carried
to its logical! conclusion in the absolute \miqueness of the
1+9
Son of God in the doctrine of the Trinity. The same
uniqueness was present in the doctrine of providence (one God
- one world)^ find is here again present in the doctrine of
the person of Christ. Whether one calls the union of God
and man in Christ a "new nature" or not simply depends, on
whether one takes "nature" in the concrete sense of prots
ousia (= hypostasis) or in the abstract sense of deutera
ousia (= eidos).^ In any case the analogy between the
hypostatic union and the body-soul union holds provided that
it is bracketed by the overall contours of the complemen¬
tarity hierarchy.
10.3 Christology and Complementarity:
The rather tangled discussions of the previous two
sections were designed to establish the framework for a
point-by-point comparison of the two-natures doctrine with
the logic of complementarity. As in previous chapters our
procedure will be to use the format of complementarity dev¬
eloped. in chapter 2 as- an outline for the analysis of Christ-
ology.
(l) Unity! For all the debate over the use of words there
is no doubt in anyone's mind that Christ is numerically one;
the human and divine natures are united without division
(adiairetos) and without separation (achoristos) as the Coun¬
cil of Chalcedon Insisted. But the question remains; "One
what?" and "what kind of union?" Even the Nestorians agree
that the two natures constitute one prosopon by virtue of
/ \ 5^
their conjunction (synapheia;.VJ On the other hand, the
Monophysites insist on a much stronger union Cheilosis)^ res¬
ulting in an entirely new, single nature (mla physls tou
v 5^5
theou logon sesarkomenev understood in the concrete sense
of the term. The "orthodox" solution has been something of
a compromise; Christ is held to be one pro sop on and one
hypostasis in two natures (duo physesin) understood in the
abstract sense. Recently, however, there has been a more
open attitude toward the mla physls formula especially in
57
the Eastern Orthodox churches. As we have already sugg¬
ested, the issue largely depends on the sense in which the
words are taken. From the viewpoint of complementarity
Christ must be described as one single being whether as proso¬
pon, hypostasis, physls or (prote) ousia.
(2) Common Properties: Just as in the doctrine of
the Trinity the homoousion does double duty by asserting a
common substance as well as a single being, in Christology
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the hypostatic union implies both a single person and a
common subsistence.. And just as the common properties which
are in the Father are the source of those with which the Son
98
is endowed, the preexistent subsistence of the Logos is
the source of the subsistence of his assumed humanity (enhy¬
pos tasla), that humanity having no independent subsistence
of its own (anhypostasla).^ Apparently, however, this
common subsistence does not entail a common will (thelema)
60
or a common operation (energia); these must therefore be
classified as "conjugate properties" (see point 9 below).
(3) Individual Completeness: Each of the "natures"
63
or "modes of being" in Christ is complete, entire, perfect
and fully real in itself (if not of itself due to the (enhy-
62•postasla)» It follows that Christ is both homoouston to
uatrl and homoousIon hemln^ although the latter point is
somewhat problematic. It certainly means that the humanity
Christ assumed was a full humanity, composed of both body and
6b
soul. But there is also a strong soteriological tradition
running from Hilary to Barth which maintains that Christ's
incarnation and resurrection pertain not just to his indivi-
69
dual ...humanity but to mankind as a whole. On the basis of
our previous discussions, I can see two possible explanations
for this amazing claim: it could be regarded either dia-
chronically as a statement of Christ's 'recapitulation' or
66
'summing up' of man's history, or else synchronically as
a special case of the mirroring or imaging of all mankind in
( 7
each individual man. Perhaps both explanations are req¬
uired: the synchronic view shows how it is possible for
any one individual to represent all men, and the diachronic
view shows how it came to be that this one man, Jesus Christ,
did represent all men. Either view would then be incom¬
plete by itself and would require the other for its elucid¬
ation .
(V5) Coexhaustiveness and Equal Necessity: There
are two natures or modes in Christ, no more and no less.
68
The two are equally real and equally true. "He does not
cease to he God because He becomes man /against Kenotieism7,
nor fail to be man because He remains for ever God. /against
Docetisra/. This is the true faith for human blessedness,
to preach at once the Godhood and the manhood, to confess the
Word and the flesh, neither forgetting the God, because He
6 9
is man, nor ignoring the flesh, because He is the Word."
It follows that both, modes must be included in any treatment
of the person of Christ and. that neither one can be elimin¬
ated in favor of the other.
(6) Alternation: Since time itself, in our view,
70
is an ongoing dialectic between God and the world, the
life of Christ must entail a continual alternation between
its own two modes. This does not mean that the Logos is
71
changed into flesh or vice versa, as Tertullian points out, '
because the Word was made flesh by clothing rather than by
transformation. Nor does it mean that the acts and words
of Jesus can be divided into two categories, human and div-
72
ine, for all of the visible-audible activity of Christ
7
was performed by the Word-made-flesh.—* The properly divine
activity of Christ is his sustaining and governing of all
71+
creation, but this is not visible or audible; it is only
75'
known tacitly and by grace. According to Maximus the
76
Confessor, the two natures and their activities reciprocate
or alternate with one another like thought and word or like
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the reciprocal actions of cutting and burning by a red-hot
77
knife. Or, as John of Damascus puts it, ' there are two
reciprocal movements, the deification (theosis) of the flesh
and the "inhoraination" (enan thrope s1s) of God. From the
alternation of the natures, we then come to their mutual
interpenetration»
(7) Coinherence: Implicit in the eery fact of in¬
carnation is the fact that the Logos indwells or inhabits
7A
the flesh like a garment or a temple. There follows a
reciprocal penetration of the humanity into the (immanent)
deity of the Logos so that there is a mutual penetration
. . 79
(perichoresis) and coinherence between the two natures.
Hence, where one nature is present the other is also, and
what one nature does (or what Christ does in and through that
nature) the other does also so that there is an. inter-
participation and "co-operation" between the two.^° Then,
on account of this perichoresis and in view of the hypo-
O-j
static union, the Fathers argue, ~ there is an interchange
of titles, functions and attributes (antldosis idiomaton)
between the two natures. But what is the nature of this
interchange? It cannot be a mere matter of words as Nestor-
O r\ O -J
ius held or only a figure of speech as Zwingli J claimed.
On the other hand, it must not be allowed to obliterate the
distinctive characteristics of Christ's humanity as it does
gh 85
in Gregory of Nyssa or even Hilary. x Perhaps Calvin's
rather ambiguous attitude is most appropriate here; the
transfer of attributes is done improperly though not without
,86reason;
(8) Mutual Exelusivenesss In spite of their inter-
penetration the two natures or modes of being remain uncon¬
fused (asunkutos) and unchanged (atreptos), each retaining
8 7
its full integrity within the hypostatic union. This is
due to the fact that they are mutually exclusive, i.e. "in-
88
congruous" and "utterly dissimilar" to begin with so that
no compromise or reduction to an intermediate nature or mode
89
is even conceivable.
(9) Conjugate Properties - Reciprocity: Each of
the two natures or modes of being has its own proper funct¬
ions and attributes, and these remain intact within the
90
hypostatic union; even Cyril of Alexandria agrees to this
91
point. The conjugate functions and attributes include
92
being "in heaven" vs. being "on earth", sustaining the uni
cp
verse vs. living a human life, ^ being uncreated vs. created
9b
invisible vs. visible, unconfined vs. confined, and even
two natural volitions, two natural energies, and two kinds
99
of wisdom and knowledge. Moreover, there is a definite
relation of reciprocity between these conjugate properties
in that the attributes proper to one mode are inappropriate
9f>
to (hence not strictly definable in) the other mode.
This principle naturally counterbalances the antldosis
idiomaton, but it applies only to the opposition of properly
human and properly divine activities and should not be con¬
fused with an artificial division of Christ's human life
into two parts corresponding to the humanity (i.e. the mom¬
ents of weakness and humiliation) and divinity (the miracles
and the resurrection).^
(10/11) Emergence and. Pointing? The point here is
simply that the two natures or modes of being are.not symm¬
etric to each other but involve two different "levels"' of
reality: one is "higher" while the other is "lower"; one is
98
"in heaven" while the other is "on earth". Moreover, the
human nature depends upon the divine nature as its source
99
of life and subsistence, ' and, accordingly, it points to
that source as a true manifestation or revelation of God."*" ^
In this sense Christ's humanity is indeed an instrument
(or ranor?.) through which he makes himself known as Athanasius
, . 101said.
The foregoing analysis speaks for itself: there is
clearly a one-to-one relation between the major points of
Christology and the eleven points of complementarity, and
the logical relationships among the former are identical to
those among the latter. It should be noted, however, that
the d-iachronic dimension is much more important in Christol¬
ogy than in any of the natural sciences, and it is not acc¬
ounted for (though it is allowed for) in the synchronic model
of complementarity. Moreover, the point of coinherence
which was almost incidental in quantum physics has become a
major principle in theology.
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Chapter 11
The Church} Word and Sacraments
"For if in truth the Word has been made flesh and
we in very truth receive the Word made flesh as
food from the Lord, are vre not bound to believe
that He abides in us naturally /naturaJiter"/. Who,
born as a man, has assumed the nature of our flesh
now inseparable from Himself, and has conjoined the
nature of His own flesh to the nature of the eter¬
nal Godhead in the sacrament by which His flesh is
communicated to us? For so are we all one, because
the Father is in Christ and Christ is in us."
Hilary, On the Trinity 8.13 (p.l^l).
11.1 Introduction - Ecclesiology in Perspectives
In this final chapter on the application of comple¬
mentarity to theological Issues we consider the nature of
the church, the word of scripture and of proclamation, and
the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist. Each of these
is, of course, a topic in itself, but for our purposes they
may be treated together and, in fact, are best treated tog-
ether due to their structural similarity and interrelation.
In each case there is a multi-polar relation between the
risen Christ in heaven, the Holy Spirit, and the visible ele¬
ments on earth through which they operate in the history of
the church during this present age.
By setting the problem up in this way I intend
specifically to exclude any consideration of an "invisible
church" in heaven which is related in some fashion to the
2
"visible church" here below. This model seems to have been
derived from an archaic two-level cosmology in which every¬
thing was either sensible (e.g. our bodies, 'earth') or
3'+l
intelligible (e.g. our souls, 'heaven', eternal 'ideas',
God) with the result that the spiritual side of man and of
the church was regarded as existing on the same level as
heaven and even God. Clearly, such a model is not com¬
patible with the biblical view of man as earthbound (at
least during this life) and of God as transcending even
heaven itself (2 Chron.6.18).
Hence the earthly, 'empirical' side of the church,
is man, himself, in his fullness - body and soul, atom and
organism, wave and particle. The 'transcendent', heavenly
side is rather more complicated; :Lt involves not only the
triune structure of (the immanent) God but also the comple¬
mentarity of creator and creature involved in the being of
the Word-made-flesh. Since we have already worked through
the various combinations and permutations of these terms'
(Word-Spirit, creator-creature, heaven-earth) in previous
chapters, we may put the matter succinctly by saying that
the relation between the Holy Spirit and man in the church
is modelled along the lines of theophany - a simple creator
(Spirit)-creature relationship with the function of histori¬
cal revelation and redemption. Thus the church is said
to be the "temple of the Spirit", the word is inspired by
the Spirit (here through apostles, evangelists and preachers
rather than O.T. prophets), and the administration of
baptism and the consecration of the elements in the, euchar-
ist are accompanied by and activated by the Spirit. From
the strictly synchronic viewpoint these activities of the
Spirit in the church are identical to those in the Old Testa¬
ment - theophany, prophesy and miracle. The only difference
between them is the diachronic or historical one due to the
watershed-event of the Incarnation.
The relationship of Christ and man in the church is
quite different since the Word, unlike the Spirit, was the
actual subject of the Incarnation and is forevermore the
Word-made-flesh. Our union, with Christ, then, is not simply
a theophany, even in the strictly synchronic sense for we
if
are not joined to a disembodied Word, as were the prophets,
but in the first instan.ce to the humanity of Christ which is
now glorified in heaven. We are his 'body' not because he
is the mind or the soul but because he is the 'head'.
Hence we are one body (and one soul) with him as well as with
one another. The relation of Christ and the church, then,
must be considered at two levels? (l) the relation of the
Word to his 'flesh', both in heaven and on earth, which is
parallel to the relation of creator and creature in theoph¬
any, and (2) the intracosrnic relation between the heavenly
'head' and his earthly 'body', i.e. between Christ's glori¬
fied humanity and us, which is parallel to the intracosmic
/
relation of heaven and earth as in the case of angels.
There is an asymmetry, then, between Word (made
flesh) and Spirit in ecclesiology that is not present in the
supra-historical intra-trinitarian relations (even granting
the filioque) and is not present in Old Testament redemptive
history. In the liturgical traditions this asymmetry is
possibly reflected in the difference between the epiklesls
and the anamnesist the Holy Spirit is 'invoked' as one
from beyond, at least in the Eastern tradition, while the
Incarnate Word is simply 'remembered' as one who already
3^3
7
resides within the intracosraic sphere.
11,2 Mystical Union, Sacramental Union and Transubstantiation:
It would simply be tedious to try to document all
eleven points of complementarity for the nature of the
church, the word and each of the sacraments, and little would
he added to the overall picture we have already built up in
previous chapters. The relations of creator and creature
and of heaven and earth have already been investigated in
detail under separate headings, and one can easily document
the necessary analogies between the relation of Christ (or
the Spirit) and the church and the relations of Father and
8 9
Son in the Trinity, of Word and flesh in the Incarnation,
10
and of body and soul in man. Therefore, we may concen¬
trate our attention on the two most problematic (and there¬
fore most interesting) points, the nature of the 'union' in
church, word and sacraments and the manner in which this
union is achieved, which correspond to the first two points
in the logic of complementarity.
First, with regard to the church we must say three
things in light of the foregoing discussion: (l) Christ and
11
his 'body' are one person (hypostasis) or one being, (2)
12
his glorified humanity and our humanity are one 'body',
and (3) the Holy Spirit and ourselves constitute one life
13
and one 'spirit'. For instance, the mystical union of
\
Christ's humanity and the church is compared by Hilary to
the essential union of Christ's deity and the Father;, both
are said to exist 'naturally' (naturallter)i.e. by virtue
of a common 'nature' (here in the sense of urote ous.la
since it is effected by the reception of the sacraments as
\ lb
well as the occurrence of the Incarnation). It follows
that, since the union of Christ and the church is as real as
that between Father arid Son, those properties which are
common to both (head and body) must have their source in
the ontologically prior mode (the head)."0 In other words,
the church - as church (the body of Christ) - must be 1enhy-
postatized.' in the glorified humanity of Christ (which, in
turn, is 'enhypostatized' in the deity of Christ) which is
the source of its specifically Christian life, its holiness
and its very being-as-church, its catholicity.
Similar considerations could be developed, with suit¬
able adaptions, for the union of the word of man and the Word
17
of Cod in inspiration and proclamation. It should be
noted that this 1 verbal unions both presupposes the 'mystical
union' in. the church (here between Christ and the listener as
well as between Christ and the speaker) and, at the same
time, reinforces it through the 'hearing' of the Word.
Hence there is a dialectic of word and church which allows a
progressive strengthening of the 'mystical union' and rules
out the kind of timeless transcendentalism usually associated
"i ft
with 'epiphany religions'. Of course, the same progress¬
ive dialectic holds between the sacraments and the church:
the minister consecrates and administers or distributes the
19
elements as the representative of Christ, and this mystical
union is strengthened through the 'worthy reception' of
20
those elements. Finally, there is also the dialectic of
word and sacrament: the word explains and sanctifies the
21 2
sacrament; ' the sacrament illustrates and confirms the word.
3'+5
In the case of the sacraments we again have a kind
of union (a) between the Holy Spirit and the water in bapt¬
ism, and (b) between the glorified body of Christ and the
consecrated elements of bread and wine in the eucharist.
In regard to baptism, of course, there is the perennial ques¬
tion of the relation between baptism with water and baptism
with the Spirit, but this is really a diachronic problem and
need not detain us here. If we may draw a parallel with
the problem of the Incarnation .and its relation to the Resurr¬
ection, we may say that the Spirit is in and with the waters
of baptism independently of the subsequent development of
the person being baptized even though the character of the
Spirit's activity in and with the baptismal waters may be
po
decided retroactively on the basis of such development. J
At least, there is no doubt in the minds of the Fathers, that
by virtue of the eplklesls, the baptismal waters are truly
olf
united with the Spirit who acts in and through them.
Moreover, it follows that, insofar as the waters have any
grace or efficacy, they derive it not from their own nature
but from the presence of the Spirit. In this sense they
may be said to be 'enhypostatized" in the Spirit.
In regard to the eucharist the problem is compli¬
cated by the fact that there are at least three different
traditions in Western theology, the Catholic view of tran-
substantiation, the Lutheran view of sacramental union or
consubstantiation, and the Reformed view of sacramental con¬
junction. The difference between the Catholic and Lutheran
views seems to boil down to a difference of terminology.
3*+6
The Latin word substantia, like the Greek ousla (and, unfor¬
tunately, the German Wesen), can be used in the sense of
either primary or secondary substance. The medieval church
evidentally understood it in the primary sense (i.e. con¬
crete, independent reality), hence the use of the Aristot¬
elian distinction between 'substance' and 'accidents' or
•species' (- substantia secunda), as Schi.1 lebeeckx has
recently pointed out.2o Since there can only be a single
primary substance within the sacramental (or any real) union
and since Christ is a primary substance in his own right,
the elements of bread and wine must be de-substantiated or
dispossessed of their independent reality and trans-subs tan-
tinted or possessed from above' by the independent reality of
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Christ. Clearly, there is a parallel here with the anhy¬
po stasia and enhypostasia of Christ's humanity itself. In
fact, the dynamics, of transubstantiation are simply the
reflex action of the enhypo stasia, at a lower level; (l)
Christ's (glorified) humanity is enhypcstatized in the divine
hypostasis, arid (2) the elements of bread and wine are enhy-
postatized (transubstantiated) in the enhypostatic humanity
of Christ. There is this difference, however; the elements
of bread and wine are pr©existent ("Christ took bread and
wine...") whereas the humanity of Christ was not ("the Word
became flesh"). Hence the force of the prefix trans and
all of the suspicions that it naturally raises.
Luther, on the other hand, seems to have understood
substantia in the secondary sense although it is difficult
to get a consistent picture out of his various writings.
Sometimes he spoke of the bread and the body of Christ uniting
3V7
2.8
to form an entirely new substance (Wesen) or thing (Ding),
a view which would seem to require some sort of trans-
substantiation I More often, however, he took the opposite
tack, claiming that the sacramental union, like the personal
union of Christ, consists of two distinct natures or sub¬
stances although these may be called one substance or one
29
thing by way of synecdoche. On these terms the notion of
transubstantiation was not only unnecessary; it would have
been totally inappropriate since it would have denied the
full reality of the elements of bread and wine and thus
undermined the significance and value of creation.
As Calvin was quick to point out, however, Luther's
view of 'con-substantiation1 implies an unacceptable duality
80
in Christ's body. In other words, either Christ's body
and the elements are truly united to form one thing, in which
case a doctrine of transubstantiation seems inevitable, or
else there are really two things which interact or are con-
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joined in some way. Needless to say, complementarity
could not be used as a model in the latter case; hence it
could have no place in a Reformed view of the sacraments, at
least, as traditionally conceived.
11.3 'Ecstasy' and ' Enthusiasm':
In this and the previous two chapters we have con¬
centrated on the ontology of complementarity, the various
relations between creator and creature, heaven and earth,
which correspond with the religious phenomenon of 'enthusiasm'
oi 'possession', the state of a man in whom God dwells and
through whom God speaks and acts.^ The similarity and
3**3
dissimilarity between the general religious phenomenon and
the biblical view of theophany have already been discussed
in chapter 9»2. In this final section I would like to
return to the problem of man and his ability to know which
was raised in chapter 1.5 and again in 3.3' After all,
perhaps the most astounding feature of our world is not that
modal alternations are continually taking place whether we
are-.aware of them or not, but that man is actually able to
discern them, i.e. to extend the limits of his subjecthood
and indwell objects that are external to his own body and
thus to follow the shifts in the "subject-object boundary"
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at various levels. In keeping with the language of rel¬
igious phenomenology we may refer to this extension of
subjecthood as a movement of 'ecstasy'. Then the question
naturally arises; just what is the relationship between
ok
'ecstasy' and 'enthusiasm' in Christian theology?J
Specifically, in regard to the word and the sacra¬
ments, we have a problem of worthy reception. In spite of
the real presence of God in word and sacrament, we are con¬
tinually reminded by theologians of all ages that faith is
necessary if we are to benefit from this presence.^ We
must "lift up our eyes" to heaven in order to discern the
presence of Christ.What does this mean? What does it
mean to hear the word of God or to taste the flesh of Christ?
It means to apprehend them in accordance with thel#. oroner
function. Of course, a string of words or a piece of bread
can function on many different levels at once. There are
the atomic and molecular levels (even words can be analyzed
into vibrations in the air or else molecules of ink on
paper), the various organismic levels, and then the specifi¬
cally human level of artifacts and ideas. Bread, tor
instance, is an artifact with a particular social and. rel¬
igious significance in each culture (at least in western
Asia and Europe). But when bread is consecrated in the
eucbar-ist it begins to function at an entirely new level,
viz. as the body of Christ. This is not the replacement of
one function by another ('trans-functionalization') at the
cultural level, as Schillebeeckx would have it,for the
bread continues to have its usual social and religious sig¬
nificance, or, at least, it should. Rather, the bread,
together with its cultural significance, operates in relation
to the body of Christ just as the bread alone operates in
relation to its cultural significance at a somewhat lower
level.
Naturally, the same considerations apply to the
words of scripture or to the waters of baptism. Then, to
hear the word or receive the sacraments "worthily" is to
understand their proper (i.e. specifically Christian.) func¬
tion and to apprehend them accordingly. Thus, it is not
so much the entry of words into the ear or of bread into the
mouth that benefits us as the extension of our subjecthood
outward to indwell word and sacrament as they are. One
receives these gifts of God not so much by consumption as by
appreciation, not so much by taking bread as by giving
thanks. This is the specifically Christian sense of the
term 'ecstasy'.
It should also be clear, then, that this Christian
form of 'ecstasy' requires and presupposes a Christian form
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ox 'enthusiasm'. As we noted in chapter 6.5? man's ability
to control modal alternations extends only as far as the
level of man. It follows that man's natural ability to rec¬
ognize modal alternations should also only extend as far as
the human level. In fact, it is a general rule that beings
can only recognize other beings and phenomena that do not
exceed their own level of being. Animals can recognize
each other and can recognize man as another animal, but they
cannot recognize the presence of mind or appreciate the
force of ideas or the beauty of art. So a man can recog¬
nize another man, as a man, but how can he recognize another
man as the Son of God (Mt.16.17) or another man's words as
the Word of God? How can he give thanks for the gift of
Christ's flesh and blood in the sacrament? How can he have
the proper faith? Certainly he must be 'born again1 into
a higher level of existence (In.3.3); not that he evolves
from below into a higher order of being himself5 rather he
is 'born from above' as he enters into complementarity with
the incarnate Word of God, is dispossessed of his own inde¬
pendent being and is "trans-substantiated"' or repossessed by
by the Word-made-flesh. It is only by virtue of this
*
Christian 'enthusiasm', viz. Christ-.in-us, that we are able
to extend our subjecthood to indwell the word and sacraments
19
in accordance with their properly Christian function.
'Enthusiasm' is the necessary condition for 'ecstasy', and
this 'ecstasy', in turn? reinforces the 'enthusiasm' on
which it is based.
These considerations finally provide us with the
theological underpinning of the logic of complementarity.
In chapter 1.5 we began with the structure of man's knowing
and from that we inferred the structure of being which it
required as its presupposition. We have also noted in pass
ing that man's knowing must somehow be modelled on the strue
kO
ture of being as a general rule, but here, at last, we can
actually see how man's ability to know, even beyond his own
level, is grounded in the structure of his relationship
beyond his own level, to God,
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Chapter 12
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
12.1 Conclusions :
The conclusions we have reached in this study may
be restated and summarized as follows: (1) Bohr1s ideas form
a coherent body of 'logic' which is worthy of consideration
in its own. right.
(2) The epistemological basis of Bohr's thought is
the criterion of commun1cab1Xity or intersubjectivlty which
requires that all objective knowledge be expressed in the
terms of ordinary language and logic. When applied to
•extra-ordinary' fields like quantum mechanics., this criter¬
ion leads to the correspondence principle: all results must
be expressed in terms of classical physics even when they
transcend the classical framework and call, it into question.
When classical concepts are applied in this way they are
semantically displaced, so there is an incommensurability as
well as a correspondence between the classical and applied
senses of the terms.
(3) When classical concepts are applied to atomic
objects they must be subjected to a principle of complemen¬
tarity. Complementarity Is basically an ontological
principle; it concerns the 'modes of being' of atomic objects
(i.e. the 'wave-mode' and the 'particle-mode'). But being
is viewed relationally here; the mode of being is determined
by the context or environment of the object, and when an
observation is being made by a scientist the experimental.
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apparatus is that environment. Hence, complementarity has
an epistemological correlate, the dialectic of 'application'
and 'analysis', or (to use Polanyi's terms) 'tacit' and
'specifiable' knowledge. When the object is being analyzed,
it is located, on the object-side of the subject-object
boundary and is known specifiably, but, when it is applied
in accordance with its proper function, it is indwelt on
the subject-side of the boundary and is known tacitly.
However, the location of the subject-object boundary is an
empirical feature of the experimental arrangement; It is not
just a function of the mental attitude of the human observer.
Hence, complementarity, in Bohr's sense, is not a relation¬
ship between different viewpoints (Born), or between alterna¬
tive frameworks of description (Wheeler and Feynman), or
between phenomena' and noumena (Heisenberg and von Weizsacker).
(H) Complementarity can also be applied to the rel¬
ationship of atom and organism in biology and to the relation¬
ship of mind and body in psychology. Hence, there is a.
structural nanallel or homology between the uses of comple¬
mentarity in the various sciences. Moreover, these appli¬
cations are related hierarchically and there Is an overall
progression or semantic displacement in the significance of
complementarity from one end of the hierarchy to the other.
For example, there is a progressive emergence of correlation
between the states of alternate modes at the biological
level and an emergence of internalization and individuality
at the psychological level of the hierarchy. These adapta¬
tions do not affect the formal definition of complementarity,
but they serve to dislodge it from the peculiar context and
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connotations of atomic physics.
(5) In psychology, complementarity can also be
applied to the modes of the existence of ideas in man's mind
(epistetiological complementarity). The application or
indwelling of the concept of an object is the mental comple¬
ment of the application or indwelling of the object itself.
Hence, man's ability to think, to create and manipulate
ideas in his mind, is complemented by his ability to extend
the boundary of his subjecthood beyond the natural limits of
his body, to indwell external objects, and to fill the
subject-side of the subject-object boundary. The ontolog-
ical (mind-body) and epistemological (analysis-application)
aspects of complementarity are here seen to be orthogonal
to each other.
(6) The notion that personal involvement or subject-
hood plays a positive role in human knowledge is not a new
one. Dilthey's concept of Verstehen, contrasted with. Erk-
laren, and Collingwood's concept of the 'understanding' of
thoughts, contrasted with the 'perception' of physical.
events"'" may be cited for comparison. The novel features of
Bohr's view are; (a) It applies to all the sciences and so
unifies them hierarchically rather than dividing them into
two opposing types such as the 'natural' and 'spiritual'
2
sciences of Dilthey. In this sense, it is more like Till-
ich's concept of 'receiving', as opposed to 'controlling',
knowledge,^ or Polanyi's concept of 'tacit', as opposed to
'specifiable', knowledge.^ (b) The epistemological comple¬
mentarity of analysis and application is grounded in the
ontological complementarity of structure and function; the
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analysis of an object is the (specifiable) knowledge of its
structure (at a given level) while the application of the
the same object is the (tacit) knowledge of its function.
Hence, the effect of personal involvement is not to isolate
the subject in a world of his own, but to bring him Into
real contact with the external, world.
(?) In the field of theology, complementarity may
be applied to a number of doctrines that involve a polarity
of 'modes1 or 'natures'. Seen as a whole this group of
theological doctrines extends the hierarchy of complementar¬
ities beyond the level of man to God. The overall hierarchy
is mono tonic, in the sense that the direction of 'revelation'
or 'pointing' is always upward, but this basic symmetry is
broken by a reversal in the direction of ontological depen¬
dence at the level of man; levels below (and including) man
depend on lower levels while those above man depend on yet
higher ones. One result of this curious reversal is the
fact that the relational, view of being (and, attributes:) does
not apply to God. God has 110 environment, and his modality
is purely spontaneous or or active; it is not a response to
changes in the 'experimental arrangement'1 as is that of
atoms and organisms» In short, all being is modal, but
only contingent being is relational.
(8) Our application of complementarity to Christian
theology has led us to make several assumptions or condit¬
ions. One such condition is that the three orderings or
dimensions of the 'generation' of the Son (and/or the 'pro¬
cession' of the Spirit, in short, the opera ad intra), the
transcendence and immanence of God with respect to the world
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(the opera ad extra), and time must bo regarded as orthog¬
onal to each other. Hence, the pr©existent Logos (Son) is
strictly distinguished from the creative immanence of God
in the world. This assumption is not necessary for the
application of complementarity as such, but it is required
by the demands of Chri s t i an or tho doxy.
(9) Another condition is that God and time be re¬
garded as two distinct realities that interpenetrate in an
asymmetrical fashion. In complementarist terms, there are
three 'modes' composing two 'realities'; God exists, in two
modes, ' transcendent •' and 'immanent', and time also exists
in two modes: one is creation itself, and the other is the
immanent Godhead. Thus the immanent Godhead acts as a
middle term; it belongs to both realities. In other words,
C*od is complementary to creation (due to his immanence),
but he is not ,iust the complement of creation (due to his
transcendence). God and the world are one being, but God
himself is a distinct (though not an other) being. It
follows that God is the ground of all being. Again, this
is not a new result; the novel feature is the mode of deriv¬
ation.
(10) The application of complementarity to the
relation of (immanent) God and the world, or of Creator and
creature, requires a 'relational', as opposed to an 'instru¬
mental' view of time. Our common-sense notion of time is
based on the measurement of ereaturely events with physical
clocks, and it is impossible on this basis to determine
whether the acts of God are simultaneous with those of the
creature or whether divine acts precede the corresponding
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ereaturely ones. Yet the application of complementarity
would require such a precedence, not just in the logical,
but in the temporal sense if God's immanence is to be taken
seriously at this point. Hence complementarity would re¬
quire an expansion or generalization of our common-sense
notion of time to allow for divine, as well as creaturely,
moments. Time must be defined in relation to the alternate,
corresponding acts of Creator and creature, not the other
way around.
(11) The concepts of a created heaven and of angels
are no more (or less) mythological than those of mind and of
God. The relationship of heaven and earth and the phenom¬
enon of 'theophany' can be understood in terms of complemen¬
tarity. In this context, it makes sense to speak of Christ's
'coming down' from heaven and 'ascending' to heaven again
after the resurrection.
(.12) The hierarchy of theological concepts is multi-
levelled (God-heaven-earth) just as the hierarchy of the
sciences is (atom-organism-man). Hence, the popular dist¬
inction of 'matter' (all physical objects including man's
body) and 'spirit' (including man's soul, the angels and God)
is misleading on several counts? (a) it is oversimplified;
there are many levels, not just two, (b) it suggests an arbi¬
trary dichotomy in the realm of being; one of the two sides
is bound to be regarded as more real then the other, (c) it
treats God as one (spiritual) being among many on the same
level, and (d) it tends to be interpreted as a relationship
between 'phenomena' and 'noumena.' or between the realms of




(13) All of the theological doctrines we have con¬
sidered have a common element which was not forseen in the
logic of complementarity as derived from the sciences. In
the doctrine of the Trinity there is the derivation of the
properties of the Bon from the Father (the enousios); in the
doctrine of creation there is the fact that God is the
'ground1 of all being: in Christoiogy there is the enhypos-
tasla: and in the doctrine of the sacraments there is the
notion of rtransubstantiation'. In the language of comple¬
mentarity this means that all properties that are common to
to the two modes have their source in the ontologically prior
mode. There is no logical reason why the same could not be
said in the sciences; for instance, it could be said that a
stable atom (wave-mode) derives its rest mass; and net elec¬
trostatic charge from its constituent particles. Hence,
there are not two 'masses' (or two 'charges'), one of the
atom as a whole and the other of the constituent particles,
but one mass, that of the particles which is the source of
the derived 'mass' of the stable atom. Such metaphysical
language might sound strange to a physicist, but it would no
more suggest the unreality or incompleteness of the wave-
mode of atoms than the enhypostasia implies the unreality
or incompleteness of the humanity of Christ.
(lh) Complementarity is basically a synchronic prin¬
ciple; it applies to the ongoing dialectic or relationship
between two alternate modes of being. It may be said to
'generate' time, as in (10) above, but it tells us nothing
about where time is 'going'; it says nothing at all about
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history. From the viewpoint of complementarity alone,
there is no essential difference between the relation of
Creator and creature in providence, theopbany, and incarna¬
tion (the unio personalis). All three of these doctrines
involve the same two levels of the complementarist hierarchy,
so their distinction requires a diachronic principle which
complementarity allows for but does not actually provide.
For instance, the uniqueness of Christ consists in the inten¬
sity and permanence of God's Cor God-the-Son's) involvement
in the humanity of Jesus, but this permanence is only effected
7
'retroactively' from the standpoint of the resurrection.
Therefore, it is historically constituted and cannot be
understood in terms of complementarity, or any other syn¬
chronic principle, alone. The distinction here between syn¬
chronic and diachronic corresponds to that between 'revela¬
tion' (from 8 above'5 Barth, Brunner) and 'revelation history'
(Cullmann, Pannenberg). In our view, both are required to
do full justice to the complex structure of Christian theology.
(15) Finally, it should be noted that our applica¬
tion of complementarity to theology takes no account of the
problem of evil. For one thing, the existence of evil can
only be discussed properly in the language of history, for
example, in terms of a primeval 'fall', or else of an eschat-
g
ological goal. The fact that evil has no place in the
complementarist hierarchy simply reflects the more basic fact
that it has no being of its own, not even the relative, con-
9
tangent being of creation.' Hence it cannot be understood
in terms of 'modes of being'.
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3.2.2 Suggestions for Future Research:
A number of interesting questions have been raised
in the course of our study, and it may be worthwhile listing
some of these for future reference.
(l) The hypothesis that living organisms exist in
a supra-atomic mode does not prevent them from being photo-
10
graphed continuously, as in a high-speed motion picture.
Apparently the photography does not disturb the interior
states of the organism, but the continual interaction of the
organism with light requires that its surface exist in the
atomic mode at all times. Hence, there must be a kind of
boundary layer or 'skin' between the interior of the organism
and the external environment. The 'interior' would still
31
alternate between atomic and organismic: modes,"" and infor¬
mation would, be exchanged between 'skin' and 'interior'
during the brief intervals in which the latter exists in its
atomic mode. The 'skin' must include the outer layers of
molecules, so its thickness must be at least a hundred Ang¬
strom units (10 ° cm). In physiological terms it coincides
with the exposed surfaces of the sense organs, e.g. the
retina of the eye and the surface of the tongue, where infor¬
mation is continually received from the environment at the
physico-chemical level. It may also include the involuted
surfaces of the respiratory and digestive systems where nut¬
rient material is continually being absorbed at the chemical
12
level. "" Hence the application of complementarity to biology
could be developed into a multi-levelled model of the inter¬
action of an organism with its total environment.
(2) The hierarchy of complementarities in the
Pre¬
sciences also involves a hierarchy of time scales-. At the
O
atomic level, wave-particle alternations require only 10
seconds, while, at the other end of the hierarchy, the mind-
body alterna.ti.on requires at least a tenth of a second.
In between these two extremes there are a number of organ!s-
mic and mental levels with intermediate time scales. The
implication is that for every single alternation at one
level there are a number of alternations at the next lower
level. In other words, a number of alternations (perhaps
ten) between the modes at the lower level are needed to est¬
ablish the state of the lower mode at the next higher level.
A number of alternations between the modes at this second
level are in turn needed to establish the state of the lower
mode on a third level, and so on. Consequently, in order
for information to be passed from lower to higher levels
there must be some kind of information storage or "short-
i it.
term memory'"" at each of the intermediate levels. The
Information contained in one of the first of a series of mode-
events at one level must not be lost before the series is
completed and the information can be passed on to the next
higher level. Furthermore, there must be a 'threshold'
mechanism at each level. If a particular stimulus affects
the state of only one or two in a series of mode-events at
one level, the information may not be passed on to the next
higher level. Only if the number of excited mode-states
exceeds some threshold value (which may depend on the inten-
sity of the stimulus) will the information be passed on
and become a stimulus for the next higher level. Hero we
have the makings of a fairly detailed model for the process
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of perception which could perhaps be elaborated and tested
empirically.
(3) The highest psychic processes that are investi¬
gated in conventional cognitive psychology are the conception
of words (verbal responses to physical stimuli) and the per¬
ception of visual formsj both of which involve time scales
16
of a fraction of a second. However, there is also a grow¬
ing interest in the psychology of meditative states which
3 7
may last for many seconds or even minutes. It is possible
that these 'higher' psychic processes could be understood as
an extension of the complementarist hierarchy described
above.In this case, one would expect that the degree of
'ecstasy' (which can be determined empirically)"^ would be
correlated wioh the time required for the establishment of
the corresponding meditative state. In other words, the
more intense ecstatic experiences would, involve higher levels
of mind and so would require longer time scales.
(h) The association of meditative states with the
1unconscious' is frequently taken to imply that they are
purely subjective. In extreme cases of ecstasy.it may be
true that "I-S-elf communication" breaks down and the indivi¬
dual is cut off from the external world in a state of "pure
20
self-reference"1. However, there are also intermediate
states in which conscious and unconscious forces are counter¬
balanced. and the individual is able to function in the
23
external world with great skill. Could there be a connec¬
tion between this reality-oriented 'ecstasy', this 'standing
out' of oneself, and Michael Polanyi's concept of "dwelling
22
in' the object of one's attention? If so, then there
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might be grounds for interpreting some forms of mystical
experience as the tacit perception of higher modes of being
in the external world.
(5) In our discussion of complementarity in biology
and psychology we noted that there is an increasing degree
of 'correlation' between the states of alternate modes at
23
higher levels of being. Ultimately, the correlation be¬
comes complete at the level of God's concurrence with creat-
plj.
urely events." In fact, the various degrees of correlation
at creaturely levels are upheld by the perfect correlation
of providence. But what is the precise nature of this 'cor¬
relation'? If it were simply mechanical or deterministic,
the relative independence of the various modes and levels of
being would be threatened. When we speak of the conformity
of creaturely activity to the will of God we use terms like
'providence' and 'grace'. For the translation of atomic
stimuli into organismic states and mental ideas we use the
term 'perception'. Should we be embarassed by the seeming
vagueness of these terms and seek for an 'explanation' in
more conceptual categories, or should we regard them as in¬
herently irreducible and hence perfectly legitimate in their
appropriate contexts?
(6) In this study we have stressed the vertical,
hierarchical structure of being, and we have developed a par¬
ticular model for this structure based on Bohr's principle
of complementarity. It might also be possible to develop
a model for the horizontal dimension of history based on
2.6
the correspondence principle. There is a relationship of'
'correspondence' and 'incommensurability' between type and
36?
antitype or promise and fulfillment just as there is between
the classical sense of a concept and. the meaning it receives
26
when applied to a new branch of science. This dialectic
of* correspondence could be applied quite generally to the
relationship between any two events in a single continuous
history; the earlier event has significance in itself, but
it takes on new significance in the light of the subsequent
event. For example, the crucifixion has one significance
in itself said quite another in the light of the resurrection.
27
The 'retroactive effect' of events on previous history
is then analogous to the semantic displacement brought about
by the application of classical concepts to new situations.
If such a model of history were to replace the notion of
events as atomized beads 01:1 a string, some of the difficulties
that plague current philosophies of time might well be avoided.
(?) Throughout this study we have been equating
'theology' with 'Christian theology'. Christian theology is
particularly suited to a complementarist analysis because it
abounds with dipolar concepts like the intra-personal .rela¬
tions in the Trinity and the two natures of Christ. But
similar concepts occur in other religious traditions. For
instance, there is the relation between Brahman. and Ishvara,
or nirguna Brahman and saguna Brahman, in Vedanta, or the
trikaya (three bodies of the Buddha) doctrine in Mahayana
28Buddhism.^ How would complementarity work as a model in
such cases? Unfortunately, there is a reluctance in Eastern
traditions to specify the exact relations in question with
the degree of precision required for such an investigation.
Moreover, there is a strong tendency to regard the lower
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modes or levels as being less real than the higher ones.
Would factors like these rule out the application of comple¬
mentarity to Eastern traditions? If so, what Is the sig¬
nificance of the fact that the Judeo-Christian tradition is
uniquely susceptible to complementarist analysis? Does it
merely reflect the common Western background of Christian
theology and modern science, or does it actually tell us
something about objective reality?
(8) What, then, is the significance of the fact that
a complementarist analysis applies to God as well as to man
and nature? Does this simply reflect a category of percep¬
tion in the sense that anything man (i.e. Western man) per¬
ceives is automatically cast into the mold of complementary
modes of being? The answer to this question binges on
one's view of the correspondence principle. Granted the
viability of classical language in non-classical fields of
experience, the appearance of complementary modes is to be
30
expected. But without a belief in the fundamental prop¬
riety of classical concepts, the objectivity not only of
complementarity but of every ontological assertion is subject
31
to doubt. From the theological viewpoint, therefore, the
concept of complementarity has two important implicationss
The logic with which God has endowed creation is
fundamentally the same as that with which he himself is im¬
bued. God exists eternally in complementary modes of being,
and he upholds his creation is such a way that it too par¬
ticipates in the logic of complementarity; ultimately it
participates in complementarity with God himself. If this
were not the case, we may speculate, man's knowledge of God
369
would be completely unlike his knowledge in other fields,
and theology would be totally discontinuous with the other
sciences. A. belief in the objective validity of complemen¬
tarity, therefore, entails a belief in the grace of God in
creation which allows an underlying continuity between
creation and revelation.
But unless man's fundamental concepts, like wave and
particle or father and son, have a certain legitimacy even
in areas that are far removed from everyday human experience,
the foundations of every science, whether natural or theologi¬
cal, would forever be uncertain. Therefore, the belief in
the objective validity of complementarity also entails a
belief in the providential quality of human society and she
32
ordinary human concepts which are socially maintained.
One cannot argue from the basic validity of human concepts
to the nature of God without presupposing the grace of God
in the formation of those very concepts in the first place.
12.3 Evaluation;
Throughout this study I have been trying to demon¬
strate the viability of complementarity as a conceptual tool
in the sciences and in theology. However, a number of
serious difficulties have arisen and these should not be for¬
gotten in our final evaluation.
First, it should be noted that there are basic
ambiguities in the definition of complementarity itself.
Concepts like 'unity of being', 'coinherence', and 'pointing*
can be defined with reasonable precision in the context of
Bohr's writings, but when they are lifted out of the context
of atomic physics and applied to other areas they tend to
become abstract and rather elastic. These ambiguities be¬
come particularly troublesome in the application to theology
where very fine distinctions are required.
For instance, under the rubric of 'unity of being1
we have considered such diverse topics as the conslibstantia.l
unity of persons in the Trinity, the ontological solidarity
of God and the world in creation and providence, the hypos¬
tatic union of human and divine natures in Christ, and the
mystical union of Christ and the church. ^ Clearly, such
an enormous feat, of assimilation is only made possible by
the suppression of the peculiar features, ontological and his¬
torical, which make each one of these relations unique. In
other words, the application of complementarity to theology
transforms the concrete, intuitive ideas of Bohr into abstract,
formal principles which Bohr would hardly have recognized or
appreciated himself.
Moreover, we have found that the application of
complementarity to several theological doctrines becomes
feasible only when special models are artificially construc¬
ted. For example, the intra-trinitarian relations must be
treated dyad.iea.lly in such a way that the Father-Son relation
can be dissected from the Spirator~Spir.it relation. It is
true that the full complexity of the Trinity can be recon¬
structed from these separate relations, but one might well
t
question whether the procedure of analysis and synthesis
is at all appropriate in this context. Here again, the
principle of complementarity would seem to have been trans¬
formed Into something quite different from what its author
0 <7 ~
J < J-
intended it to be.
Similarly, the application of complementarity to
the God-world relation requires an analysis into two distinct
relations; that between the essence and the energies of God,
and that between the immanent energies of God and the world.
The most that could be said here is that the relation of
Creator and creature has always seemed to defy logical analy¬
sis and that any specific model is bound to be strained, to
the limit.
Finally, the application of complementarity to the-
ophany and Incarnation requires a strict distinction between
historical and structural features. From an analytical
viewpoint, it makes sense to posit two orthogonal dimensions,
diachronic and synchronic, and this procedure is accepted in
disciplines like linguistics and sociology. But it becomes
somewhat artificial in, the context of Christian theology where
history enters into the very structure of being as in the
Incarnation.
In all his writings, Bohr was reacting against the
emphasis of contemporary science on formalism and analysis,
and he conceived the principle of complementarity in the hope
that it would counteract these tendencies. However admirably
It may succeed in the context of quantum theory, or even
biology, we are forced to conclude that it does not do justice
to the concreteness and the integrity of the God who has
revealed himself in Jesus of Nazareth. Perhaps this nega¬
tive result would not have disappointed Bohr at all for he
"vividly realized that our proud theories are but temporary
resting places of the mind on the unending road to knowledge.-'
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Then, recognizing the full limitations of comple¬
mentarity in the theological field, what may we say are its
legitimate functions? First, the terms 'complement1 and
'complementary' may prove to be useful and enriching in the¬
ological discourse. It could be said, for instance, that
the Son is the full ! complement'. of the Father or that divine
sovereignty and human freedom are 'complementary' causes of
a particular event. At the outset, some basic rules would
have to be established to prevent misunderstanding. For
example, it would have to be stressed time and time again
that complementarity is not a symmetrical concept so that it
would not suggest reversibility. Moreover, one would have
to be reminded that complementarity is a strictly contextual
concept: God and the world are 'complementary1 only within
the context of creation and. providence; the Word and the
flesh are 'complementary1 only within the unto personalis,
and so on. But all of these difficulties arose with the
first use of the term perichoresis. as well, so one may ex¬
pect that the appropriate sense of 'complementarity' would
gradually be established through usage and adaptation.
Secondly, the eleven-point definition of complemen¬
tarity (or some improved version) could be used as a format
for the exposition of various theological doctrines as we
have shown. The functions of such a format would be heur¬
istic and pedagogical. On the one hand, it could be used
t
to demonstrate common themes, like the derivation of common
properties from the ontologically prior mode, and, on the
other, it would serve to pinpoint difficulties in terminology
and problems of conceptualization, such as the description
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of supra-temporal orderlags in ostensibly temporal language.
Again, however, the contextual nature of the eleven points
would have to be stressed. The claim is not that point 'n'
in doctrine 'A* is the same as point :n! in doctrine *B',
but that point 'n' stands in the same relation to the other
ten points in one doctrine as it'does in the other. For
Instance, the coinherence of Father and Son plays the same
role in the Father-Son relation as a whole as the interpene-
tration of Word and flesh does in the context of the unio
personalis, and both of these function, in their respective
contexts, in the same way that the coinherence of wave and
particle does in atomic physics. The analogy is one of pro¬
portionality, not of direct proportion.
Finally, the hierarchy of comp1ementari11es could
be used to investigate the complex relationships between
theological doctrines. In spite of the dangers of analysis
and formalism, some useful insights could be readily estab¬
lished. For instance, the doctrines we have studied fall
into two basic groupings; The doctrine of the Trinity and
the relation of essence and energies owe their uniqueness
primarily to their location within the overall hierarchy, or
rather their location above and beyond the hierarchy of tem¬
poral complementarities. In contrast, the doctrines of
providence, theophany, and Incarnation cannot be distinguished
on hierarchical grounds alone; here the role of historical
relationships becomes all.-important. While complementarity
cannot give a definitive treatment of these complex issues,
it does serve to bring them out into the open so that the
relevant discussions in the theological literature can be
37!+
better appreciated.
Ultimately, the success of complementarity as a
fundamental principle depends on what one expects of it.
As a conceptual tool borrowed from the sciences it may well
be of service In theological discourse. Like any other
concept, it must be adapted through usage. However, it
could never become an over-arching master concept for it
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